Using public value theory to assist in understanding how and why executives integrate results-based management : exploratory case studies of the Canadian Federal public sector by Try, David Richard
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/52395
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
  
Using Public Value Theory to Assist in 
Understanding How and Why 
Executives Integrate Results-based 
Management 
 
Exploratory Case Studies of the 
Canadian Federal Public Sector 
 
 
 
  by  
 
David Richard Try 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Warwick Business School 
 
 
 
 
Warwick Business School, Operations Management 
University of Warwick, 
 
 
June 2006 
  Page ii 
 
Table of Contents 
Index of Tables ........................................................................................................... vii 
Index of Figures ......................................................................................................... viii 
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................... ix 
Declaration.....................................................................................................................x 
Research Abstract ........................................................................................................ xi 
Abbreviations and Brief Definitions........................................................................... xii 
1 Introduction........................................................................................................1 
1.1 Introducing the Research Question................................................................2 
1.1.1 Brief Statement of the Research Topic ..............................................2 
1.1.2 The Research Question ......................................................................4 
1.2 Why is this Topic Worthy of Study? .............................................................4 
1.2.1 Substantial Effort, but Questionable Progress ...................................4 
1.3 A few Key Definitions ...................................................................................6 
1.3.1 Results-based Management ...............................................................6 
1.3.2 Public Value Theory ..........................................................................7 
1.3.2.1 Moore’s Strategic Triangle ..........................................................8 
1.3.2.2 Moore’s Public Value Model.......................................................9 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis ...........................................................................10 
1.5 Summary ................................................................................................11 
2 Literature Review Chapter...............................................................................13 
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review..........................................................13 
2.2 The Art of Management...............................................................................14 
2.2.1 Introduction to Management............................................................14 
2.2.2 A Brief History of Management ......................................................14 
2.2.3 Studying Executives’ Activities.......................................................16 
2.2.4 The Executive and Information .......................................................18 
2.2.5 Performance pay and incentives ......................................................20 
2.2.6 Summary - The Art of Management................................................23 
2.3 Comparing Public and Private Sectors ........................................................24 
2.3.1 Public versus Private Goods ............................................................24 
2.3.2 Public versus Private Sector Management.......................................30 
2.3.3 Theories of Public Management ......................................................34 
2.3.3.1 Bureaucracy ...............................................................................34 
2.3.3.2 Politics – Administration Dichotomy ........................................35 
  Page iii 
2.3.3.3 Public Choice Theory ................................................................37 
2.3.3.4 Agent – Principal Theory...........................................................39 
2.3.4 Summary - Comparing Public and Private Sectors..........................41 
2.4 New Public Management (NPM).................................................................41 
2.4.1 A Brief History of Canadian Government Reform Efforts..............41 
2.4.2 Declining Confidence in Governments............................................45 
2.4.3 New Public Management (NPM) – An International Phenomenon 47 
2.4.4 Limitations and Criticisms of NPM.................................................50 
2.4.5 Public Value – Broadening Public Sector Theory ...........................53 
2.4.5.1 Moore’s Strategic Triangle ........................................................54 
2.4.5.2 Moore’s Drivers of Public Value...............................................55 
2.4.5.3 Contrasting Traditional, NPM and Public Value.......................59 
2.4.5.4 Public Value and the Citizen/Client ..........................................60 
2.4.5.5 Summary of Public Value..........................................................61 
2.4.6 Service for Whom? The Client/Customer/Citizen dilemma............62 
2.4.7 A ‘Canadian Model’ of public sector reform...................................66 
2.4.8 Summary of Public Sector Reform in Canada.................................68 
2.5 Results-based Management (RBM).............................................................71 
2.5.1 RBM in the Canadian Public Sector ................................................71 
2.5.2 Moving from Outputs to Outcomes .................................................73 
2.5.3 Results – Who Decides what they should be? .................................74 
2.5.4 The Three E’s – Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness ...............78 
2.5.5 Logic Models – Tying the E’s together ...........................................81 
2.5.6 Adding a 4th ‘E’ – Equity.................................................................83 
2.5.7 Summary RBM ................................................................................85 
2.6 Assessing Performance under RBM ............................................................87 
2.6.1 Defining Performance Measurement ...............................................88 
2.6.2 Performance Measurement in the Public Sector..............................89 
2.6.3 Unintended Consequences of Measuring Performance ...................92 
2.6.4 Measuring Public Value...................................................................95 
2.6.5 Results for Whom? Measuring Client Satisfaction..........................96 
2.6.6 Summary – Assessing Performance...............................................100 
2.7 Accountability............................................................................................102 
2.7.1 Public Sector Accountability .........................................................103 
2.7.2 Accountability under Results-based Management.........................106 
2.7.3 Telling the Story – Public Sector Reporting in Canada.................109 
2.7.4 Performance Reporting – An Under-utilization Problem ..............112 
2.7.5 Executive Accountability – or the Risk/Reward Dilemma............114 
2.7.6 Summary – Accountability ............................................................115 
2.8 Summary of the Literature Review............................................................117 
2.9 The Proposed Research..............................................................................118 
2.9.1 The Research Gap ..........................................................................120 
2.9.2 Linking Results-based Management and Public Value Theory.....120 
2.9.3 Summary ........................................................................................121 
3 Methodology Chapter ....................................................................................122 
3.1 Research Question .....................................................................................122 
3.1.1 Research Objectives.......................................................................122 
3.2 Methodology Section.................................................................................124 
  Page iv 
3.2.1 Considering Ontology, Epistemology and Method .......................126 
3.2.2 Interpretivist Paradigms .................................................................128 
3.2.3 Qualitative Research ......................................................................130 
3.2.4 The Role of the Researcher............................................................131 
3.2.5 Summary of Methodology Section ................................................133 
3.3 Method Section ..........................................................................................135 
3.3.1 Research Purpose – Exploratory, Descriptive or Hypothesis ........135 
3.3.2 Contrast and Selection of Research Methods ................................136 
3.3.3 Case Studies in Research ...............................................................137 
3.4 The Key Informant Interviews...................................................................141 
3.4.1 Selection of Key Informant Interviewees ......................................141 
3.4.2 Impact of the Key Informant interviews on the Research Design .142 
3.4.3 Confirmation of Case Selection .....................................................143 
3.5 Field Research Section...............................................................................148 
3.5.1 Identification of Potential Interviewees .........................................148 
3.5.2 The Interview Guide ......................................................................149 
3.5.3 Field Procedures.............................................................................151 
3.5.4 Ethics and Attribution....................................................................153 
3.6 Analysis Strategies.....................................................................................155 
3.6.1 Qualitative Analysis.......................................................................157 
3.6.2 Validity, Generalizability and Reliability ......................................158 
3.6.3 Triangulation..................................................................................162 
3.7 The Analysis Phase of the Research ..........................................................165 
3.7.1 The Analysis Process .....................................................................166 
3.7.2 Codes..............................................................................................170 
3.7.3 Reflexivity......................................................................................171 
3.7.4 Secondary Analysis of Interview Data ..........................................171 
3.8 Building Theories.......................................................................................172 
3.8.1 Building Theories from Case Study...............................................174 
3.9 Summary - Methodology Chapter .............................................................175 
4 The Saskatchewan Case Study.......................................................................178 
4.1 Background ..............................................................................................179 
4.2 Has Management Changed? ......................................................................180 
4.3 Public Value - Services..............................................................................188 
4.4 Public Value - Outcomes ...........................................................................190 
4.4.1 Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes..............................................193 
4.5 Public Value - Trust ...................................................................................196 
4.6 Executive Information and Decision Making ............................................198 
4.7 Creating Public Value Through Client Feedback ......................................205 
4.8 Saskatchewan Executive Motivation .........................................................209 
4.9 Development of the RBM Logic Model ....................................................211 
4.10 Summary - Saskatchewan Case Study.......................................................212 
5 The Health Case Study...................................................................................216 
5.1 Background ..............................................................................................217 
5.2 First Nations Health Background...............................................................218 
5.3 Has Management Changed? ......................................................................220 
5.3.1 Horizontal Management.................................................................222 
  Page v 
5.4 Managerial Accountability.........................................................................223 
5.5 Public Value - Services..............................................................................227 
5.6 Public Value - Outcomes ...........................................................................230 
5.6.1 Difficulty of Measuring Health Outcomes ....................................233 
5.7 Public Value - Trust ...................................................................................236 
5.7.1 Accountability and Reporting ........................................................238 
5.8 Executive Information and Decision Making ............................................242 
5.9 Creating Public Value Through Citizen/Client Input ................................245 
5.10 Health Executive Motivation .....................................................................247 
5.11 Summary - Health Case Study...................................................................248 
6 Senior Executive Interviews ..........................................................................252 
6.1 Background ..............................................................................................253 
6.2 Mandate ..............................................................................................254 
6.3 RBM - Slow Progress ................................................................................255 
6.4 Public Value Theory ..................................................................................255 
6.5 Intra-Departmental Differences .................................................................256 
6.6 Accountability and RBM ...........................................................................258 
6.7 The Logic Model........................................................................................259 
6.8 Information and RBM................................................................................259 
6.9 Summary – Senior Executive Interviews...................................................261 
7 Discussion......................................................................................................262 
7.1 Revisiting the Research Question and Objectives .....................................262 
7.2 Public Value Service and RBM .................................................................264 
7.3 Public Value Outcomes and RBM.............................................................266 
7.3.1 Difficulty of Measuring Outcomes ................................................267 
7.3.2 Managerial Flexibility and the Logic Model Concept...................269 
7.3.2.1 Input Levels .............................................................................270 
7.3.2.2 ‘Red-Taped’ Processes ............................................................271 
7.3.2.3 Outputs and Legislation...........................................................272 
7.3.2.4 Outcomes .................................................................................273 
7.3.2.5 Summary, the RBM Logic Model ...........................................274 
7.3.3 Summary, Public Value Outcomes ................................................275 
7.4 Public Value Trust and RBM.....................................................................276 
7.4.1 Programme Accountability and Reporting ....................................277 
7.4.2 Citizen/Client Feedback – a Curious Absence...............................279 
7.4.3 Summary of Public Value Trust ....................................................280 
7.5 Summarizing Public Value’s Contribution to Understanding RBM .........282 
7.6 Assessing the Contribution of Other Management Theories.....................285 
7.6.1 Principal/Agent ..............................................................................285 
7.6.2 Public Choice Theory ....................................................................286 
7.6.3 Moore’s Strategic Triangle ............................................................288 
7.6.3.1 Operationally and Administratively Feasible ..........................288 
7.6.3.2 Legitimacy and Political Sustainable.......................................289 
7.7 Other Factors Impacting Executive Adaptation of RBM ..........................290 
7.7.1 Executive Pay and Rewards...........................................................290 
7.7.2 Executive Motivation.....................................................................293 
7.7.3 Executive Information Sources......................................................294 
  Page vi 
7.7.4 Accountability, Results-based Management and Public Value .....296 
7.8 Additional Analysis of Interview Data ......................................................297 
7.8.1 Analysis of Regional/Headquarters Differences............................298 
7.8.2 Analysis of Corporate Executives..................................................300 
7.8.3 Gender-based Analysis ..................................................................301 
7.8.4 Analysis by Length of Service.......................................................301 
7.9 The Future of Results-based Management and Accountability.................302 
7.10 Summary - Discussion ...............................................................................303 
8 Conclusions....................................................................................................305 
8.1 Findings of the Research Proposition ........................................................305 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge – Public Value Theory ..................................306 
8.2.1 Executive Influence and Control ...................................................308 
8.3 Contributions to Knowledge – Emergent Findings ...................................310 
8.3.1 Managerial Flexibility....................................................................310 
8.3.2 Service Delivery Control and Clarity of Programme Objectives ..311 
8.3.3 Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes..............................................312 
8.3.4 Accountability Aligned to Results .................................................313 
8.3.5 Executive Motivation.....................................................................314 
8.4 Summary of Emergent Findings - Five Barriers to Implementing RBM ..315 
8.5 Theoretical Implications of the Research Findings ...................................317 
8.6 Practitioner Implications of Research Findings.........................................319 
8.7 Limitations of the Research .......................................................................320 
8.8 Future Research .........................................................................................322 
8.9 Concluding Remarks..................................................................................324 
9 Bibliography ..................................................................................................325 
10 Appendixes ....................................................................................................362 
10.1 Appendix A – Interview Lists, by Case Study...........................................363 
10.1.1 Key Informant Interview List ........................................................363 
10.1.2 Health Case Study Interview list....................................................364 
10.1.3 Saskatchewan Case Study Interview List ......................................366 
10.1.4 Senior Executive Interview List.....................................................367 
10.2 Appendix B – Interview Request Documentation .....................................369 
10.3 Appendix C – Interview Questions and Guide ..........................................371 
10.4 Appendix D – Nested Analysis Topics and Categories .............................375 
10.5 Appendix E – Sample Extract from an Interview Analysis.......................376 
10.6 Appendix F – Overview of Public Service Surveys 1999 and 2002..........379 
10.7 Appendix G - Executive Comments on the Future Direction for Results-
based Management and Accountability ...............................380 
 
  Page vii 
Index of Tables 
 
Table 1: Thesis Outline................................................................................................11 
Table 2: An Overview of the Literature Review .........................................................13 
Table 3:  Issues and Limitations of Performance Pay Within the Canadian Public 
Sector ...................................................................................................................22 
Table 4: Summary of Section 2.2 ................................................................................24 
Table 5: Key Differences between the Private and Public Sectors..............................27 
Table 6: A Comparison of Private and Public Sector Management ............................32 
Table 7: Summary of Section 2.3 ................................................................................41 
Table 8: Comparison of New Public Management and Traditional Public 
Administration .....................................................................................................50 
Table 9: Contrasting Traditional Public Management, NPM, and Public Value.........60 
Table 10: A Comparison of Citizen and Client Driven Models ..................................63 
Table 11: Evolution of Key Values in Canadian Public Administration.....................67 
Table 12: Summary of Section 2.4 ..............................................................................69 
Table 13: Concepts of Equity ......................................................................................84 
Table 14: Summary of Section 2.5 ..............................................................................86 
Table 15: Public Managers’ Purposes in Measuring Performance..............................91 
Table 16: Limitations to implementing Performance Measurement Systems .............91 
Table 17: Unintended Consequences of Public Sector Performance Reporting..........94 
Table 18: Summary of Section 2.6 ............................................................................101 
Table 19: Types of Accountability ............................................................................103 
Table 20: The Changing Nature of Accountability under NPM................................108 
Table 21: Summary of Section ..................................................................................117 
Table 22: Summary of Chapter 2...............................................................................118 
Table 23: Potential Research Gaps ............................................................................119 
Table 24: Contribution of Key Informants to the Research Design ..........................143 
Table 25: Case Selection Logic .................................................................................146 
Table 26: Case Study Interviews Statistics................................................................147 
Table 27: Linking the Questions to Public Value Theory in the Interview Guide ....151 
Table 28: Case Study Validity and Reliability Strategies..........................................161 
Table 29: Triangulation, as Applied Within This Research Project ..........................163 
Table 30: Data Collection Methods ...........................................................................164 
Table 31: Executives’ Information Sources, Health Case Study...............................243 
Table 32: Programme Mandate and Service Delivery and RBM ..............................312 
 
  Page viii 
Index of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model ..............8 
Figure 2: A Theoretical Research Model incorporating Public Value Theory............10 
Figure 3: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model ............54 
Figure 4: Results for Canadians...................................................................................68 
Figure 5: Treasury Board of Canada, Management Accountability Framework.........70 
Figure 6: The Interrelation of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness ......................78 
Figure 7: Sample Logic Model ....................................................................................82 
Figure 8: Guidelines for Effective Public Performance Reporting............................111 
Figure 9:  The Research Environment .......................................................................119 
Figure 10: Research Methods Continuum .................................................................127 
Figure 11: Research ‘Onion Graph’...........................................................................134 
Figure 12: Radnor Methodology................................................................................166 
Figure 13: Map of Canada .........................................................................................180 
Figure 14: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management ...............212 
Figure 15: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management ...............270 
Figure 16: A Conceptual Map of RBM Constraints, Using Public Value Theory ....284 
Figure 17: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model ........288 
Figure 18: Information Sources and Public Value Theory ........................................295 
Figure 19: A Conceptual Map of RBM Constraints, Using Public Value Theory ....307 
Figure 20: Public Value and Managerial Impact .......................................................309 
Figure 21: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management ...............310 
Figure 22: Five Barriers to Adapting RBM Within a Public Sector Environment....316 
 
 
  Page ix 
Acknowledgements 
 
Although there is one ‘writer’ of a thesis, there are many individuals who contributed 
to its success to whom I am very grateful: 
 
Foremost, I wish to thank my thesis supervisors, Dr. Zoe Radnor, and Prof. Robert 
Johnston, for their guidance and assistance over the course of the research.  Their 
helpful criticism and careful and constructive reading of this document in its various 
incarnations was deeply appreciated. 
 
Undertaking a PhD later in life, involves the support of friends and family.  I was 
blessed by the presence of three remarkable women who greatly aided and supported 
me.  Gislèle who challenged me to have the courage to live out my dream and kept 
insisting I try.  Marlene who encouraged me through the initial craziness of 
attempting an impossibly hard task in my late 40s instead of helping me plan out a 
graceful retirement.  Sue who put up with my intense mood swings as I wrote the 
thesis and encouraged me not to quit when it seemed the most sensible thing to do!  
Without each of these three women, I doubt this document would exist. 
 
I also had many friends cheering me on, especially Chantal who was kind enough to 
read and offer highly useful comments on the thesis and Paul, who was my travelling 
companion literally, as we traversed the ocean repeatedly, and figuratively as a fellow 
traveller on the PhD road himself.  
 
Even with thirty two years of federal government experience, I was grateful and 
impressed by the kindness busy public servants showed in taking the time to help me 
through interviews, comments, and discussion.  I was humbled by the passion of these 
men and women as they strive to make a difference for Canadians through public 
service.   
 
Finally, I offer this work in memory of my father, who passed away just as I was 
completing the PhD.  He was a gifted, kind and generous man, with many friends, 
acquaintances, and people whose lives he touched – what greater legacy can one 
leave?  He encouraged me to pursue my goals and ambitions, but stressed the 
importance of making time to help those in need in my community.  I miss him and 
his sage advice.
  Page x 
Declaration 
 
I declare that this thesis research and findings are my own work and that this material 
has not been submitted for a degree at another university. 
  Page xi 
Research Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades, the philosophy of public management in governments 
worldwide, including Canada’s, have embraced the principle of Results-based 
Management, has under the banner of New Public Management.  It was believed that 
such private sector techniques would eventually lead to a fundamental cultural shift in 
the public sector – a leaner, more flexible, more responsive bureaucracy.   
 
This theme, Results-based Management, has been a consistent focus of Canadian 
‘central agencies’ for over ten years, traditionally the time required to achieve 
significant organizational or cultural change.  It is argued that to be meaningful, to go 
beyond political rhetoric, Results-based Management must introduce changes in 
executive focus and activities, as well as organizational accountability and reporting.  
However, the Auditor General of Canada and other commentators report, at best, 
limited progress.   
 
Through the perspectives of executive public servants themselves, this research 
examines and assesses how Canadian federal public sector executives have responded 
to changes in management and accountability introduced by Results-based 
Management.  In seeking greater understanding of the underlying drivers of Results-
based Management adaptation, this thesis investigates the theoretical contribution of 
Public Value theory in assessing executive behaviour.   
 
The primary research method consisted of two major case studies within the Canadian 
federal public sector, the first exploring regional perspectives in Saskatchewan, and 
the second, revealing perceptions of executives employed in a national health branch.  
In addition, the research also incorporated a series of interviews with senior 
executives to capture their perspective and validate the research findings from the two 
case studies. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: New Public Management, Results-based Management, Public Value 
Theory, Exploratory Case Study  
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Abbreviations and Brief Definitions 
For readability, please treat all references to government departments, for example the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, Office of the Auditor General, Corrections, etc. as 
referring to departments within the Canadian federal government, unless otherwise 
specified.  
 
Similarly, within this thesis, the term executive will refer to employees of the 
Canadian federal public service classified within the Executive (EX) or Deputy 
Minister (DM) classifications.  Senior executives are those employed within the latter 
two categories, EX4-5 or DM levels.  Positions titles and levels are typically: 
 EX - 1 or 2  Director   
 EX - 3   Director General 
 EX - 4 or 5  Assistant Deputy Minister 
 DM   Deputy Minister 
 
Two Other definitions follow.  
 
Central Agencies - Within the Canadian federal government, ‘Central Agencies’ refer 
to those departments with intra-departmental management responsibilities for 
administration and governance.  Central Agencies include the Privy Council Office, 
Treasury Board Secretariat, Public Service Commission and, depending on the 
context, may also include Justice Canada. 
 
‘Grants and Contributions Programmes (G&Cs)’- This broad group of programmes 
provide funding to third parties who in turn deliver programmes or/and public 
financial support for their activities.  For clarity, alternatives to G&Cs include the 
delivery of programmes by public servants, direct service contracts with third parties, 
and grants to other levels of government (typically provincial governments). 
 
ASD Alternative Service Delivery a form of government programme 
delivery where the service delivery aspect is typically under contract, 
rather than by employees, also known internally as outsourcing 
CAC Consulting and Audit Canada is a Special Operating Agency which 
provides internal consulting services only within the federal 
government of Canada 
CCAF-FCVI Canadian Comprehensive Audit Foundation – La Fondation 
canadienne pour la vérification integrée is a leading advocate for 
meaningful public reporting, including reporting of results 
CSPS Canadian School of Public Service, formally Canadian Centre for 
Management Development (CCMD).   Including in its mandate is the 
responsibility for research on public sector management 
FNIHB First Nations and Inuit Health Branch, Health Canada – the 
organization examined in one of the two major case studies 
MAF Management Accountability Framework – the core of the revised 
executive performance appraisal process 
NGO Non-Government Organizations – the ‘third’ or non-profit sector, 
often includes international aid organizations 
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NPM New Public Management 
OAG  Office of the Auditor General of Canada 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RBM Results-based Management  
RMAF Results-based Management Accountability Framework – a 
management tool used by the Treasury Board of Canada in assessing 
new and revised programmes 
SASK Saskatchewan is one of ten Canadian provinces – departments with 
regional offices in Saskatchewan were examined in one of the two 
major case studies 
SOA Special Operating Agencies 
TBS Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada 
 
The terms ‘Outcomes’ and ‘Results’, and ‘Results-based Management’ and 
‘Managing for Results’ are synonymous. 
 
 
  
1 Introduction  
 “Science is a journey, not a destination” (Gummesson, 1993:79). 
 
Results-based Management has a wonderful simplicity to it; ‘motherhood and apple 
pie’ in American folklore.  Who could possibly argue that a nation’s public servants 
should not be actively and fully engaged in managing towards results?  But this 
apparent simplicity masks the complexity of most modern-day public sector 
programmes with potentially conflicting programme and inter-programme objectives, 
multiple stakeholders including a political context, limited, finite resources coupled 
with unlimited demand, and programmes delivered within the boundaries of a myriad 
of internal rules and regulations.    
 
As a long-term public servant, my initial interest in this research topic was stimulated 
by three failed attempts to implement performance management systems in 
government; failures which could not be traced to waning enthusiasm by senior 
management.   Making the argument that managing for results requires information to 
manage with, and faced with the daunting task of identifying a PhD thesis topic which 
the literature suggested should be a subject of personal interest (Phillips and Pugh, 
2000), the initial research goal was to identify and understand what academia could 
contribute to understanding and improving the implementation of Results-based 
Management.   
 
The author’s professional work-experience greatly assisted in identifying the 
preliminary research questions, which were subsequently refined by the literature 
review and Key Informant interviews, and matured into the research question found in 
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Section 1.1.2 below.   During the interviews, the author’s employment experience, 
including positions with all Central Agencies directly supporting Deputy Minister and 
Assistant Deputy Minister communities, greatly assisted in gaining access to risk-
adverse, busy executives and provided credibility to interviewees regarding the 
research agenda.  In addition, my linguistic skills permitted conducting interviews in 
both English and French, as required in French speaking regions of Canada. 
 
The foregoing acknowledges that the author brings a practitioner’s perspective to this 
research project.  However, strict attention was paid to ground the thesis in academic, 
not practitioner, literature and research practices.   
1.1 Introducing the Research Question 
1.1.1 Brief Statement of the Research Topic 
 
Over the last two decades, the philosophy of public management in governments 
worldwide, including Canada’s, has incorporated private sector management 
techniques under the general label of New Public Management (NPM) (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000; OECD, 2002).  It was believed that private sector techniques would 
eventually lead to a fundamental cultural shift in the public sector – a leaner, more 
flexible bureaucracy (Pollitt, 1995).  Underlying drivers of NPM reforms included 
fiscal restraint, growing citizen dissatisfaction with government, as well as broad 
societal changes including globalization and advances in technology.   
 
While Canada was not generally considered a leader in public sector reform during 
the 1990s (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), most would argue that Canada made 
significant progress with public sector reform since 2000 (Gow, 2004).  This included 
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embracing the principles of Results-based Management.  A variety of policies, 
especially the Management Accountability Framework, sets out renewed 
responsibilities and accountabilities of Deputy Ministers, and all other executives, and 
included a major focus on results (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c). 
 
The development of theoretical frameworks incorporating theories and models from 
the literature, helped focus and bind the research (Barnes, 2001:1082; Huberman and 
Miles, 2002).   While in the context of exploratory case studies, theoretical 
frameworks may be less important (Hussey and Hussey, 1997:123), or less clear in 
structure, they do provide structure for data collection, while permitting exploration of 
a wide range of topics (Barnes, 2001).   Findings from the Key Informant interviews, 
a series of initial interviews conducted to confirm and refine the research topic, 
enabled the discarding of the alternative theory – that Results-based Management is 
not new.  This thesis will investigate the utility of the theoretical contribution from 
Public Value Theory (Moore, 1995) in understanding executive behaviour in 
responding to changes introduced by Results-based Management (RBM) within 
Canadian public sector management.   
 
Thus, the overall goals of this research are two-fold, one to explore the applicability 
of the Public Value Model in understanding Results-based Management 
implementation within the Canadian Public Sector, and second to identify additional 
factors which influence Results-based Management adoption from the perspective of 
executive public servants. 
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1.1.2 The Research Question 
The overall research objective is to increase the body of knowledge on RBM, through 
exploratory research.  As noted, the primary research question will explore the utility 
of Public Value theory in increasing understanding of executives’ perceptions and 
actions as follows:  
How does Public Value theory help to explain the limited progress in 
implementing Results-based Management within programmes in the 
Canadian federal public sector? 
 
The research design specifically selected executives as the primary data source.  
Within organizations, including public sector organizations, executives are the leaders 
capable of instituting the organizational changes required to adopt RBM.  It is 
acknowledged that other perspectives may be equally valid.  For example, programme 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, politicians, and programme managers can, and 
probably do, have divergent opinions or perspectives of RBM.  However, the 
limitations of a PhD thesis precluded interviewing all stakeholders.   Furthermore, it is 
argued that executive support is, and remains, key in advancing Results-based 
Management within the Canadian public sector.  
 
1.2 Why is this Topic Worthy of Study? 
1.2.1 Substantial Effort, but Questionable Progress 
Results-based Management has been a consistent focus of Canadian central agencies 
for over ten years, traditionally the time required to achieve major organizational 
cultural change (Senge, 1990).  As the research findings will support, one would be 
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hard-pressed to find an executive unaware of RBM, reflecting the government’s effort 
to encourage, integrate and sometimes simply require RBM.   Similarly, one can 
readily locate extensive RBM literature1, both from a practitioner and academic 
perspectives, and quickly find a wealth of advice on implementing a RBM 
framework.  Within the public sector, one discovers an increasingly strong mandate to 
demonstrate the results achieved to Parliamentarians, programme stakeholders, and 
central funding agencies.    
 
Nevertheless, the Auditor General of Canada and other commentators report, at best, 
limited progress (Savoie, 2004; Auditor General of Canada, 2005).  Why would this 
be?   
 
Answers might include that the theory of Results-based Management within the 
public sector is faulty, or that implementation has failed to take into account some 
critical aspect or address some systematic impediment, or perhaps that another 
undiscovered, unidentified issue remains unresolved; in order to understand and 
explain the limited progress to date.  Public Sector RBM theory must also address the 
diversity of literally thousands of federal government programmes with widely 
differing suitability for Results-based Management.   
 
From the perspective of individual executives, whether RBM makes sense for ‘their’ 
programme(s), whether it is based on a rational, logical theory, or whether results can 
be attributed to programme efforts is effectively irrelevant.  RBM is simply a 
requirement.  A requirement dictated by ‘central agencies’ for sustainability of 
                                                 
1 For example, an internet search generated 750,000 hits for the terms “public sector performance 
management” on March 12, 2005. 
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programme funding, mandatory reporting and executive accountability.   This thesis 
will boldly attempt to engage executives in examining these very statements.  The 
resulting research will examine RBM from the perception of executives, an under-
researched, if not untouched, topic within Canada. 
 
It is further argued that to be meaningful – to move beyond political rhetoric – 
Results-based Management must introduce changes in executive focus and activities.  
Perhaps an adoption of the saying; ‘If nothing changes, nothing changes’ would be 
appropriate.   
 
Noting that Results-based Management may be undertaken at three distinct levels; the 
organization as an entity, the programme level, and an individual basis (Rummler and 
Brache, 1990; Dewar, 2000; Propper and Wilson, 2003), the focus of this research is 
at the programme level.   
 
In order to provide context, the next two sections will offer initial definitions for 
Results-based Management and Public Value Theory.  These definitions will be 
subsequently expanded on in the Literature Chapter. 
 
1.3 A few Key Definitions 
1.3.1 Results-based Management 
Historically, executives have been accountable for: 
 economic and efficient use of resources - people, money and capital 
 activities – how programmes operated 
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 outputs – direct programme production  
(Hood, 1995; Pollitt, 1995; Lenihan, 2001:8; Mayne, 2001).   
Results-based Management increases public sector accountability to include 
accountability for programme results or outcomes - the impact or longer term results 
of government activity (OECD, 1994; Aucoin, 2000; Lenihan, 2001:8).  
 
The Treasury Board of Canada2 (2003b:3) defines RBM as: 
“a comprehensive, life cycle approach to management that integrates business 
strategy, people, processes and measurements to improve decision-making and drive 
change.… a process by which an institution ensures, through the monitoring of a set 
of indicators and the reporting of performance data to its managers, that its processes, 
products and services are aligned with and contribute to the attainment of its 
objectives”, 
 
which requires managers to:  
"… focus on results in every aspect of management. Organizations that perform 
successfully have a clear vision of why they exist, what they want to achieve and how 
well they are achieving it. They plan their work keeping in mind a clear set of 
objectives, activities, outputs, outcomes and measures. To take stock of their 
progress, they measure and evaluate…..issue public reports on their results, making 
them more accountable to Parliament and Canadians.” (Treasury Board of Canada, 
2003a:1) 
 
1.3.2 Public Value Theory 
The goal of all sectors of the economy, public and private, is to create or increase the 
value created by their contribution.  Within a private sector, this goal is fairly clear - 
to generate private value by generating a profit.  Within a public sector environment, 
the term ‘public value’ can be defined as ‘what the public values – what they are 
willing to make sacrifices of money and freedom to achieve’ (Kelly et al., 2002), and 
describes the contribution made by the public sector to the economic, social and 
environmental well-being of a society or nation.  Thus, as Moore (1995:28) states, 
“The aim of managerial work in the public sector is to create Public Value, just as the 
                                                 
2 This use of the Canadian bureaucratic definition is argued to be appropriate given that the two case 
studies were located within the Canadian public sector. 
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aim of private sector management is the creation of private value.”  Figure 1 below, is 
a visual depiction of Moore’s models which will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
Figure 1: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model 
Legiti-
mate
Oper-
ational
Service
Trust Outcomes
Creates 
Public Value
Legitimacy 
and Politically 
Sustainable
Operationally 
and 
Administratively 
Feasible
Creates 
Public Value
Programs and Services Must Address: Public Value is Created Through:  
Source: (Moore, 1995; 2000:197) 
1.3.2.1 Moore’s Strategic Triangle 
Just as conventional views of strategy development in the corporate world begin with 
the goal of enhancing shareholder wealth, so the creation of public value in the public 
sector begins with defining and understanding the mission of the department or 
branch (Drucker, 1974:158-159; Moore, 1995; Mintzberg et al., 1998).  Figure 1, left-
side, sets out a model of what public sector programmes must address to become or 
remain viable.  This model suggests that executives must consider and demonstrate:  
 Legitimacy and political sustainability 
 Operational and administrative feasibility 
 Creation of Public Value. 
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This framework serves to focus executive attention in three directions; upward to the 
political level that authorizes and funds programmes, outward to the desired impact 
and values to be created for society, and downward to address internal management 
issues (Moore, 2000).   
1.3.2.2 Moore’s Public Value Model 
On the right side of the diagram, Moore (1995) argues that the creation of Public 
Value is the ultimate goal of public sector programmes and activities - the value 
proposition that should guide public organizations.  Moore’s model suggests that to 
create public value, executives must address three key areas: 
 Services - cost effective provision of high quality services 
 Outcomes - achievement of desirable end results 
 Trust - support a high level of trust between citizens and government. 
While Kelly et al. (2002) note that the categories overlap, they suggest that the 
categories do provide a useful way of thinking about the dimensions of public value.  
The Public Value model has gained acceptance in both academic (Bozeman, 2002; 
Kearns, 2004), as well as public sector practitioner literature (Kelly et al., 2002).   
 
In responding to the research question, this thesis will first examine whether 
executives have made discernable changes in their activities and information sources 
in order to manage for results or to meet changing accountabilities.  This will be 
followed by an assessment of the validity of the Public Value Theory in 
understanding executive programme management.  This section of the analysis will 
consider the existence of systematic impediments to greater progress.  Finally, the 
thesis will draw conclusions on whether Results-based Management/Public Value 
Theory has the potential of increasing the value of public sector programmes.   
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Figure 2, below provides an overview of the links between Public Value theory, and 
executive response to RBM and notes that Results-based Management is not a 
singular concept, but rather is applicable at multiple levels.   It shows the ‘cascading’ 
of RBM and Public Value within an organization discussed in the Literature Review. 
 
Figure 2: A Theoretical Research Model incorporating Public Value Theory 
 
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This chapter sets the context and describes the rationale and purpose for the research 
study.  The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two reviews and 
assesses the literature from academic sources, and including relevant government 
policies and documents; Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology and 
methods used in conducting this research; Chapters 4, 5 and 6  present the analysis 
and findings from the Health and Saskatchewan Case Studies, and the Senior 
Executive interviews respectively; Chapter 7 discusses the results of the these studies, 
examining the contribution from components of Public Value and Strategic Triangle 
theories, as well as considering other emergent findings.  It also includes the cross-
case analysis; Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by responding to the primary research 
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question and presenting the overall research conclusions, as well as research 
limitations and suggesting future potential research.  Table 1, below, summarizes the 
thesis chapters. 
 
Table 1: Thesis Outline 
Chapter Purpose Approach 
1 Introduction Set the stage, introduction 
research topic and questions 
Topic introduction and initial 
research definitions 
2 Literature 
Review 
Literature review of academic 
and government document 
review (policies, reports etc) 
Review of relevant academic and 
practitioner literature 
3 Methodology Presentation and discussion of 
Research Methodology and 
Methods 
Research Gap, Methodological - 
Exploratory Case Study method, 
contribution of Key Informant 
interviews, Field procedures, 
interview questionnaire, etc. 
4 Health Case 
study 
Analysis of the Health case 
study 
Presentation of findings from 
Health Case study 
5 Saskatchewan 
Case study 
Analysis of the Saskatchewan 
case study 
Presentation of findings from 
Saskatchewan Case study 
6 Senior 
Executive 
interviews 
Analysis of the Senior 
Executive interviews 
Presentation of findings from 
Senior Executive interviews 
7 Discussion Determination of Findings, 
presentation of research 
questions and research 
objectives  
Analysis and triangulation of 
findings, cross-case comparisons,  
8 Conclusion Conclusions and implications 
of the research 
Responding to Research Question, 
implications of research, 
limitations, final conclusions 
9 Bibliography 
and Appendixes 
  
 
1.5 Summary 
In summary, the proposed research will explore, through the application of sound 
research methodologies, organizational and executive perceptions on the application 
of Results-Based Management within the Canadian public sector.  This research will 
apply Public Value theory to this topic and consider whether the theory improves the 
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understanding and suggests practical applications, addressing the Academic – 
Practitioner gap (Swamidass, 1991).   
 
From the perspective of public sector executives themselves, this research will 
explore and analyze public sector executives’ changing perceptions and responses to 
RBM.  It will examine the role of management information in addressing changing 
requirements for effective management under RBM (Aucoin, 2000; Mayne, 2003a; 
Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c), providing fresh insights into Canadian public 
sector reforms.   
 
Chapter 2 provides a critical overview of the relevant academic literature, as well as 
examining Canadian government RBM policy(s) and incorporating, where useful, a 
limited amount of practitioner literature. 
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2 Literature Review Chapter 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review 
Having conducted a thorough literature review, there appear to be six key areas 
applicable to this research that have emerged from the literature.  These issues are 
described in Table 2, below.  Each section will provide an in-depth summary of 
current knowledge supporting the research agenda presented in Chapter 1.  The 
literature review will focus on the relevant Canadian public sector administration and 
accountability literature, but also incorporate key international findings.   
 
Table 2: An Overview of the Literature Review 
The Art of 
Management 
This section considers the literature on the functions of 
management, focusing on the key activities of executive 
management and the central role of information in carrying out this 
function.  A subsection examines the literature on performance pay. 
Comparing Public 
and Private Sectors 
As NPM integrates a number of private sector management 
techniques into the public sector, this section discusses the literature 
comparing and contrasting the private and public sectors, including 
key differences in management between the two sectors.   
New Public 
Management (NPM)  
Introduces, examines and critiques the literature on public sector 
management reforms introduced under the broad title of New 
Public Management.  Includes sections on Public Value and Client 
Satisfaction information. 
Results-based 
Management (RBM) 
This section addresses the literature on private and public sector 
outcome management, and focuses on public sector Results-based 
Management as a key component of NPM 
Assessing 
Performance under 
RBM 
Given the role of information for RBM, this section considers the 
extensive literature on performance measurement and management, 
including its unintended side-effects.   
Accountability Addresses the literature on public sector accountability, executive 
accountability, and public reporting with a focus on accountability 
for results. 
Summary Summarizes the literature 
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2.2 The Art of Management 
2.2.1 Introduction to Management 
“Rarely in human history has any institution emerged as fast as management or had as 
great an impact as quickly.  In less than 150 years, management has transformed the 
social and economic fabric of the world’s developed countries.” (Drucker, 1988:157).  
 
Management is a very young science.  Drucker (1998) indicates that a 1943 search for 
corporate management texts turned up virtually nothing – “It was amazing, not 
because I was so ignorant, but because nobody knew anything.” (Beatty, 1998).   
Today, management is acknowledged worldwide as a field of expertise and taught at 
most universities and colleges.  This chapter begins with a brief review of the history 
of management, responding to the question - what do managers do?  This literature 
provides the context in understanding changes in managerial activity introduced by 
RBM. 
2.2.2 A Brief History of Management 
Only in the last century, have almost all necessities and luxuries of life been produced 
by organizations, private and public, controlled by managers (Kotter, 1982).  During 
most of human history, individuals have depended on themselves as hunters, farmers, 
craftsmen, traders, and landlords for the goods, services, and employment they 
required.  The arrival of the Industrial Revolution began to see the joining together of 
workers into collectives, permitting the increased specialization of work tasks.  This 
division of labour in manufacturing led, as described in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations, to significant improvements in worker productivity.  The function of 
management began to expand as efficiencies associated with division of labour 
accrued with job-specialization and the increased need for coordination.   
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Chandler (1977) defines this emergence of professional management in the 1920s as a 
key element in American business competitiveness.  Previously, most firms were 
owned by individuals who managed almost as an ancillary function of their success.  
With the articulation of the general management perspective and the development and 
refinement of general management practices, by the 1920s, American had developed 
the function and occupation of management. 
 
It is not easy to state what management is.  Some identify it as a doctrine (Hood, 
1991), while others position management as an ideology (Pollitt, 1990).  Historical 
writers focused on the functions of management.  For example, Henri Fayol (1916) 
categorized business activities into six functions: technical, commercial, financial, 
security, accounting or administration  and identified the five classic managerial 
functions as: planning, organizing, coordinating, commanding, and controlling.  
Mintzberg provides evidence that Fayol built on similar works of economists dating 
back as far as 1770 (George, 1968:65).  Fayol (1916) also suggested that certain basic 
principles, including unity of command and proper division of work, underlay 
successful organizations, “with scientific forecasting and proper methods of 
management, satisfactory results are inevitable.” (as quoted in (Mintzberg, 1973:59)).  
 
Gulick (1937), refining Fayol’s work in the 1930s, expanded the classification of 
executive tasks into: Planning, Organising, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, 
Reporting and Budgeting (POSDCORB).  Gulick argued that organizational structure 
should follow these functional lines, thus supporting the division of labour along these 
themes.   Interestingly, this original work targeted government organization, and was 
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later adapted for the private sector3.  “Work division is the foundation of organization; 
indeed, the reason for organization ” (Gulick and Urwick, 1937:3).  POSDCORB was 
popularised by many management theorists, for example (Drucker, 1954:343-344). 
 
For workers, Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management (1911) was the first research 
to systematically study work itself.  Taylor discovered as early as 1875 that work 
tasks themselves could be managed, resulting in increased efficiency.  Prior to this the 
only way to increase output was to work harder or longer (Drucker, 1980).  Scientific 
Management, radical in its day, called for executives or experts to plan out in great 
detail, the exact tasks that workers were to perform - substituting scientific 
investigation for intuition and opinion. 
 
Peter Drucker was the first academic to systematically study management as a 
specialist function (Flaherty, 1999).   His seminal work The Practice of Management 
(Drucker, 1954), considered management to be a core business activity.  Drucker, and 
others, soon acknowledged that effective management was even more important in 
non-profit groups and government organizations precisely because of the absence of 
the discipline of a financial bottom line (Drucker, 1993). 
2.2.3 Studying Executives’ Activities 
As the importance of management has grew in human economic activity, management 
theorists began to consider its major elements (Fayol, 1916; Barnard, 1942; Drucker, 
1974) and to study the functions of executive management. 
 
                                                 
3  POSDCORB originated in a memorandum for the US President’s Committee on Administrative 
Management (Pollitt, 1993a:4).   
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In 1951, Carlson published Executive Behaviour, the first study to systematically 
examine what executives actually did each day, at the activity level.  Carlson 
empirically studied six of the most influential business leaders in Sweden at that time 
(Carlson, 1951).  In his research, Carlson discovered that executives spent an 
unexpectedly large amount of time communicating, generally face-to-face, with 
employees, colleagues and external contacts, and a relatively limited amount of time 
in what had traditionally been assumed to be the functions of executives. 
 
Executive Behaviour inspired a stream of further research studies, especially in Britain 
and North America (Thomason, 1966).  Subsequent studies, which conducted 
empirical studies on managers at various levels, confirmed Carlson’s findings of 
strong reliance on verbal communication (Carlson, 1952).  Horne and Lupton 
(1965:25) stated that “… much of manager’s time was spent in talking with one other 
person, mostly face-to-face; or in a small group informally…. [Managers] spent little 
time dealing with paper.”  Other researchers reached similar findings including Burns 
(1957) and Brewer & Tomlinson (1964).   
 
Similarly in North America, researchers adopted Carlson’s approach in studying 
managerial activities (Sayles, 1964; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982; Luthans et al., 
1988).   Mintzberg (1973) discussed the fragmented nature of managerial work, with 
executives spending an average of 7 minutes on any one task.  He argued that 
management scientists could help break this vicious cycle of inefficient time use.  
Kotter (1982), on the other hand, argued that this fragmentation was in fact highly 
efficient, it maximized the executives’ knowledge for effective decision making, 
given the scope and breadth of the CEO’s job. 
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Kotter (1982) also focused on the networks that executives build to enhance informal 
communication opportunities in ‘agenda setting’.  Similarly, Luthans et al. (1988) 
reported that managers spent a total of 48% of their time on routine communication 
and networking.  Stewart (Stewart, 1988:50), whose study of 160 managers from all 
levels, acknowledged that “It is by talking and listening that managers get most of 
their work done” and reported that managers in her study spend fully two-thirds of 
their time in conversations. 
 
While there appears to be limited recent follow-up of this research theme, one 
empirical study of public manager activities was noted.  Mintzberg and Bourgault’s 
(2000) research confirmed that Canadian public sector executives are engaged in very 
similar activities to their private sector counterparts: fragmented work, a high focus 
on bi-direction information sharing, and a major role in human resource management.  
While activities are similar to those of private sector executives, they noted that 
inherent differences in the public sector lead to different goals and objectives.   
2.2.4 The Executive and Information  
Information, and its use, is at the very centre of management activity (Fayol, 1916; 
Drucker, 1954; 1995).  Thus, understanding how executives acquire and use 
information is key to understanding the function of management (Kotter, 1982; 
Stewart, 1988; Mintzberg, 1994b; Mayne and Zapico-Goni, 1997:11).   
 
As confirmed by numerous studies, the gaining and sharing of information is the 
principal activity of executives (Mintzberg, 1994a).  Studies have found that 
executives continuously scan their environment and exchange information with 
subordinates, senior executives and colleagues, inside and outside of their unit.  The 
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information flows are bidirectional, as executives disseminate to others ‘their’ 
information.  Fifty per cent of executives’ time is devoted almost exclusively to the 
act of communicating (Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982).  In assessing 
this research, it is important to noted that communications, like most aspects of the 
executive’s job, does not occur as a separate isolated and discrete function, but rather 
is an integral component of all management tasks which has been separated out for 
the purposes of analysis and focus (Allison, 1997:30). 
 
Formal, routine information - that is, information capable of being processed in a 
computer - plays a minor role.  Rather oral information, much of it too early or too 
soft to formalize, and even nonverbal information, form key components of the 
information gathering (Mintzberg, 1994b; Drucker, 1995).   Mintzberg (1990) 
suggested that the greatest threat of the information age and desktop computing is that 
executives will take it seriously and come to believe that they can manage through 
data alone.   
 
Examining the executives’ information sources, Mintzberg (1973:69) argues that “The 
manager’s advantage lies, not in the documented information that is widely available, 
and which takes much time to process, but in the current non-documented information 
transmitted largely by work of mouth...”  Executives seem to indicate strong 
preference for current information, much of which is necessarily unsubstantiated 
(gossip).  Other researchers have consistently confirmed these findings (Stewart, 
1988:114).  This indirectly led to a number of studies which examined the executive’s 
management of intangibles (Drucker, 1974), including organizational culture in both 
private (Peters and Waterman, 1982) and public sectors (Metcalfe, 1993).  Subsequent 
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research has confirmed these finding in both sectors (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982; 
Stewart, 1988; Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000).   
 
The foregoing is relevant when considering the changes to information implicitly 
required by Results-based Management. 
2.2.5 Performance pay and incentives 
This research will consider whether one possible link between Results-based 
Management and executive motivation might be the use of financial incentives tied to 
results.  This section examines the literature on performance-based incentives, in the 
private and public sectors.   
 
The evidence from the literature review shows that performance incentives such as 
performance pay, bonuses, incentives and rewards have long been used in the private 
sector to motivate employees to achieve firm objectives (Prendergast, 1999).  Their 
use as a motivational force for employees is generally based on the work of Maslow 
(1943), as adapted for the workplace by Hertzberg (1966)4, based on a behaviourist 
model that employees respond or respond best to extrinsic motivators – ‘Theory X –
Y’ (McGregor, 1960; Ouchi, 1981). 
 
Empirical studies have consistently suggested that the hidden negative costs of 
contingent reward may be much greater than commonly understood (Lepper and 
Greene, 1978; Kohn, 1993; Ittner et al., 1997).  Research has revealed five principle 
ways that incentives impede performance: the perception of rewards as positive 
                                                 
4 A fuller discussion of this issues may be found in Wholey who formulated a rewards framework for 
improved performance (Wholey, 1983:Table 9.1 p. 184). 
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punishments, effect on work relationships, the failure to uncover and deal with 
underlying issues and problems limiting performance, the tendency to discourage 
risk-taking and their long term negative effect on intrinsic motivation (Kohn, 1993).   
Kohn (1993) expands on this work to identify potential workplace consequences 
including, reductions of teamwork, risk-taking, and the general failure to understand 
the key role of the workplace environment in the results achieved by managers.  
Collectively, these workplace studies suggest that performance incentives are “not 
only ineffective but often positively counterproductive.”, especially in creative tasks 
(Kohn, 1993:119).  It can be argued that their use is most effective, or least damaging, 
for simple, repetitive tasks – obviously not typical executive work.  The research 
findings are clear, extrinsic incentives that use rewards to modify behaviour are 
simply ineffective over the long run, and actually lower existing intrinsic motivation.   
 
Administering incentive plans is also problematic.  For example, incentive plans must 
be based on measured criteria, yet there are a lot of difficulties associated with 
objectively measuring performance (Hall and Lim, 2002).  Penderguast (1999:30) also 
reports that supervisors fail to sufficiently differentiate good from bad performance in 
rating through ‘centrality bias’ and ‘leniency bias.’   
 
The Canadian federal public sector has experimented with executive performance pay 
since the late 1960s (Strong, 1998), with the current approach introduced in 1999 
(Treasury Board of Canada, 2004a).  The awarding of executive performance pay to 
over 99 per cent of public sector executives in the early 2000s reduced programme 
credibility and validity and led to the introduction of distribution guidelines for 2004.  
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For brevity, the Canadian literature, academic and practitioner, on performance pay is 
summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3:  Issues and Limitations of Performance Pay Within the Canadian Public 
Sector 
Issue Description 
Size of incentive The literature suggests that significant financial incentives are estimated 
to be 15 to 25 per cent of total compensation (Manas, 1999).   Canadian 
public sector incentives are typically 5-7 per cent of gross income (2003 
data), logically suggesting that few would be motivated to act for 
economic reasons.  Additionally, high Canadian marginal taxation rates 
applicable at executive salary levels, reduce net pay to less than 50 per 
cent of the award 
Limited no. of 
beneficiaries 
Within the Canadian public sector only executives, comprising 
approximately 1 per cent of employees, are eligible for performance pay  
Individual / 
Team rewards 
Rewards, with a few exceptions, are targeted at individuals, while team 
work, participation and cooperation are typically ignored 
Mandatory 
Distribution of  
ratings 
Beginning in 2003-04, mandatory distribution of bonuses was introduced 
- 5 per cent will not receive no bonus, and a limit of 20 per cent can 
receive the maximum rating (TBS policy, 2003) 
Horizontal 
programme 
requirements 
With increasingly complex programmes, horizontal cooperation both 
intra and inter department horizontal cooperation is imperative (Treasury 
Board of Canada, 2002a; Savoie, 2003).   This aspect of the work is not 
generally acknowledged in assessing performance rewards. 
Limited number 
of ‘rewardable’ 
elements 
The literature suggests it is impossible to devise a managerial reward 
scheme that satisfactorily reflects achievements in more than three or 
four dimensions (Hopwood, 1974).  Within the Canadian public sector,  
executives are frequently required to meet multiple (5 plus) performance 
targets (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c).   
 
International experiences reported in the literature are similar (OECD, 2003).  Within 
the public sector, performance pay has been widely implemented either for all 
managerial levels, for example: Denmark, Netherlands, and New Zealand; or confined 
to executives, for example: Australian, Canada, and Ireland (OECD, 1995; 2003).  
Despite the broad implementation, international research consistently demonstrates 
that performance pay is consistently rated low by public sector executives (Jabes and 
Zussman, 1988; Wood, 1995; OECD, 1997).  Boyle (2001:8) suggests that effective 
motivation must build on the different types of rewards valued by public sector 
executives.  The Literature Review was unable to locate any material assessing or 
evaluating executive performance pay in the Canadian public sector. 
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Performance pay remains intuitively attractive.  Nevertheless, the role of performance 
pay appears limited at best.  As Kohn (1993:16) states, “Rewards, like punishments, 
are very effective at producing compliance”, but also may in turn lead to gaming and 
other dysfunctional and unintended behaviour in order to achieve greater personal or 
organizational benefits (Smith, 1995).  It could be argued that the complex goals and 
operating principles inherent to public sector executive management reduce the 
suitability of performance incentives in comparison with the private sector where 
individuals may have to perform fewer, better defined, tasks (Propper and Wilson, 
2003:2).   
 
Within the Canadian public sector, the increased demand for outcomes or results 
coincided with the latest version of and focus on executive performance pay (Strong, 
1998), potentially motivating executives in implementing Results-based Management.  
The research interviews will explore the role of performance pay as a motivating 
force in implementation of Results-based Management for executives.   
2.2.6 Summary - The Art of Management 
In summary, in order to understand the links between RBM and management, this 
section has presented a review of the literature on the history of management, 
executive activities, and information sources, to provide a basis for the subsequent 
analysis of the impact of RBM on executives.  The literature on performance pay was 
also reviewed. 
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Table 4: Summary of Section 2.2 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
History of 
Management 
- Introduce the subject of the research – the executive (Drucker, 
1954) 
- historical summary of the functions of Management (Taylor, 
1911; Gulick and Urwick, 1937) 
- Basis for assessing impact of NPM & RBM 
Executive Activities - what are the principle activities of executive management 
(Carlson, 1951; Mintzberg, 1973) 
Executive information 
requirements 
- limited role of ‘structured’ information (Kotter, 1982) 
- importance of casual, informal information (Taylor and Farrell, 
1995; Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000) 
Performance Pay - the potential and problems of performance pay (Kohn, 1993) 
 
Many of the public sector changes introduced by New Public Management, especially 
RBM (discussed in Section 2.5), were adopted from the private sector.  The following 
section will examine the literature on key similarities and differences between the 
public and private sectors, including differences in management.  
 
2.3 Comparing Public and Private Sectors 
New Public Management (NPM) (discussed in Section 2.4) draws broadly on the 
private sector for innovative management techniques to improve public sector 
management.  This section will examine similarities and differences between the 
public and private sectors, including executive activities, in support of the theoretical 
model presented in Chapter 1. 
2.3.1 Public versus Private Goods 
In North America, the accepted role of the private sector is to engage in commercial 
enterprise for profit5.  Firms are generally free to engage or not engage, purchase 
inputs at the market price and abandon activities at will.  Principally accountable to 
                                                 
5  While beyond the scope of this thesis, a third Not-for-Profit sector exists.  Universities are one 
example. 
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their owners, business is held accountable by the market against several ‘hard’ 
indicators, especially profitability (Steward and Walsh, 1994).  Although profit is 
considered a key financial test of performance (Drucker, 1968:236), even a cursory 
examination of profit data reveals the possibility for manipulation (Parker, 1979).   
 
Drucker (1993) argues that one of the key purposes of government is to undertake 
activities in the areas where profit cannot be made, but the interests of society demand 
that the activities occur.  National defence and safe street-lighting are common 
examples (Box, 1999).  Bozeman (2002) suggests that public policy has frequently 
been framed in the language, theory, and tools of economics and economic theory.  A 
purely economic approach calls for public sector activity when the private sector fails 
to provide desired or desirable public goods.  Such failures, economic theory 
suggests, can be traced to non-rival goods (where one person’s consumption does not 
diminish its availability to others), steep transaction costs, information deficits and 
monopolies, and other competitive market gaps. 
 
Similarly, English and Lindquist (1998) argued that certain activities are in the public 
or non-profit sector largely because of the complexity of assessing them.  As 
Weisbrod (1988:12) notes, “Because these activities are not easily monitored and 
therefore rewarded (the strength of the private sector), society turns to other sectors to 
carry them out.”  Even examining areas where substantial overlaps with private value 
exists, most public sector enterprises have multiple objectives with no single ‘bottom-
line’ (Kelly et al., 2002).  The public sector’s lack of a financial focus or profitability 
reflects this reality (English and Lindquist, 1998). 
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Unlike the private sector which is free to disengage or cease to offer goods or 
services, the moment government undertakes any activity, it becomes entrenched and 
permanent (Drucker, 1968:226).  Public sector programmes must typically continue to 
operate however difficult the local environment, and regardless of the client’s ability 
to pay, while typically requiring nationally consistency in programme delivery, not 
just regionally (Smith, 1995).  Economic arguments suggest that beneficiaries of 
government programmes, including suppliers, programme clients and even 
bureaucrats tasked with organizing the programme will resist any attempts to abandon 
them, including arguments and appeals to the political level (Savoie, 2003). 
 
Financial indicators and ratios are widely used in the private sector.  These ratios 
allow most financial indicators to collapse to a simple denominator, permitting 
comparisons between choices and market accountability.  Within the public sector, 
profit is an oxymoron (Johnson and Broms, 2000).  In Canada, with the exception of 
the Special Operating Agencies (SOA) created during the 1990s, public sector 
executives perceive programme finances as a relatively stable input, rather than the 
key programme outcome (Kroeger and Heynen, 2003).  
 
Two other key financial differences between the sectors are:  
 Assessing the value that the public sector produces must include the achievement 
of social purposes for which no revenue stream applies 
 Public sector revenue is received from multiple sources in addition to client user 
fees for products and services (Bozeman, 2002; Smith, 2004).  
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This being the case, financial indicators and ratios have limited application and 
receive effectively no executive attention within the federal government.  A few 
exceptions were noted, principally programmes considering large capital investments, 
supported by the arrival of accrual accounting in Canada.  In SOAs and other revenue 
generating programmes, cost recovery/user fees could be considered proxies for 
market accountability.  However, the costs recovered rarely represent more than a 
portion of total costs and rarely incorporate capital depreciation costs. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the key differences between the private and public sectors, based 
on a through review of key historic contributions from the literature, as well as 
selected current literature and personal discussions.   
 
Table 5: Key Differences between the Private and Public Sectors 
Issue Private Sector Public Sector 
Overall 
Direction 
 Profit 
 Some attention on 
future profit 
 Government/Minister establish directions  
 Long term frequently limited to next election 
 Subject to contradictory pressures 
 Highly adversarial relations between political parties 
 Direction typically at policy not administrative level 
Legis- 
lative and 
judicial  
 Minimum set of law 
constraining all 
business (tax, 
environmental, 
employment, etc) 
 Citizen ‘rights’ 
 Government managers must conform to legislation 
regardless of costs 
 Generally subject to scrutiny by legislative oversight 
groups or even judicial orders 
Authority  Authority is generally 
invested in one CEO 
 Can operate in any 
sector or market 
 Authority is shared between senior mandarins and 
political party in power 
 No authority to expand/contract “sphere of 
operations” – mandate explicit and limited 
Overall 
Goal 
 Profit 
 Standardized 
indicators Returns on 
Capital Invested 
(ROIC) and 
Shareholder / 
Economic Value 
Added (EVA) 
 Create and sustain citizen satisfaction 
 Overall infrastructure, economic and physical 
 Value for Money  
 Measured as the level of benefits net of costs 
 Must incorporate public sector  values and ethics 
 Equity, Probity 
 “Red tape” greatly reduces reaction time for 
emerging opportunities/events 
General 
Culture 
 Profit based 
 Entrepreneurial 
 Managerial style 
 Values based 
 Bureaucratic, although attempting to move from  
‘Command and Control’ to a Managerial style 
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Issue Private Sector Public Sector 
matches business 
needs 
 Innovative  
 Quicker decision 
making 
 Risk adverse 
 Citizen expectations can greatly exceed private 
sector 
Account- 
Ability 
 Objectives much 
clearer 
 Owners, shareholders 
 Legal reporting 
requirement only 
 Few horizontal 
considerations 
 Central Agencies, Parliament/ politicians, citizen 
 Information generally ‘acquirable’ (public sector – 
Access to Information laws) 
 Role of media 
 Horizontal (inter and intra-departmental) 
considerations 
Equity  
and 
Efficient 
 Greatest stress on 
efficiency and 
competitive 
performance 
 Greatest stress on equity, probity 
 General failure to disengage from activities which 
are not meeting current goals 
Primary 
stake-
holder 
 Shareholder is 
dominant stakeholder 
 Conflicting stakeholder interests 
 Shifting stakeholder dominance 
 Potential to conflict on overall govt policy 
 One critical aspect is horizontal coordination 
between departments in achieving societal goals 
 Public media opinions influence decision making 
Role of 
inform-
ation 
 Most held internally 
and remains 
confidential 
 Exposure to intense public scrutiny – “managing in 
a fishbowl” 
 Access to Information Act - managers must, and do, 
consider every memo, letter, briefing note, 
presentation and e-mail a public document.   
 Public perception and the potential for political 
embarrassment always considered, even for logical 
and sensible decisions 
Budgets  Flexible, expected 
Profit, ROI, EVA  
 Budgets subject to 
significant changes 
 Relatively fixed, stable budgets 
 Frequently budget based on previous year plus 
inflationary adjustment 
Invest-
ment 
 Decision driven by 
appropriate  measures 
(projected) ROI / 
EVA and other 
financial ratios 
 Driven by politics, legislation and policies, generally 
funds not raised in capital market 
 No dividends are payable 
 Public sector managers only rarely accountable for 
ROI, or outcomes from capital expenditures 
Source: various including (Rainey et al., 1976; Dunlop, 1979; Allison, 1997; Box, 
1999; Larson, 2002; Kroeger and Heynen, 2003) 
 
Kelly et al. (2002) argue that public sector activity is also distinguished by other key 
non-financial differences, including: 
 Citizens placing a strong value on ‘public’ issues such as distributional equity 
and due process.  Interestingly, the fact that Canadian public sector 
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programmes are available and support all (eligible) Canadians in a fair and 
impartial manner is itself valued by Canadians 
 Lacking the direct communication methods such as price mechanisms, and 
noting the limited frequency of electoral feedback, it is often difficult for 
citizens, individually or collectively, to register preferences on a particular 
public issue 
 Public sector outcomes are frequently the result of a collaboration between 
citizens and state (for example, public health, education, and community 
safety) 
 The existence of a broad range of different perspectives on the optimum level 
of public sector involvement and the corresponding public value created.  
Private sector shareholders may have differences on some issues (e.g. on the 
time horizon for returns) but these generally do not extend into ethical 
disagreements (e.g. the nature of social justice) 
 Government’s stewardship role to protect future generations far exceeds 
private firms’ obligations to future shareholders.  Firm’s legal responsibility is 
limited to their current shareholders only (while acknowledging the 
requirement to protect the future value of their equity) (Kelly et al., 2002:8). 
 
One final difference between the sectors lies in the power of government to compel 
citizens to act, or not act, in certain ways, through the state’s unique ability to create 
law.   The use of legislative power rests in a different process, collective decision-
making as expressed in democratic procedure and institutions (Chapman, 2003).   
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Having examined the evidence, it could be concluded that significant differences 
between the public and private sectors do exist.  This research now considers the 
literature that discusses the impact of these inherent differences on public and private 
sector executive functions. 
2.3.2 Public versus Private Sector Management 
There is broad discussion and diversity of opinion on whether fundamental 
differences exist in private versus public management functions.  Many of the private 
sector practices and methods adopted for the public sector make an implicit 
assumption that such differences are minimal (Kaplan and Norton, 1996).  Other 
academics disagree, for example, Allicon (1997:525) states that “public and private 
management are at least as different as they are similar, and that the differences are 
more important than the similarities” and “business and government administration 
are alike only in all unimportant respects” according to Wallace Sayre (Clark, 
2001:75).    
 
Private and public sector management models each have advantages and 
disadvantages.  Osbourne and Gaebler (1993:45-6) suggest that government is 
superior in “policy management, regulations, ensuring equity, preventing 
discrimination or exploitation, ensuring continuity and stability of services and 
ensuring social cohesion (ex. integration of races),” while the private sector is better 
at “performing economic tasks, innovating, replicating successful experiments, 
adapting to rapid change, abandoning unsuccessful or obsolete activities, and 
performing complex or technical tasks.” 
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As all public service activity (at the Canadian federal level) is undertaken on behalf of 
Parliament, Parliament is both the provider of legitimacy and direction (policy, law, 
etc), resources, and the recipient of accountability.  The literature comparing private 
and public sector management note the presence of politicians and politics as a key 
difference between the two sectors (Keeling, 1972).    
 
Parliamentary Ministers remain highly risk adverse, driven by the highly adversarial 
nature of Canadian politics (Aucoin et al., 2004).  Ministers continued insistence on 
error-free government has predictable results (Auditor General of Canada, 2002b; 
Good, 2004b).  Central agencies attempt to minimise risk through imposing 
administrative requirements, which simply have no counterpart in the private sector 
(Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998).  Such actions, however, directly impact on 
managerial flexibility.  Even where recent Canadian scandals have focused on either 
administrative errors or criminally fraudulent activities, rather than a failure to 
achieve programme outcomes (Savoie, 2003; Good, 2004b), the tendency has been to 
re-impose controls from the centre (Thomas, 2004a; Ehrenworth, 2005).  Table 6 
summarizes the literature comparing management in these two sectors.  
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Table 6: A Comparison of Private and Public Sector Management 
 
Aspect Private Sector Public Sector 
Adminis-
tration 
 Systems are generally designed 
to support business processes 
and strategic goals  
 Legal & union constraints only 
 More constraints on procedures 
 Tendency to proliferate formal 
specifications and controls 
Financial 
Aspects 
 Revenues by products and 
service 
 Bankruptcy possible 
 Decisions generally based on 
data/information 
 Processes are means to end 
 Costs relatively unimportant or given 
 Revenues insignificant 
 No bankruptcy threat, although over-
spending can generates sanctions 
 Decisions generally driven with little data 
 Process is an end into itself 
 Highly rules-based 
HR 
Aspects 
 HR supports business needs 
 Staffing levels are investment 
decisions 
 Greater management latitude, 
even in union environments 
 Much greater flexibility (hiring, 
firing, absence of diversity and 
language ‘rules’) 
 Highly bureaucratic – ‘red tape’ 
 Highly unionised 
 High level of internal promotion – 
‘closed shop’ 
 HR investment decisions are not directly 
tied to output level/desired outcomes 
Perform-
ance Pay 
 Managerial incentives 
congruent with results and 
meaningful 
 Potential for job loss 
 Successful risk-taking is 
rewarded 
 Incentives non-existent for employees 
 Incentives relatively low (max 10-15% of 
salary) 
 Strong employment security 
 Greater difficulty in devising incentives 
for effect 
The “E”s  Economic 
 Efficient  
 Effective 
 Same as Private but add:  
 Equity 
 Probity 
Perform-
ance 
Measures 
 Profit 
 Trend towards holistic 
performance management 
systems such as Balanced 
Scorecard 
 Little if any agreement on the standards 
and measurements of performance –  
including lack of financial bottom line 
 Frequent lack of external ‘Best practice’ 
comparisons available 
Sources: various, including (Allison, 1997; Jog, 2001) and personal communication 
 
Comparing the two sectors, managing ‘from the bottom up’ demonstrates that at a 
basic level, managerial requirements are similar between the two sectors – e.g. 
management of human resources, budget, project management, service delivery, etc.  
However, from a ‘top-down’ perspective, democratic values, ministerial/politics, laws 
and rights, etc. shape a very different picture of managerial requirements (Savoie, 
2003; Good, 2004b).  A management model for the public sector must balance and 
integrate both views (Tait, 1996), while managing government from a business model, 
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with a financial focus, can lead to the potential subversion of values of openness, 
fairness, and public propriety (Box, 1999).   
 
Empirical research reporting on interviews with executives with both private and 
public sector experience concludes that the public sector is considered the more 
difficult to manage.  This is attributed to a public sector environment of greater 
conformity, transparency and accountability (Bourgault and Ethier, 2000; Kroeger 
and Heynen, 2003).   Within Canada, a rare empirical comparison between private 
and public sector executives concluded that the heads of organizations, CEO versus 
Deputy Minister, have significant and inherent differences generally attributable to 
the introduction of Minister/political elements.  Zussman and Jabes (1989) conclude 
that while many functions of management are relatively similar, the environment does 
create considerably different managerial pressures. 
 
In summary, while public and private sectors require similar basic management 
functions, the different environment, context and constraints do affect managerial 
roles and the way they are performed (Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000).  Public sector 
management is more complex, addressing key issues of equity, transparency and 
probity, within a political context (Wilson, 1989; Osbourne and Gaebler, 1993; Pollitt, 
2003).  Therefore, it can be argued that considering private management practices, 
including Results-based Management, for public management may require adaptation 
not adoption.  It also suggests that the potential for significant unintended 
consequences should not be overlooked (Rainey et al., 1976; Savoie, 1994; Aucoin, 
1995; Mintzberg, 1996; Allison, 1997). 
 
  Page 34 
2.3.3 Theories of Public Management  
This section briefly considers four theories that the literature suggests impact on New 
Public Management (Kaboolian, 1998).  These theories support the analysis and 
understanding of executive responses to the introduction of RBM by suggesting 
alternative classifications as well as motivators inherent in the research topic.  
2.3.3.1 Bureaucracy 
Weber’s classical work The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (1947) 
identified and discussed innovative concepts, for the time, of separation of position 
from person, hierarchical–based organizations, reliance on written records and files 
and neutral administration.  This was argued to be the most efficient way to 
coordinate and control the work of a large number of people pursuing stated goals; the 
Bureaucratic Model (Weber, 1947:329; Etzioni, 1964; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; 
Savoie, 1994).  Down (1967) suggests that many government services, monopolies 
and those with ‘non-market’ components, are optimally delivered in a bureaucratic 
manner to ensure consistency and equity for citizens.  
 
Bureaucracy has a long history within the public sector (Beetham, 1996) where it is 
designed to effectively and consistently administer laws, regulations, policies and 
programmes and calls for procedural rules designed to prevent favouritism and 
corruption at both the political and public servant levels (Hood, 1995; Weber, 1997).   
Bureaucracy remains a highly effective and efficient form of management when 
applied appropriately and in suitable circumstances, whether public or private 
(Aucoin, 1997).  Nevertheless, bureaucracy in modern discourse, has come to 
represent an inefficient, unresponsive and monolithic organization limited in its 
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responses to compliance with existing rules and regulations (Ouchi, 1981; Bozeman, 
2000).  However, Aucoin (1997:292) suggests that the bureaucratic model is receiving 
blame for what is really poor design and bad management.   
2.3.3.2 Politics – Administration Dichotomy 
Over a century ago, Woodrow Wilson first suggested that a key element of efficient 
government was an apolitical public administration.  This politics-administrative 
dichotomy calls for the separation of policy development by elected politicians from 
the impartial, objective programme delivery by public servants (Wilson, 1885).  In the 
early part of the 20th century, academics argued that this separation was both possible 
and desirable (Wilson, 1885; Goodnow, 1900; Gulick and Urwick, 1937; Waldo, 
1940), reflecting the need to protect administration from excessive political influence, 
common at that time (Savoie, 2003).   
 
The dichotomy began to fall out of favour by the mid-20th century as academics and 
practitioners began to argue that administration of public programmes had inherent 
policy development aspects by creating and interpreting regulations, decisions on 
delivery mechanisms and defining eligibility for programme benefits (McCurdy, 
1977).  As Denhardt (1984:50) argued, 
“As a theory, the politic-administration dichotomy was soon dead, although it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that it had never been alive.  As a practical matter, 
however, because writers wished to direct their works to the practical problems of a 
specific audience of administrative personnel the politics- administration dichotomy 
lived on in an institutional definition of public and administration reform.  And, to the 
extent that public administration is still defined in institutional terms, the dichotomy 
survives.” 
 
Similarly, modern writers (Pollitt, 2003; Savoie, 2003) argue that it is not possible to 
separate programme administration from politics and policy setting.  Within Canada, 
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it is generally acknowledged that effective policy development requires the interaction 
of both public servant and politicians (Privy Council of Canada, 2001; Good, 2004b), 
supported by a politically neutral and professional public service.  These are key 
cornerstones of Canadian public sector values (Tait, 1996; Treasury Board of Canada, 
2001b; Good, 2004b). 
 
Other arguments against this separation in Canada include the role of career, 
politically neutral public servants in protecting the long term interests of the state 
from short(er) term political interests.  Politicians, many of whom serve for relatively 
short durations, often find it difficult to fully understand complex policy issues.  At 
the same time, they must also function as representatives for their constituents in 
minor programme administration decisions. 
 
The presence of politicians, with their desire to avoid negative media attention, results 
in a highly risk-adverse environment (Savoie, 1999).  Good (2003) comments that 
while the literature contains numerous studies on aspects of New Public Management, 
it virtually ignores changes to the working relationships between politicians and 
career officials.  Similarly, others argue that significant public management reform 
will not succeed until the role of politics is also redefined and repositioned (Savoie, 
1995). 
 
Deferring discussion of Ministerial Accountability until Section 2.7, at this stage it 
will suffice to state that elected politicians continue to call for ‘error-free’ 
administration of government programmes with ‘no surprises.’  There is an obvious 
contradiction between NPM’s call for greater innovation, including risk taking 
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leading to possibly improved results, with error-free programme delivery.  Central 
Agencies have demonstrated reluctance to relax controls, with a tendency to reinstate 
rules even when reasonable mistakes have been made and corrected, or in response to 
outright corrupt behaviour6 (Good, 2004b).  In short, Thomas (2004b) argues that 
Ministers have followed a strategy of blame avoidance, failing to accept uncertainty 
inherent in giving up a degree of control under NPM. 
2.3.3.3 Public Choice Theory 
In its simplest form, Public Choice theory applies economic models to the production 
of ‘public goods.’   At the heart of all public choice theories then is the notion that an 
official at any level, be they in the public or private sector, “acts at least partly in his 
own self- interest, and some officials are motivated solely by their own self-interest” 
(Downs, 1967:78).  For Downs, other motivators such as pride in performance, 
loyalty to a programme, department or government, and a wish to best serve their 
fellow citizens will also affect a bureaucrat's behaviour, and the level to which self-
interest plays a role in decisions.   
 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) argue that New Public Management is founded, at 
least in part, on Public Choice Theory.  They quote Kaboolian’s arguments that New 
Public Management’s  reliance on ‘Market-like’ arrangements (Kaboolian, 1998) and 
Hood’s stance that NPM moves away from traditional modes of legitimizing the 
public bureaucracy in favour of “trust in the market and private business methods… 
ideas…. couched in the language of economic rationalism” (Hood, 1995:94). 
 
                                                 
6  It could be argued that even the best audit and accountability regime is limited to identifying 
instances of potential corruption; human nature is such that no system can prevent it. 
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Public Choice Theory, as applied to government bureaucracy7, assumes that 
individual decision makers are rational, self-interested and thus seek to maximize 
their ‘utility’ – the greatest benefit or least cost.  It suggests that individuals making 
rational choice are selecting based on collective values.   However, lacking a profit 
goal to guide behaviour, bureaucrats relying on Parliament for their budgets may be 
captured by stakeholders or interest groups who potentially benefit from political 
decisions.    
 
It is not surprising then, as Hood (1991) suggests, that as NPM emphasizes efficiency 
and productivity (what he calls ‘sigma values’) Results-based Management may be 
achieved at the expense of honesty, fair dealing, the avoidance of bias, or the pursuit 
of transparency and accountability (theta values), or security, resilience, and the 
capacity to adapt (lambda values). 
 
A related sub-theory,  the Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat theory, was first advanced 
in the mid-1960s, in response to the observed rapid growth of government budgets 
(Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1991).  This theory suggests that bureaucrats are self-
interestedly rational, not simple obedient implementers of public law, who seek to 
increase or maximize budgets in order to increase their power, prestige and potential 
for promotion (Blais and Dion, 1991:59; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000:92).  
However, Blais and Dion (1991) in the UK, and Dolan (2002) in the USA, found little 
supporting evidence for this theory. 
 
                                                 
7  While outside the scope of this thesis, Public Choice theory is widely applied at the political level, 
where elected officials’ primary goal of re-election can be expected to cause them to deviate from the 
interests of their constituents (Aucoin, 1995:31). 
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2.3.3.4 Agent – Principal Theory  
Agent - Principal theory argues that the goals and objectives of agents may be 
different than those of principals, and that left unchallenged or monitored, agents will 
shirk or fail to act in the direction or manner that the principals desire.  Therefore, one 
central concern of the Agent - Principal theory is how principals can monitor and 
control the behaviour of their agents (Behn, 2003).  In order to control agents, 
principals incur monitoring costs in obtaining and processing information about the 
performance of agents and the extent of their conformity with the principals’ 
objectives (Box, 1999:23).  This can be expensive in terms of principals’ time and 
funds. 
 
Within the public sphere, the bureaucracy has a long and distinguished history of 
control, supporting at least two sets of principal-agents: citizen-politician and 
politician-public servant.  Focusing on the latter, politicians enter into agent - 
principal relationships with professional public servants.  Tasks requiring a high 
degree of expert knowledge and professional judgement are very difficult for those at 
the political level to master8.  As noted by the theory, principals must monitor agents.  
However, this monitoring must be balanced with its effects on organizations’ ethics, 
values (transparency, politically neutral) and the intrinsic motivation of public 
servants.   
 
Interestingly, as Behn (2003) notes, one of the rarely stated but very real purposes 
behind Results-based Management and associated performance measurement systems 
                                                 
8 Aucoin and Jarvis note that, in Canada, this degree of difficulty is increased due to the relatively high 
turnover of elected Parliamentarians, especially in comparison with the career nature of executive 
public servants (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2004). 
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is to enhance monitoring by principals of compliance against goals and objectives.  
However, at the political level, certain writers have suggested that politicians have a 
disincentive to provide clear objectives what would enable clear accountability for 
progress.  Faced with such vague signals, public servants, by virtue of their greater 
time pressures in expending budgetary funds within the fiscal year, will attempt to set 
goals, which may be in conflict with the political ‘principles’ (Mayston, 1993). 
 
Within the Public Sector, a risk adverse culture can be argued as one reason for a high 
degree of monitoring.  However, in addition to the direct costs incurred, such controls 
may themselves be imperfect forms of controlling agents, leading to further loss of 
efficiency via reduced agent trust and motivation (Mayston, 1993).   It should be 
noted that other key motivators such as leadership and accountability, may also play a 
significant role (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003).  Indeed, one criticism of NPM notes 
the risk of erosion of traditional public service ethics through the focus on efficiency 
and production, and a tendency to redesign public sector organizations on 
principal-agent lines (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994:12). 
 
As monitoring can be time-consuming and costly, alternatively, principals may seek 
to find a balance between incentives, punishment and monitoring (Mayston, 1993).  
Agents may take reciprocal actions which may serve to frustrate the wishes of the 
principal, including many forms of rational, but organizationally dysfunctional 
behaviour  (Smith, 1995:280; Propper and Wilson, 2003).  
 
In summary, these four theories provide a theoretical basis for analysing and 
interpreting the executive behaviours which will emerge from the research data, and 
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could support the subsequent development of a model of executive reaction to the 
advent of RBM. 
2.3.4 Summary - Comparing Public and Private Sectors 
This section has compared and contrasted the private and public sectors, including the 
impacts on respective managerial activities, information usage, incentives and 
motivation(s). The literature suggests that there are inherent differences between the 
two sectors, which this research will argue must be reflected in the respective 
managerial activities and accountability.   
Table 7: Summary of Section 2.3 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
Public versus Private 
Goods 
Understand key similarities and differences between the two 
sectors (Drucker, 1974; Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000) 
Public versus Private 
Management 
Leading to an assessment of different managerial requirements 
(Box, 1999; Savoie, 2003) 
Theories of public 
management 
Discussion of four public management theories from the 
literature  
 
Having concluded that key differences are present, the following section will 
introduce the literature on New Public Management, including a renewed focus on 
outcomes and changing accountability structures – Results-based Management.  It 
will be shown that many aspects of NPM, including RBM, can be traced to private 
sector sources.  This review will discuss the potential impact of these changes on 
public sector management.   
2.4 New Public Management (NPM) 
2.4.1 A Brief History of Canadian Government Reform Efforts  
There is little doubt that public administration and management in Canada, as 
elsewhere, has undergone a fundamental shift.  This shift moves public sector 
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management from a traditional ‘Administrative Model’ to a new ‘Managerial Model,’ 
under the general title of New Public Management (NPM).   The pace of these 
changes or reforms have accelerated through the 1990s, touching nearly every aspect 
of public management: policy and values, programmes and expenditures, consultation 
and collaboration, organization and delivery, HR, administration, IT, and 
accountability, audit and evaluation (Peters, 1999; Good, 2004b).  
 
During Canada’s first century (i.e. up to 1967), the Canadian public sector remained 
small, bureaucratic and highly clerical in nature (Statistics Canada, 1980).  Public 
servants implemented policies developed at the political level and delivered 
programmes for Canadians.  The greater role of government in society and in the 
economy beginning during WW II led to a rapid increase in the Canadian public 
service.  By the 1970s, growing dissent with the bureaucracy, rapid growth of the 
public service, and increased complexity of programmes, set the stage for a number of 
attempts at public sector management reform in Canada (Savoie, 2003; Statistics 
Canada, 2004). 
 
It could be argued that modern public sector management reform in Canada began 
with the 1962 Royal Commission on Government Organizations [Glassco 
Commission] (Royal Commission of Government Organizations, 1962; Plumptre, 
1988).  Glassco reported that administrative regulations and procedures were 
excessive and issued a famous call to ‘let the manager manage.’   Over the next 
decade, other proposed reforms were advanced by the Royal Commission on 
Financial Management and Accountability [Lambert Commission] (Royal 
Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, 1979), the Report of the 
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Special Committee on the review of Personnel Management and the Merit Principle 
[D'Avignon Committee], and the Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the 
House of Commons [McGrath Report] (House of Commons, 1985). 
 
In response to the above-noted Commissions and other internal and environmental 
shifts, the government began to undertake a number of management changes.  Higher 
profiled actions included the establishment of the Office of the Controller General, 
and the creation and strengthening of the evaluation function (Johnson, 1992).  The 
introduction of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the late 
1960s was an early attempt, adopted from the private sector, to tie planned results to 
programme budgets (Aucoin, 2001).   Numerous other changes, policies and 
initiatives were also undertaken (Johnson, 1992).  Yet, by the late 1980s, a review by 
the Auditor General’s office concluded that the essentials of the management regime 
then in place seemed not to have changed (Johnson, 1992:14) and stated that in the 
absence of accountability instruments, central agencies have tended to issue 
increasingly detailed directives on all aspect of management (Auditor General of 
Canada, 1987).  
 
Drucker (1974) suggested that public sector management would benefit from 
management systems and methodologies similar to those that had emerged in the 
private sector.   Even within the private sector, management information, which had 
historically been linked to standardized financial indicators developed in the 1920s, 
remained largely unchallenged prior to the late 1980s (Neely, 1998).   Increasing 
managerial complexity demanded the inclusion of information from a broad spectrum 
of sources and the examination of both financial and non-financial indicators.  Given 
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the non-profit nature of the public sector, the analysis of non-financial indicators 
contributed to improved managerial capacity (Kaplan and Norton, 2001). 
 
Another key change was the expansion of the Auditor General of Canada’s role to 
include ‘Value for Money’ audits in 1977, giving the Auditor General a lead role in 
encouraging and commenting on management reform, a role that would show up 
repetitively in his/her official reports to Parliament (Auditor General of Canada, 
1997a).   
 
The 1990s saw three additional rounds of government-wide managerial reforms, with 
one key change, these reforms were launched by the public service itself.  PS 2000 
was launched in the early 1990s to remove or reduce management constraints and 
improve performance (Treasury Board of Canada, 1990; Edwards, 2001; Good, 
2004b).  La Réleve was principally focused on government human resource 
management and succession planning (Privy Council of Canada, 1996).  These two 
reform initiatives were internally, as opposed to politically, led and largely 
unsuccessful due to changing priorities (Dewar, 2000), especially the effects of major 
downsizing and reorganizations in the mid-1990s (Thomas, 2004a).   
 
The third reform was more procedural, but led to significant changes in management 
accountability.  The Expenditure Management System (EMS), introduced in 1996 
embraced strategic planning concepts adopted from the private sector.  These included 
requirements for departmental business plans outlining strategic challenges and 
priorities, and provided a base from which to assess the subsequent reporting of 
departmental performance.  These reports are tabled in Parliament annually by 
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departmental Report on Plans and Priorities each Spring and Departmental 
Performance Report each Fall (Treasury Board of Canada, 1995).  However, a 2002 
review by the Auditor General of Canada found limited quality in results reporting 
(Auditor General of Canada, 2002a). 
 
For some executives, the frequency of Canadian reform efforts over the last three 
decades suggests that the Canada public sector has moved from “periods of routine 
punctuated by periods of reform…. [to] becoming a seemingly endless stream of 
reform and change, occasioned by momentary interludes of routine and stability.” 
(Good, 2004b:9).   It can be argued that many executives adopt a ‘wait and see’ 
attitude, with the more cynical referring to management reforms as the ‘flavour of the 
month’ (Johnson, 1992). 
2.4.2 Declining Confidence in Governments 
It is suggested that one of the principle drivers of NPM reform was declining citizen 
confidence in government (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Blais, 2003).  By the 1990s, 
the public sector was accused of being bloated, cumbersome, uncreative, lethargic and 
insensitive (Savoie, 1994:3).  This trend, well supported by international empirical 
evidence, showed that Canadian citizens had become less deferential to and more 
sceptical of government.  Citizen expressed concerns over the role government plays 
in their lives, the clarity and coherence of programme objectives, programme 
efficiency and effectiveness, and both tax levels and expenditures (Adams, 1997:168; 
CCMD, 1998; Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999; Peters, 2003), and included Canadian 
studies (Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2005).  Ensuring confidence 
and trust in democratic governments is crucial, since it guarantees the institutions’ 
legitimacy (Fortier, 2003).  
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A number of theories are advanced in the literature for this decline in public 
confidence include changes in socio-economic well being (Inglehart, 1997), higher 
taxation coupled with a reduction in programme budgets to address government debt 
load, reduced respect for authority, increased reporting of public sector scandals9 
(Peters, 2003), and survey evidence that citizens believe politicians are self-interested 
(Blais, 2003)10.  The Canadian experience is noted as similar to international findings 
(Nevitte, 1996:Chapter 3; CCMD, 1998; Savoie, 2003).   
 
There is a complex debate on what determines levels of trust and legitimacy.  For 
example, EKOS (1997) concluded that declining trust and confidence can be 
attributed to aging population, rapid social and technological change, and lower 
public programme expenditures.  One of the reasons often cited for declining trust in 
government is that it is symptomatic of a general decline in the trust in authority and 
institutions.  However, empirical data from the UK, examining changes in trust in a 
wide range of authority groups from 1983-2002 revealed no consistent pattern of a 
changing attitudes to authority (MORI, 2003). 
 
MORI (2003) also advances arguments explaining this decline in trust: views towards 
government are shaped by the perceived effectiveness with which it manages the 
economy and delivers services and by the behaviour of politicians and political 
institutions behaviour11.  There is mixed evidence for the strength of all these effects, 
with some evidence indicating that factors outside government control may have a 
strong impact on measures of trust.  It should be noted that empirical evidence does 
                                                 
9  There is no evidence that politicians and / or public servants are more dishonest than they were in the 
1960s or 1970s (Blais, 2003:109). 
10 A full discussion of drivers of reduced confidence in government can be found in (Sims, 2001:5-7). 
11 This could be expanded to include several high level public servant scandals which were widely 
reported in the Canadian media. 
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demonstrate that public trust varies considerably across government departments and 
services. 
 
Unfortunately, understanding of the causes of these declining patterns of trust is 
imperfect. Factors such as social change, quality of public services and the behaviour 
of politicians and senior public servants all appear to play a role in determining the 
level of trust between citizens and the government (Kelly et al., 2002).  Interestingly, 
although trust in government had clearly fallen, the 1997 Rethinking Government 
survey in Canada found that trust and legitimacy in government have been on the rise 
during the 1990s (Ekos, 1997).  Nevertheless, it is argued that the overall level of 
public confidence, together with other areas of public dissatisfaction, supported the 
implementation of New Public Management within the Canadian government.  New 
Public Management is discussed next. 
2.4.3 New Public Management (NPM) – An International Phenomenon 
Internationally, governments have engaged in numerous reforms and initiatives 
designed to improve cost effectiveness and efficiency, to increase quality of public 
services, to become results-oriented and citizen focused, and to emphasize strategic 
and business planning (OECD, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  This global 
paradigm shift in public sector management integrates concepts, tools and 
management techniques adopted from private sector management and calls for a new 
relationship between governments and citizens (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987; OECD, 
1990; Metcalfe, 1993; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  
These reforms, expanding through the 1980s (Savoie, 1994), became collectively 
known as New Public Management (Pollitt, 1990; Hood, 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000), and have been responsible for a number of highly positive changes in the 
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public sectors (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1993; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Kettl, 
2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).   
 
Precise definitions of NPM are difficult.  Although this term is a relatively recent 
addition to the public sector lexicon, NPM is based on concepts and ideas found in 
public administration since its earliest beginnings (Pollitt, 1990; Savoie, 1994; Hood, 
1995:95; Kettl, 2000).   As such, it could be argued that NPM is simply “new wine in 
old bottles” or a convenient myth (Kettl, 2000; Pollitt, 2001).  
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:8-11) define NPM as: “… public management reform 
consists of deliberate changes to the structure and processes of public sector 
organizations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better.”  
However, Pollitt and Bouckaert, also note that the concept of public management 
embraces many streams, ranging from the purely ‘managerial’ aspects identified by 
Perry (1984) to examining public administration as a social system (Koning, 1996).  
Given the wide range of NPM definitions and perspectives, it could be argued that 
assessing NPM’s contribution within the public sector is difficult. 
 
It is widely believed that these reforms represent an ideological shift to a 
‘Managerialism Model’ from the previous public sector ‘Administrative Model’, 
representing a major change from previous public sector traditions (Pollitt, 1993b:11), 
although limited empirical evidence can be found to support this claim (Carroll and 
Garkut, 1996).  Administration can be defined as “the review, in an area of public life, 
of law, its enforcement and revision, and decision-making on cases in that area 
submitted to the public service” (Denhardt, 1993:8).  In contrast, Managerialism is 
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“essentially the application of market principles and business practices to the 
management of government” (Denhardt, 1993:8).  The focus on Managerialism 
reflects an underlying philosophy that success, in both private and public sectors, 
depends on the quality and professionalism of managers, although this must be 
matched to relevant authorities who make and execute decisions; the “freedom to 
manage” (Pollitt, 1993b:1-3; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000).   
 
Table 8 summarizes the key differences between traditional and New Public 
Management, incorporating key historic contributions, as well as selections of current 
literature.  In addition to being grounded in the literature, this table also draws on 
personal discussions and correspondence with practitioners and academics.   
Understanding these key differences is critical to understanding the overall 
management culture as executives engage in Results-based Management. 
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Table 8: Comparison of New Public Management and Traditional Public 
Administration 
 
 ‘Traditional’ public administration 
(legal rationality) 
New Public Management  
(managerial rationality) 
Focus  Citizens and communities  
 Collective relationships 
 Organization-Focus 
 Clients (individuals and groups)  
 Micro-relationships  
 Citizen/Client Focus 
Preferred 
means of 
development 
 Public policy and design  
 Social equity  
 Procedural compliance  
 Career orientation  
 Programme management and 
evaluation 
 Quality  
 Privatization  
 Employability  
Socio-
professional 
characteristics 
 Rule-centred  
 Analytical (reflective) 
 Probity 
 Continuity and consistency 
 Control 
 Empowerment of employees 
 Intrapreneur (action-oriented)  
 Creativity 
Organizational 
cultures 
 Administrative, prudence, 
bureaucracy (hierarchy) 
 Secretive  
 Public interest 
Political/administrative continuum 
 Managerial freedom  
 Flexibility  
 Risk-taking, innovation  
 Customer/client responsiveness  
 Political/administrative 
dichotomy 
Management 
Style 
 Hierarchical structure, bureaucratic 
 Anonymous (to public)  
 Focus on values, life–long 
employment 
 Apply proven private sector 
management techniques 
including RBM, performance 
pay, contracts, etc. 
 ‘Bold’ leadership 
Politico-
administrative 
structures 
 Public service as a large institution 
 Most programmes delivered by 
departments 
 Centralization and hierarchy 
 Public service as organizational 
units  
 Programme delivered by wide 
variety of mechanisms 
 Decentralization and autonomy 
Accountability  Procedure and process 
 Control by collaboration 
 Expand accountability to include 
results and outcomes 
 Clearly defined objectives with 
performance targets 
Source:  various -  (Hood, 1995:96; Charih and Rouillard, 1997:31; Kernaghan et al., 
2000; Thomas, 2004a) 
 
2.4.4 Limitations and Criticisms of NPM 
New Public Management is not without its critiques.  In the late 1980s and early 
1990s NPM was presented as ‘a public management for all seasons’ (Hood, 1991) or 
the ‘one-best way’ (Gendron et al., 2000).  However, by the early 1990s, there was a 
suspicious similarity to the stories of governments that had adopted NPM (Hood, 
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1991), especially regarding potential conflicts between elements of democratic 
government and NPM reform (Sutherland, 2003:198).   
 
It has been suggested that the complaints surrounding bureaucracy that NPM is 
intended to solve, i.e. lethargy, unresponsiveness, belatedness, etc., have more to do 
with the Westminster-style parliament, politicians and citizens model than with public 
servants, and thus solutions must address limitations in Canada’s current political 
institutions (Savoie, 1995).   Similarly, Thomas (2004b:22) suggests that the 
“prevailing political culture of cabinet-parliamentary government conflicts with the 
espoused values of the new public service culture of risk taking and learning.”  Borins 
(1995b), earlier argued that NPM cannot itself resolve all issues, but remains an 
important re-conceptualization of public administration, in response to environmental 
challenges facing governments. 
 
At the centre of counter-arguments to NPM are inherent differences between public 
and private sectors.  It is argued that many NPM reforms are fundamentally flawed 
because private sector management practices rarely apply to public sector and are “…. 
focused on efficiency and market based reforms that ….threatens to eliminate 
democracy as the guiding principle of public administration” (Savoie, 1995:114).  
Contrary viewpoints argue that subscribing to NPM principles such as privatization 
and contracting out creates “… innovative bureaucracies that provide better service, 
produced at lower cost by public servants whose morale has improved” (Borins, 
1995a:124). 
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Another criticism of NPM is a requirement to cope with rapid changes introduced by 
NPM, while living within tight resource constraints (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987:24; 
Aucoin, 2001).  In fact, during the mid-1990s, Canadian reformers were forced to 
reconcile NPM renewal themes with reductions in operating budgets (Clark, 1994).  
Noting that change initiatives in the private sector are generally supported by internal 
investment, it can be argued that NPM adaptation in the public sector has been 
impeded by a lack of similar investments. 
 
Other weaknesses of NPM that Kelly et al. (2002) suggest can be traced to its narrow 
perspective are: 
• a focus on improving functionally defined services rather than meeting the 
overall service needs of different client groups 
• a pre-disposition towards piecemeal improvement rather than larger scale 
innovation 
• a tendency for micro-management and reduced discretion for front-line 
workers, with high costs created by detailed monitoring by headquarters and 
central agencies 
• an inability to extend NPM to engage with citizens and stakeholder groups 
despite noting an increased client focus. 
 
It can be argued that when NPM, emerging from the private sector, fails to adequately  
incorporate public values, there is a cost to society12 (Bozeman, 2000; Chapman, 
2003).  As Bozeman (2000:6) suggests, “Too often, contemporary (public policy) 
discourse is dominated not by public values, but by market intervention, technical 
                                                 
12 For example, the tobacco product market may be highly efficient, leading to strong profits,  but it can 
be argued, fails to address social values of public health (Bozeman, 2000:157).   
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efficiency, and the private value of public things.”  The concept of Public Value, 
discussed in the next section, emerged partly in an attempt to understand these 
limitations (Moore, 1995).   
 
One final criticism rests on NPM’s failure to differentiate between the various 
programmes offered by a national government.   There appears to be an unstated 
NPM assumption that all programmes can be managed similarly.  However, 
programme function does matter (Pollitt, 2003:225).  As Edwards (2001:31) suggests, 
the  failure of previous ‘alphabet soup’ of results-based initiatives: PPBS, ZBB, MBO 
and OPMS; can be at least partially attributed to the limitations of applying grand 
templates to the diversity of the public service. 
2.4.5 Public Value – Broadening Public Sector Theory 
Just as the goal of the private sector is to create private value, the goal of the public 
sector is to create public or social value.  The term ‘public value’ can be defined as 
what the public values – what they are willing to make sacrifices of money and 
freedom to achieve (Kelly et al., 2002), and describes the contribution made by the 
public sector to economic, social and environmental well-being of a society or nation.   
 
The following sections will situate Moore’s (1995) Public Value Theory within the 
large context of his Strategic Triangle (Moore, 1995), shown in Figure 3, below.  
Each element will be discussed in turn. 
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Figure 3: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model 
Legiti-
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Oper-
ational
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and Politically 
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and 
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Creates 
Public Value
Programs and Services Must Address: Public Value is Created Through:  
2.4.5.1 Moore’s Strategic Triangle 
As noted, on the left side of Figure 3, Moore’s Strategic Triangle (1995) positions 
Public Value as one of three critical elements which programmes must address to 
become or remain viable.  The other two are Legitimacy and politically sustainable, 
and Operationally and Administratively Feasibility. 
 
The model suggests that the legitimacy of public sector activities must be grounded in 
legislative mandates, departmental mission and vision statements, and political and 
public will.  Without strong mandates backed by consistent and enthusiastic public 
support, public sector executives will be unlikely to sustain resources, stakeholder 
cooperation and employee motivation to accomplish objectives  (Heymann, 1987; 
Roberts, 1995; Moore, 2000; Chapman, 2003).  This is especially true given the 
competition for resources from other programmes (Aucoin et al., 2004; Moore, 2004), 
and for politicians to fund new programmes (Canada National Budget, 2005).   
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Similarly, no individual declaration that something is publicly valuable will cause tax 
dollars or public authority to flow to a government organization. It is only when 
citizens and their representatives agree that some purpose is publicly valuable, the 
‘authorizing environment’ of the organization, that these key public resources can be 
committed to productive action (Heymann, 1987; Moore, 1995; 2000).  Ongoing 
proactive management is required to ensure continued programme legitimacy and 
resource allocations.  
 
Considering ‘Operational and Administrative Feasibility’, a key element of executive 
management is assessing and maintaining the overall capacity of the organization 
(Drucker, 2004).  This second concept incorporates all issues associated with 
employees (competency, recruitment and retention, training, etc.) budget and resource 
levels, and the overall capacity or limits of organizational processes, systems, 
infrastructure and corporate structure and responsibilities.  At the macro level, 
Operational Feasibility would also address the limits of humankind’s knowledge and 
capacity limits – some issues simply cannot be resolved (Moore, 1995). 
 
This Strategic Triangle framework serves to focus executive attention in three 
directions: upward to the political level that authorizes and funds programmes, 
outward to the desired impact and values to be created for society, and downward 
addressing internal management issues (Moore, 2000).   
2.4.5.2 Moore’s Drivers of Public Value  
Moore (1995) argues that the creation of Public Value, the right side of Figure 3, is 
the ultimate goal of public sector programmes, suggesting that to create public value, 
executives must address three key areas: 
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• Services - cost effective provision of high quality services 
• Outcomes - achievement of desirable end results 
• Trust - support a high level of trust between citizens and government 
This model has gained acceptance in both in academic (Bozeman, 2002; Kearns, 
2004) and public sector practitioner literature (Kelly et al., 2002).   
 
The first element – Services – is similar to the private sector.  Under Public Value 
theory, successful service delivery supports all elements of public value creation 
outcomes, services, and trust.  Public Value outcomes incorporate the concept of 
citizens as a co-producers of public benefits (health, education, etc), as well as 
heightens the role and importance of overall social benefit within public 
programmes13.   In each of these roles, outcomes, services and trust, the aspects of 
service delivery that lead to public value is different, and it is these multiple 
dimensions and richness of values that contribute to the dialogue on public services. 
 
Clients and consumers of public sector programmes derive direct benefits that are 
similar to those benefits accrued through purchases in the private sector.  However, 
key differences are noted in the indirect benefits citizens receive through the equitable 
and fair distribution of services received by others.  In other words, fair distribution in 
itself  is a desirable public value (Kelly et al., 2002).   Other aspects of Service are 
linked to frameworks of client satisfaction and accountability.   
 
Service also incorporates the public value generated through economic, efficient and 
effective programme delivery (Moore, 1995).   
                                                 
13 An example would be comparing the importance of one’s child receiving a sound education with the 
importance to society of all children receiving sound education. 
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The second element – Outcomes – focuses on the overall benefit to society (beyond 
the individual) and has long been a core element of the ‘citizen/government contract.’   
Historically, the most important functions or outcomes of overall national government 
were peace and security.  Notably, public value criteria changes over time; public 
health emerged in the 19th century as a key outcome objective, while poverty 
reduction and environment emerged in the late 20th century.  
 
While a central tenet of modern public sector reform is an increased focus on 
outcomes, this raises a number of issues, both theoretical and practical.  For example, 
that public value is generally produced as a joint effort between citizens and 
government is particularly relevant for outcomes.  The public sector alone cannot 
deliver lower crime or better health; social norms of behaviour are critical in 
achieving these outcomes.  Changing social norms can be one of the most powerful 
tools for a government seeking to create value through outcomes. Although there have 
been some notable successes (e.g. reduction in drinking and driving, fewer smokers), 
understanding of how governments can effectively change behaviour remains 
underdeveloped, and in many cases the public still overestimates what government 
can and cannot do (Kelly et al., 2002). 
 
The third driver in creating public value is Trust.  Trust does not appear to conform to 
any one universal definition, but rather is a multi-faceted concept that can mean 
several things, depending on the context (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; MORI, 2003).  
The large and increasing volume of literature on trust crosses multiple social science 
fields, and is widely acknowledged to be crucial for the smooth and efficient 
functioning of society, public and private sectors (Rousseau et al., 1998; O'Hara, 
2004; Thomas, 2004a).  Within the public sector, public trust is at the centre of the 
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citizen-state relationship, giving legitimacy to government programmes and actions 
(Moore, 1995).  Even when outcome and service targets are achieved, a decline or 
collapse in trust levels may limit or even destroy the creation of public value14.   
 
Trust is an especially important aspect of public value given the recent decline in the 
general level of trust reported for government and public institutions.  As discussed in 
Section 2.4.2, there is considerable debate over what drives levels of trust in public 
institutions (Ekos, 1997; MORI, 2003; Treasury Board of Canada, 2003d).  
Arguments include the connection between general levels of social trust and trust in 
institutions, the behaviour of politicians and politics, and that trust in government is 
shaped primarily by government competence in the management of the economy and 
the delivery of services.  Unfortunately understanding the causes of these changing 
patterns of trust is imperfect.  However, factors such as social change, quality of 
public services, and the behaviour of politicians and political institutions all play a 
role in determining the level of trust between citizens and the government (Kearns, 
2004).  
 
Accountability and trust are closely linked, as discussed more fully in Section 2.7.2.  
Accountability increases public trust through a variety of methods.  Reporting, 
ranging from simple resource accounting to more complex and subjective ‘Value for 
Money’ audits, impacts on public trust.  A second factor generally absent in the 
literature, is that the presence of suitable accountability instruments increases public 
trust (Auditor General of Canada, 2002b; Smith, 2004:69).   Accountability also 
                                                 
14 As Chapman (2003:127)  notes, committing to improve services / service levels to meet a specific 
target and then not meeting the target may lead to a reduction in trust and correspondingly public 
value, even though service levels may have improved. 
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reassures citizens that errors and mistakes are caught, rectified, and avoided wherever 
possible in the future. 
 
Trust extends to finding sustainable solutions to public sector issues and programmes, 
and to avoid adopting short-term fixes with significant downstream consequences.   
 
Moore and others argue that while each individual element - Service, Outcome, and 
Trust – is important in and of itself; it is the complex interplay between these 
elements that contributes most to Public Value (Moore, 1995; 2003; Bend, 2004; 
Kearns, 2004).  
2.4.5.3 Contrasting Traditional, NPM and Public Value 
As noted earlier, it has been suggested that Public Value is the next iteration of public 
sector reform, responding to perceived weaknesses and unexpected results in  
adaptation of NPM (Kelly et al., 2002; Smith, 2004).  In order to present a summary 
of differences under these reform initiatives, Table 9, below, summarizes key 
differences between these three paradigms of public management: traditional public 
management, NPM and Public Value theories.  
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Table 9: Contrasting Traditional Public Management, NPM, and Public Value 
 
 Traditional Public 
Management 
New Public 
Management (NPM) 
Public Value 
Key 
objectives 
/public 
interest 
 Defined by 
politicians/experts 
 Managed by 
bureaucrats 
 Managed economies 
and efficiencies, 
respond to aggregate 
individual 
preferences 
demonstrated by 
customer choice 
 Achieve public 
value, effective in 
addressing individual 
& public preferences 
Perform-
ance 
objective 
 Managing inputs  Managing inputs and 
outputs 
 Multiple: 
 Outputs and 
outcomes 
 Satisfaction  
 Maintaining trust / 
legitimacy 
Dominant 
model of 
account-
ability 
 Hierarchical – 
Ministerial and 
Parliament 
 Addition of 
performance and 
service contracts, 
sometimes through 
market mechanisms 
to customers 
 Multiple: 
 Citizens as overseers 
of govt 
 Customers/clients as 
users 
  Taxpayer as funder 
Preferred 
delivery 
system 
 Hierarchical 
department of self-
regulating profession 
 Addition of Private 
sector or tightly 
defined arms-length 
public agency 
 Joint Ventures 
 Privatization 
 Community interest 
groups 
Approach 
to public 
service 
ethos 
 Public sector has 
monopoly on service 
ethos 
 Sceptical of PS ethos 
(leads to inefficiency 
and empire 
building), favours 
customer service 
 No one sector has a 
monopoly on ethos, 
and no one ethos 
always appropriate 
Role for 
public 
partici-
pation 
 Voting in elections 
Political pressure 
 Increased, but 
limited role in Policy 
development 
 Client satisfaction 
survey 
 Crucial and multi-
faceted (customers, 
citizens, key 
stakeholders) 
Role of 
managers 
 Respond to political 
direction and comply 
with rules and 
regulations 
 Increased client 
focus and meet 
agreed performance 
targets 
 
 Respond to 
citizen/user 
preferences, renew 
mandate and trust 
through guaranteeing 
quality services 
Source: Adopted from (Keeling, 1972:10; Kelly et al., 2002; Stoker, 2003) 
2.4.5.4 Public Value and the Citizen/Client 
One of the key distinctions between Public Choice’s purely economic approach 
(Section 2.3.3.3) and the Public Value approach is the way in which individual 
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members of society are viewed.  Within traditional public service, individual citizens 
were regarded simply as recipients of public services and products, with limited 
recourse as to service levels.  The arrival of NPM leads to a consumer/client model, 
where efforts to create the best possible products and maintain satisfaction are seen as 
key to an effective public sector.  Public Value extends this model to increasing 
citizen/client input into programme design and delivery (Chapman, 2003). 
 
Moore (1995) argues that public sector managers must not limit themselves to 
passively responding to public preferences, but rather must actively seek out ways in 
which public value can be achieved through increased dialogue with citizens and 
clients.  This suggests that executives must engage politicians, the public and 
stakeholders in meaningful dialogue about their preferences, choices and alternatives 
to increase public value (Stoker, 2003).  Notably, the consultation process also 
increases public value (Smith, 2004).   
 
Stoker suggests that the search for public value encourages the consideration of new 
and innovative ways of governing.  The Public Value Management (PVM) paradigm 
pursued through a network governance model holds out the possibility of a 
partnership between democracy and efficiency (Stoker, 2003; Smith, 2004).   
2.4.5.5 Summary of Public Value 
In summary, the Public Value model identifies conditions which support the creation 
of value between public sector programmes and citizens (Moore, 1995).  As Smith 
(2004) argues, achieving public value is at the core of public sector executive 
functions.  For Moore (1995:55), public value is fluid and changing, and attaining it 
requires proactive, not reactive, management.  As he states,  
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“Like private sector managers, managers in the public sector must work hard at the task 
of defining publicly valuable enterprises as well as producing that value. Moreover they 
must be prepared to adapt and reposition their organizations in their political and task 
environments in addition to simply ensuring their continuity. “ 
 
Moving upwards from Public Value theory to the Strategic Triangle level, Moore 
emphasizes the importance of understanding and verifying the value propositions that 
underpin operations.  The Strategic Triangle implicitly requires that executives 
understand and challenge their overall goals and objectives, and insists that they have 
the necessary means to achieving the desired results.  This suggests a logical model 
connecting resources, processes and activities to valued social results (Moore, 
1995:33-36).  
2.4.6 Service for Whom? The Client/Customer/Citizen dilemma  
“We are not merely customers of government, we are also subjects who have 
obligations, citizens who have rights; and clients who have complex needs.”  
(Mintzberg, 1996:76). 
 
A centrepiece of NPM reforms is a renewed focus on government’s role as service 
provider (Kernaghan and Langford, 1990).  New Public Management’s emphasize on 
public choice (consumers capable of expressing their individual preferences through 
various mechanisms, many adopted from the private sector) moves public sector 
service delivery from an administrative service provision model to a client satisfaction 
model (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  Individuals 
have a number of different roles they play with respect to public services, including 
consumer, citizen and overseer (Bend, 2004).  This section discusses these roles in the 
literature. 
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It can be argued that the relationship between state and the public as consumers of 
public goods is complex.  NPM increased the focus on each of the roles of client 
versus citizen (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  
Defining these terms:  
 Citizens are members of a community (nationally, regionally, or locally), who 
possess certain rights and entitlements and are also bound by certain duties 
and obligations (Tait, 1996; Treasury Board of Canada, 1996) 
 Clients are defined as the direct recipients of products or services, and who 
engage in transactions with service providers to gain access to those services.  
The term Customer has also been applied to programmes or services where 
payments, such as user fees were required.  However, modern discourse has 
broadened the term ‘client’ to include a philosophy of client interaction and 
engagement by public servants (Dinsdale and Marson, 1999) 
These two terms do have parallels in the public and private sectors (Lenihan, 2001).  
The following table summarizes key differences between the citizen and client (also 
noted as customer) models. 
 
Table 10: A Comparison of Citizen and Client Driven Models 
Dimension Citizen Client 
Source of individual resources Legal rights Purchasing power 
Types of entitlements Universal Selective 
Type of Responsibilities Civic, political None 
Base for social membership Collective Individual 
State-individual relationship Inclusive Exclusive 
Individual – State 
communication 
Verbal (‘voice’) Non-verbal (‘purchase’ or 
‘exit’) 
Policy objective Social welfare Individual empowerment 
Public administration 
management objectives 
Legal security, 
efficiency 
Customer satisfaction, market-
like resource allocation 
Source:  (Pierre, 1995:65) 
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The public value perspective sees individuals have a number of different roles with 
respect to public services, roles that an individual will switch between depending on 
the context (Chapman, 2003)15.  Recipients of public goods are simultaneously 
clients, stakeholders and citizens, with entitlements, rather than economic ability, 
typically the key to receiving programme benefits (Cooper, 1993:190).  Unlike the 
private sector market model where individuals pursue their own welfare through 
exchanges with others whenever trades are mutually beneficial, a democratic public 
sector must incorporate the collective or ‘public interest’ (Stone, 1988).  Tait 
(1996:39) suggests, “...the true role of public servants is not only to serve ‘customers’ 
but also to balance the interests and preserve the rights of ‘citizens’.”   
 
Applying the private sector customer service model in the public sector implicitly 
considers recipients as customers in an arm’s-length trading relationship (Fortier, 
2003).  In the private sector, in order to maximize customer satisfaction, businesses 
are free to provide customers with individual service and products, and often put 
certain customers above others (e.g., preferred customer or VIP treatment).   
 
Contrastingly, public sector programmes generally require that eligible citizens 
receive the same level of service in support of democratic values (e.g., accountability, 
transparency, the rule of law), principles of natural justice (fairness, due process, 
impartiality) and horizontal equity (equal treatment of like citizens).  Thus, both the 
means (fairness, due process, and probity) and the ends (guarding the public interest 
                                                 
15 Chapman (2003) uses the example of a hospital visit.  If a citizen found the hospital dirty, slow and 
rude, the citizen is not simply a dissatisfied customer of the service; as a citizen and tax-payer they 
are also upset that the standard of provision is so low.   But had the experience been the exact 
opposite – an extremely plush waiting room with free coffee, immediate service, etc. – she might 
also have been disturbed at the high level of service her taxes were paying for. These are quite 
distinct from her reactions as pure consumer. 
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and achieving public goods) of the public sector are distinct from those of the private 
sector (Dinsdale and Marson, 1999:6).    
 
The discourse on public sector clients suggests a ‘public market’ for goods and 
services.  Presumably, for those who choose to participate - and this suggests a level 
of choice that is frequently absent when accessing public sector programmes such as 
emergency health care or unemployment insurance - greater satisfaction is possible.  
However, Pierre (1995) argues that public markets differ from private markets in 
three critical respects: entrance requirements, demand structures, and the absence of 
pricing/cost calculations. 
 
In the public sector, most departments operate under what Conroy (2001) refers to as 
a bi-polar model, with all clients served to the maximum level within the resource 
constraints.  As well, unlike the private sector where benefits flow principally to 
voluntary purchasers, in the case of many public sector programmes benefits also 
accrue to citizens (e.g. regulatory activities), which are harder to measure (Dinsdale 
and Marson, 1999).   
 
In summary, NPM’s focus on clients as customers tends to overlook the complex 
interplay of issues within public programme goals (Pollitt, 1993a:209).  The 
client/customer/citizen worlds are different; their values, goals, standards, and 
responsibilities and accountability create different spaces (Stein, 2001).  While 
attractive, the doctrine of NPM appears to avoid the discussion of the complexity of 
the client relations model of public services, as well as the interplay of issues within 
public programme goals (Pollitt, 1993a:209).  Furthermore, as executives embrace 
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NPM client/customer focus, it has been suggested that critical elements of public 
sector activity which define and legitimate government (e.g. social injustice, 
environment), as well as certain key high level objectives (e.g. probity, equity, 
transparency), may be falling by the wayside (Box, 1999).   
2.4.7 A ‘Canadian Model’ of public sector reform 
Turning to Canadian experience with public sector reform, it is clear that Canadian 
ministers and senior officials were well aware of NPM thinking from the late 1970s 
onward (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), influenced by public sector reforms from the 
USA and UK (Savoie, 1994).  Similar to other OECD governments, the Canadian 
government has adopted a range of NPM management techniques and tools including 
strategic planning, RBM, increased citizen focus, performance measurement, accrual 
accounting and performance based pay (Peters, 1993; Aucoin, 1995; Mayne, 1997:3; 
Auditor General of Canada, 2000b; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
 
A number of authors have commented upon the Canadian experience, including 
several international comparisons (Aucoin, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; 
Aucoin, 2001).  While Aucoin (1995) argues that up to the mid-1990s, Canadian 
reforms had been ‘rather timid’ in comparison with other countries, Canada was able 
to study and reflect on international experiences prior to engaging in widespread 
systematic changes (Auditor General of Canada, 2000a).  The evidence from the 
literature confirms that Canada has embraced NPM in the last decade (post-1995). 
 
Acknowledging that while none of its elements are unique, it has been argued that a 
Canadian model of NPM reform exists.  Unlike the USA, which used a legislative 
approach, and the UK’s Parliamentary driven exercise, Results for Canadians, 
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Canada’s NPM policy agenda was internally designed and led by senior bureaucrats 
(Aucoin, 2001; Edwards, 2001; Green, 2002).  It has been implemented “calmly, 
competently, without much fanfare” (Bourgon, 1998:7), and that it is sufficiently 
different to warrant attention as a unique contribution to NPM reform (Bourgon, 
1998; Privy Council of Canada, 1998:2; Good, 2004b), although this is far from 
accepted (Aucoin, 2000).  Table 11 below describes Canadian reform efforts to-date.  
 
Table 11: Evolution of Key Values in Canadian Public Administration 
Canadian version of UK 
Whitehall Model (1918–
1967) – a Weberian 
Bureaucracy   
Values Added by 
Amendment (1967–1999) 
New Public Management 
(1967–1999) 
Ministerial responsibility Public service accountability Public service accountability 
Supremacy of parliament Increase of administrative 
regulation  
Public service 
entrepreneurship, innovation 
Rule of law Charter of Rights and 
freedoms (1982) 
Results oriented 
Obedience Collective bargaining (1967) Client oriented 
Discipline Control, policies and 
regulations 
Values and Ethics based 
Incentives 
Merit Employment equity Personnel oriented, Flexible 
merit 
Secrecy Access to Information Act Partnerships 
Political neutrality Limited political activity Limited political activity 
Seniority Job security Excellence 
Source: (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999:163) 
 
Canada’s NPM document Results for Canadians was formally launched in 2000 
(Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  This document sets out the four key elements of 
Canadian NPM.  Figure 4, below, shows these four elements.  
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Figure 4: Results for Canadians 
 
Source: (Treasury Board of Canada, 2000:5) 
 
Linking Results for Canadians and other management policies together in a cohesive 
package in 2003, The Treasury Board Secretariat released the revised Management 
Accountability Framework (MAF), which incorporated all executive accountabilities.  
This serves as the base for revisions to the annual performance appraisal system 
(Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c).  Figure 5 separates managerial accountability 
into ten categories (MAF), including programme results and client satisfaction.  
2.4.8 Summary of Public Sector Reform in Canada 
In reviewing Canadian progress, the literature suggested that overall, public sector 
reform in the 1990s was limited, arguably influenced by changing priorities, frequent 
reorganizations and the major downsizing of the mid-1990s (Edwards, 2001; Thomas, 
2004a).  Similarly, the Auditor General of Canada (1993:Chapter 6) identified that 
early reform efforts would have benefited from a “more strategic approach to public 
management and public service reform.” 
 
Savoie (2004:15) argues that sustained political leadership was lacking and Clark 
(2001:2) suggests that “Major public service reforms can succeed only if they are 
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embedded in a ‘management agenda’ that is led from the political level, and that is 
aligned both with the government’s policy and fiscal agendas.”  
 
 A stronger political will, as demonstrated by the introduction of ‘internal 
management’ bills (legislation), and arguably consistent internal leadership has seen 
significant progress this decade in integrating NPM concepts in keys areas such as 
Results-based Management, Service Improvement Initiative, and accountability to the 
public (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005).  Continued 
progress in Canadian public sector reforms require that traditional values of prudence, 
economy and probity be balanced with themes of client focus, results and 
accountability (Box, 1999), a difficult task given the diverse interests of stakeholders 
for most government programmes.    
 
Table 12: Summary of Section 2.4 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
History of public sector 
reform 
Introduce topic (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Canada, 1990; 
Savoie, 1994) 
Declining confidence 
in Government 
Setting the stage for more reform efforts (Johnson, 1992; 
Edwards, 2001) 
New Public 
Management 
Paradigm shift in philosophy of the public sector (Aucoin, 1995; 
Hood, 1995; Pollitt, 1995) 
Including limitations and critics (Hood, 1991; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000) 
Public Value Theory Introduction of the theoretical model (Moore, 1995) 
Client/Customer Focus Major component of NPM (Zussman, 1997; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000) 
Canadian model of 
reform 
Summarising a decade of NPM within a Canadian public sector 
context (Savoie, 2003; Good, 2004b) 
 
  
Figure 5: Treasury Board of Canada, Management Accountability Framework 
 
  Source: (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c:3)
  
2.5 Results-based Management (RBM) 
“Enhancing performance in government to move public management beyond 
bureaucracy and promote greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness is the 
bottom line of public management reform.” (Aucoin, 2001:183) 
 
Extensive literature demonstrates that Results-based Management has emerged 
internationally as a key component of public sector reform (OECD, 1995; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000; OECD, 2002).  However, the literature also notes that the essential 
ideas underlying Results-based Management (RBM) are not new either in theory or 
practice (Drucker, 1974; Neely et al., 2002).  This section will introduce the topic of 
Results-based Management in the Canadian Public Sector, followed by sections 
discussing issues associated with: 
 Moving from Outputs to Outcomes 
 Results - who decides what they should be 
 The Three E’s - Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 Logic Models - Tying the E’s together 
 Adding a 4th ‘E’ - Equity 
2.5.1 RBM in the Canadian Public Sector 
Similar to other nations, Canada has intermittently experimented with RBM concepts 
since the late 1960s (Dewar, 2000; Savoie, 2003).  However, progress has been slow.  
Even during the last decade, the Auditor General (2001:7) suggested, “It took much of 
the 1990s … to achieve wide acceptance that managing for results is a key principle 
of managing in (Canadian) government.”  However, by the mid-1990s, the political 
and operational environment in Canada had become much more hospitable, leading to 
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renewed interest in management reform, including Results-based Management 
(Lindquist, 1998b).  
 
It could be argued that up to 2000, forty years of Canadian management reform had 
consistently sought to increase executive attention to programme results or outcomes.  
However, while the collection and reporting of programme performance data has 
demonstrably increased in quantity, increases in quality have been marginal (Auditor 
General of Canada, 2003c).  Information focused mainly on broader issues, rather 
than on operational details (Savoie, 1999), and on activities and outputs, rather than 
on outcomes or impacts (Lindquist, 1998b:168,176).  As the Treasury Board 
(2000:12) noted, “…the current state of results-based management is still a good 
distance from the ideal.”   
 
Nevertheless, the Auditor General (2005) does note progress in an increased focus on, 
and accountability for, results.   
 
The advent of the Results-based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF), 
mandatory for programme funding (Treasury Board of Canada, 2002a), Management 
Accountability Frameworks (MAF) linked to executive performance pay (Treasury 
Board of Canada, 2003c), and the renewed policy on Programme Evaluation, now 
required every five years for all programmes (Treasury Board of Canada, 2001a), 
support an increased focus on Results-based Management.  Nevertheless, as Gow 
(2004:21) notes, “While our practices may fall short of a rigorous RBM systems, we 
have nevertheless moved into the Result-based mode of managing, in all official 
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documents, and Deputy Ministers are expected to respect it under the new 
Management Accountability Framework.” 
2.5.2 Moving from Outputs to Outcomes 
Historically, the public sector has focused its attention on resource inputs (budgets 
and spending), activities (processes) and outputs (production).  The advent of Results-
based Management requires that executives incorporate the monitoring of both short 
term impacts and longer term outcomes or results of programmes under their 
responsibility into the management.   
 
Having presented a definition of Results-based Management in the Introduction 
Chapter, the literature suggests that Results-based Management supports three 
principle aspects of public sector management: 
 Effective strategic management - To ensure decision makers have a range of 
information to consider in making decisions on future spending and priorities  
 Improved management control of ongoing programme delivery, including 
policy adjustments 
 Increased accountability for measured results and effectiveness16  
 (Auditor General of Canada, 1997b). 
 
One of the key themes of NPM has been the increased attention by the public 
manager on outcomes.  As the Treasury Board of Canada (2000:11) states, “A modern 
management agenda requires managers to look beyond activities and outputs to focus 
on actual results - the impacts and effects of their programmes.”  The Treasury Board 
                                                 
16 Other potential uses of RBM are noted in the literature, for example, the potential of improved staff 
communications and greater alignment with organizational strategic goals. Executives did not 
advance these concepts during the research interviews. 
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of Canada (2002c:5) definitions of outputs and outcomes, deemed appropriate given 
the nature of the research under consideration, are as follows:  
“Output - Direct products or services stemming from the activities of an 
organization, policy, programme or initiative, and usually within the control of the 
organization itself.  
 
Outcome - An external consequence attributed, in part, to an organization, policy, 
programme or initiative. Outcomes are not within the control of a single 
organization, policy, programme or initiative; instead they are within the area of 
the organization’s influence. Outcomes are usually further qualified as immediate, 
intermediate, or ultimate.”  
 
It can be argued that increased accountability for programme outcomes would 
logically translate into an increased need for information on programme performance 
and results.  In addition, it can be argued that ‘managing’ for results, as compared to 
‘accountability’ for results, would require timely performance information, permitting 
managerial (re)actions in order to influence outcomes.  In either case, increased 
information is required.  This will be further discussed in Section 2.7. 
2.5.3 Results – Who Decides what they should be? 
Under Results-based Management, even the deceptively simple phrase – ‘hold 
government accountable for outcomes’ proves exceptionally difficult to operationalise 
(Behn, 1997).  Results-based Management requires clear decisions on what results are 
desired (Treasury Board of Canada, 2001b), but as Wholey (1997:100) identifies, 
“getting a reasonable degree of consensus on key results to be achieved… can be 
difficult.”  Legislative programme goals and objectives are frequently vague, arguably 
intentionally so (Good, 2004b).   
 
As discussed earlier, citizens, clients, target population, service providers, 
bureaucrats, and politicians can and will desire different programme outcomes.  For 
  Page 75 
politicians, in an environment where stakeholders seek competing and contradictory 
goals, accountability for results against general, sometimes vague, high-level 
objectives can be a rational choice (Good, 2004b).  Often multiple programme 
objectives are established, the goals clearly the result of multiple, complex activities 
external to the programme legislation, and/or with outcomes difficult to measure and 
interpret (Rouse, 1993; Meyer and Gupta, 1994:313).   
 
Similarly, for executives, this vagueness creates an environment where public 
servants are at best reluctant to accept accountability for results, knowing they must 
choose from among a continuum of outcomes, with corresponding exposure to 
criticism (Behn, 1998).  However, it can be counter-argued that executives do gain 
some control in selectively reporting results achieved to Parliament and the public.  
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that certain RBM issues cannot be resolved without 
reference to the current Canadian political–public sector model (Good, 2004b).   
 
One key aspect of public sector outcomes is that results are generally produced as a 
joint effort between citizens and government.  For example, government alone cannot 
reduce drinking and driving, individual choices are critical (Kelly et al., 2002).   In 
most areas significant gaps remain in our understanding of how to create public value 
through outcomes; either because of limited knowledge of causality of the outcome, 
or because where a reasonable sense of the causes exist, little understanding regarding 
the relative effectiveness of various policy levers on outcomes can be demonstrated. 
However, Smith (2004) notes that across a wide range of policy areas, knowledge and 
the corresponding sophistication of policy tools is steadily improving.  Executives can 
be predicted to be rational in their acceptance of results they are accountable for. 
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Horizontal policy issues can also have a significant impact in managing for results.  
While public sector programmes are, with few exceptions, delivered under the 
authority of one government department, the complexity of policy issues generally 
transcend single departments.  Increasingly, effective programme results require 
horizontal cooperation, but are constrained by vertical funding and accountability 
infrastructures (Treasury Board of Canada, 2000; Bakvis and Juillet, 2004).  
Increasing horizontality leads to greater complexity in accountability, shared 
performance indicators, and reporting requirements, as well as increasing the 
difficulty in identifying and measuring the results achieved.  It was noted that efforts 
were underway to expand tools, framework and other managerial tools for horizontal 
initiatives (Treasury Board of Canada, 2002a).   
 
Although of limited applicability, because new policies and expanded programmes 
are the exception rather than the norm17, citizen input into the policy process can 
assist in identifying desired outcomes (Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  It can be 
argued that citizen input has the potential to increase Public Value – Trust, although 
Bouckaert (2003), argues that this may be difficult to measure. 
 
Establishing the citizens’ preferences about what is valued, and to what degree, 
involves reasoned and deliberative processes as well as opinion polling/voting. Kelly 
et al. (2002:31) suggest that key issues for policy makers include:   
 “Identifying whose preferences should count: current users, those who might 
need a service (even if they are not aware of it), future users, those who will 
never use it but whose political support needs to be maintained, those who 
have views about who else deserves a service? 
                                                 
17 Most, although not all, Canadian federal programmes simply remain in effect until the enabling 
legislation is changed.  As can be expected, a review of Canadian national budgets would reveal that 
the great majority of projected expenditures are for existing and ongoing programmes, with a 
relatively small amount targeting new or significantly expanded programmes. 
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 Identifying the issues on which the public will want to be involved, to obtain 
citizen views where important but not to be over-demanding. There is clear 
evidence that for certain issues there is a stronger desire among affected 
citizens to make their views known, especially those with a direct personal 
impact. 
 Providing forums in which citizens/groups can learn about issues, express 
views, explore scenarios and seek to reach accommodations that can inform 
policy. 
 Recognizing the limits of ‘revealed preferences’ and exploring the potential of 
‘stated preference’ approaches that focus on policy trade-offs and don’t rely 
on cash as the only unit of comparison.” 
 
There is some evidence that the Canadian government has directly encouraged greater 
citizen involvement though various mechanisms, including increased use of public 
surveys to gather public opinions (Savoie, 1999; Good, 2004b), efforts to increase 
public policy consultations (Justice Canada, 2002), development of tools to measure 
client satisfaction (CCMD, 1998; Schmidt and Strickland, 1998), and incorporation of 
the Service Improvement Initiative policy which commits departments to achieve a 
minimum of a 10 per cent increase in client satisfaction by 2005.  Client satisfaction is 
discussed in Section 2.6.5. 
 
One final argument concerns the lack of stability in the ‘programme environment’ 
when assessing results.   Programmes do not operate in stable environments.  Rather, 
changes in the internal and external environment influencing programme resources 
available, level of activity, and political and public attention, and even the results to 
be obtained, are common (Sutherland, 2003:198).   
As a next step in examining the literature underpinning this research, the chapter will 
now consider the broad parameters and frameworks adopted in actually measuring 
results. 
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2.5.4 The Three E’s – Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
One widely used model of assessing public sector programmes is measuring and 
analysing programme costs, efficiency and effectiveness.  The literature on these three 
‘E’s’ is extensive, especially within evaluation and audit functions, with several 
academic journals addressing their role.  Within the Canadian public sector, the 
Auditor General of Canada (2003a:119) defines economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and their interaction, as follows: 
 “Economy - getting the right amount of resources, at the right quality, at the 
right time and place, at the lowest cost.  The latter has long been the focus of 
many of the rules and regulations in areas such as contracting and HR to 
manage costs.  
 Efficiency - the minimum resource inputs to achieve a given quantity and 
quality of output.  An efficient operation either produces the maximum 
quantity of output of a given quality for any given resource inputs, or uses 
minimum inputs to produce a given quantity and quality of output 
 Effectiveness refers to the extent to which the outcomes of an activity match 
the objective or the intended effects of that activity.”  
 
 
Figure 6: The Interrelation of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
 Source: (Auditor General of Canada, 1995:5)  
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Historically, stewardship - the prudent management of entrusted resources – has been 
an enduring public sector value.  Savoie (2003) suggests that the bureaucratic 
management model has a long tradition of managing ‘economic’ aspects of 
programmes through rules, regulations and policies which ensure consistency in 
acquiring and using resources, people or goods (Stein, 2001).  Effective and economic 
management of resources remains a key element within the Management 
Accountability Framework (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003c).   
 
Assessing efficiency requires the measurement of the transformation process, turning 
input resources into a product or service.  Efficiency can be measured in two broad 
ways:  Allocative – ‘Are we doing the right things?’ - which is an inherently political 
question; and Technical - ‘Are we doing them in the right way?’    
 
The latter can be achieved in two ways, producing outputs at the lowest cost, or more 
often in a public service context, maximizing benefits from relatively fixed inputs.  
However, unlike economic aspects, simple measures of efficiency generally require 
external, measurable standard(s), for example, how many units are produced per 
worker, per day (Stein, 2001), leaving  efficiency open to conflicting interpretations 
on the suitable comparison measures (Stone, 1988).   Furthermore, as Stein (2001:6) 
notes, “Efficiency is not an end, but a means to achieving valued ends.  It is not a 
goal, but an instrument to achieve other goals; it is not a value, but a way to achieve 
other values.”   
 
While the general public seems to have a fairly clear idea of what economical and 
efficient programme delivery represents to them, at least in a private sector context, 
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these two values are often far from clear to public servants who get conflicting signals 
about their meaning and relative importance.   Johnson’s (1963) warnings of the 
inherent conflict between the values of ‘administrative efficiency’ and ‘service 
efficiency’ while dated, remain true today, with public servants called not simply to 
account for technical efficiency but also to operate within a context of public sector 
values, culture and client satisfaction.  
 
Effectiveness, the third ‘E’, is a complex concept, with no overall agreement on what 
the term means in the public sector literature, nor in practice.  While a tautology, 
measuring programme effectiveness first requires clearly identifying programme 
objectives, and clarifying contradictions, as well as identifying which aspect of the 
programme is under examination: management effectiveness, operational 
effectiveness, programme effectiveness or organizational effectiveness.  Furthermore, 
effectiveness is highly dependant on who is considering it (CCAF-FCVI, 1987:18).   
 
Similarly, Aucoin (2000:14) argues that in a public service context, effectiveness can 
amount to no more than assessing the technical dimensions of quality service 
delivery, as the broad parameters of what is to be done are primarily determined by 
the political leadership.  For example, measuring the efficiency of health care is of 
limited value without considering its’ effectiveness (Stein, 2001:172).   In this 
context, efficiency is little more than a measure of labour productivity, while 
effectiveness is a reflection of impact against stated objectives (Kernaghan and 
Langford, 1990; Dewar, 2000).    
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Programme executives must find ways to balance effectiveness, economy and 
efficiency (CCAF-FCVI, 1987; Auditor General of Canada, 1995; Flynn, 1997:171).  
A failure to manage all three will be considered a failure by politicians and/or 
citizens.  This is difficult, and can also lead to unintended consequences.  For 
example, within certain programmes efficiency measures represent the average cost of 
processing a given output heedless of any value to the public.  In these circumstances 
it’s possible for measures of efficiency to improve without there being a concomitant 
improvement in the service experienced by the user, for example reducing customer 
contact time may increase efficiency (measurement issues are discussed in Section 
2.6.2).  Improvements in efficiency in this narrow sense can be argued to even 
decrease Public Value (Kelly et al., 2002). 
 
In order to provide an information base to assess progress required by these three Es, 
Canadian central agencies have mandated the use of Logic Models and identification 
of a performance measurement system based on the programme’s logic model 
(Treasury Board of Canada, 2002a), required by the programme budget process.  
Given its mandatory use, as well as potential benefit as an information source for 
executives, Logic Models are briefly examined in the following section. 
2.5.5 Logic Models – Tying the E’s together 
 
Logic Models, historically linked with the evaluation function in both private and 
public sectors, support a greater understanding of the implicit programme theory and 
assumptions by defining the relationship between programme resources, activities and 
processes, and outputs and outcomes (Wholey, 1983; Wholey et al., 1994; Kellogg 
Foundation, 1998; Auditor General of Canada, 2000a; Treasury Board of Canada, 
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2002a).  The use of Logic Models is considered especially suitable for complex 
initiatives with intangible outcomes, as well as for programmes which require a long 
duration of time to achieve desired results (Kellogg Foundation, 2003).  Logic models 
are also practical tools for managing for performance (Millar et al., 2001:79).  A 
sample Logic Model is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Results-based Management implicitly requires that programme managers and 
executives be aware of how programme inputs, activities and outputs transform or 
influence programme outcomes.  Brown (1996) argues that each stage of the Logic 
Model is the driver of the subsequent stage and therefore must have associated 
performance metrics to manage for achievement of strategic objectives.   To that end, 
it becomes critical not just to know how these casual links contribute, but also to 
consider the best or optimum method of attaining these results. 
 
Figure 7: Sample Logic Model 
 
 Source: (Treasury Board of Canada, 2002a) 
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Three limitations of Logic Models are noted.   The first limitation is that logic models 
can only reflect the collective expectations of the participants developing the model.   
In the Canadian context, Logic Models are required to acquire new programme 
funding, and are thus based on the expected relationships, not on an observed reality.  
The second limitation notes that the attribution of programme activities and outputs in 
achieving programme outcomes may be limited.  As Mayne (2001:10) states; “Causal 
forces such as programmes are rarely necessary conditions due to the multiplicity of 
ways of achieving a policy objective, and they are almost never sufficient conditions 
since certain contextual or environmental conditions are typically vital to a given 
programme’s success.  Here, causality is seen more as a contributing factor.”  A third 
limitation is that Logic Models inherently limit themselves to aspects of the 
programme under full or partial control of managers, and tend not to fully incorporate 
‘external factors’ (Millar et al., 2001:80). 
2.5.6 Adding a 4th ‘E’ – Equity 
Before turning to the Canadian experience in integrating RBM into its operating 
culture, the section will briefly touch on the fourth ‘E’ - equity18.  In this context, 
equity can be defined as the consistent availability of a programme to eligible 
Canadians.  It usually implies some combination of common goals, equal opportunity, 
equal access, equivalent treatment, and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.   
 
Equity is a key requirement for most public sector programmes.  This can be 
contrasted with the private sector where individual differences (i.e. market 
segmentation) are exploited and frequently paramount (Montricher, 1998:117).   
                                                 
18 Some authors use the term equality rather than equity.  For simplicity, this thesis will use the term 
equity intending that this term capture the concept of programme access. 
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While a relatively simple concept, applying the principle of equity requires resolving 
or balancing a number of conflicting goals and issues.  Table 13 describes certain 
difficulties and trade-offs involved in integrating equity into programme delivery and 
assessments. 
 
Table 13: Concepts of Equity 
Dimension Issues Dilemma 
Membership Definition of pool of potential benefactors 
Rank-based 
distribution 
Unequal benefits based on defined criteria – 
horizontal and vertical equality 
Recipients 
Group based 
distribution 
Benefits distributed at the group, not individual level 
(ex. Affirmative action) 
Boundaries of the item Consideration of item within a larger context Item 
Value of the item Define item in terms of its value to the individual 
Competition  Opportunity as starting resources 
Lottery  Opportunity as statistical chance 
Process 
Voting  Opportunity as political participation 
Source: (Aaron and Lougy, 1986:9), as quoted in (Stone, 1988:33) 
 
A distinction is often made between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ equity.  Horizontal 
equity refers to ‘equal treatment of equals,’ while vertical equity is often defined as 
‘the appropriately differential treatment of unequals.’  For example, in the Canadian 
tax system, people in the same circumstances with the same income should pay the 
same taxes.  However, lower income is taxed at a lower marginal rate; higher income, 
higher marginal tax rates.  How to objectively measure what constitutes ‘equals,’ and 
what is the appropriate differential between ‘unequals,’ can obviously become 
complex and contentious (Robinson, 2004).    
 
In summary, ensuring that citizens are treated fairly, equally, and deliberately by 
government requires that key public sector values of equity, fairness and due process 
be balanced with competing values of economy and efficiency.  It has been argued 
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that a trade-off exists between efficiency and equity (Okun, 1975; Stone, 1988).  
However, this fact is frequently overlooked in discussing NPM’s adoption of private 
sector methods into the public sector (Savoie, 1995:323).  
2.5.7 Summary RBM 
It can be concluded that the literature demonstrates that Results-based Management 
within the public sector continues to be an elusive goal.  While intuitively desirable, 
RBM frequently proves to be a contested area with stakeholders holding significantly 
different and potentially conflicting positions.  In addition, Results-based 
Management’s call for the establishment of performance targets serves to downplay 
the inherent differences between public and private sector organizations noted in 
Section 2.3 (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Hood, 1998), differences which may prove 
difficult to overcome. 
 
Similarly, public sector programme objectives are rarely clear or consensual, often 
having multiple and complex outcomes which are difficult to measure (Rouse, 1993), 
with limited performance information available (Meyer and Gupta, 1994:313).  As 
well, the effect of  programme activities can extend well beyond the immediate 
‘client’ or programme recipient (Smith, 1995).   
 
As a result, the systematic assessment and understanding of ultimate outcomes of 
government programmes and services is, according to Pollitt and Bouchaert 
(2000:131), both sparse and ambiguous.  They suggest that “most governments do not 
seem to have looked very hard for this type of information, but partly also because 
such information is difficult and expensive to collect, and then hard to interpret.”   
Nevertheless, sustained pressure by central agencies in support of continued 
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integration of RBM into programme life-cycle and Results-based Management has 
been noted.   
 
The initial introduction of RBM, it is argued, attempts to transpose the private sector 
results agenda onto the public sector (Box, 1999).  However, the literature suggests 
that Results-based Management techniques and tools need to be adapted, not adopted 
for the public sector as public management theory incorporates key elements, such as 
political stakeholders with high risk avoidance, not found in the private sector. 
 
Although academic criticism is noted, there is recognition that public sector progress 
has been made in this most difficult area (Pollitt, 1995; Aucoin, 2001; Auditor 
General of Canada, 2003c).   It should be noted that within the literature review, no 
studies were identified which explored the advent of Results-based Management in 
Canada from the perspective of executive, or individual public servants.  This 
research will attempt to bridge this absence, or gap, in the literature.   
 
Table 14: Summary of Section 2.5 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
Results-based 
Management 
Introducing the topic (Drucker, 1964; Pollitt, 1995; Neely, 
1998; Aucoin, 2001) 
Outputs and Outcomes (Auditor General of Canada, 1993; 
Kellogg Foundation, 2003) 
Defining Desired Results Who decides what they should be (Wholey and Aristiguesta, 
1999; OECD, 2002; Smith, 2004) 
Economy, Efficiency, 
Effectiveness and Equity 
Measuring results at different levels reveals some of the 
conflicting goals and objectives of RBM (Auditor General of 
Canada, 1997a; Stein, 2001) 
RBM in Canadian public 
sector 
Assessing the impact within the Canadian public sector 
(Aucoin, 1995; Good, 2004b; Savoie, 2004) 
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The next section will address the literature on available tools and frameworks to assist 
executives in assessing programme outcomes, developing the capacity for Results-
based Management. 
 
2.6 Assessing Performance under RBM 
“If public servants are to become good managers, focused on the results they 
are trying to achieve rather than the procedures they follow, the must have 
reliable information on the performance being achieved” (Mayne and Zapico-
Goni, 1997:11). 
 
Governments have long collected information about their own performance and about 
their impacts on society, although a healthy scepticism has always surrounded such 
data (Sims, 2001).  Performance information, often anecdote-based and intermittent, 
has always been used by public sector managers to assess programme effectiveness 
and then as the basis to improve and expand those programmes (Dewar, 2000).  The 
capacity to measure and evaluate results is considered a prerequisite for assessing the 
outcomes of programmes, services and policies, and increased accountability to 
Parliament and Canadians (Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  While not always 
successful for reasons described below, there is a clear international trend towards 
greater use of measurement in the public sector to determine empirically the results of 
government activities (OECD, 1994; Wholey, 1997; Kettl, 2000; Mayne, 2003b).  
 
The following section will introduce and define performance measurement, followed 
by sections on: 
 Performance measurement in the public sector 
 Unintended consequences of measuring performance 
 Measuring Public Value 
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 Results-for Whom? Measuring Client Satisfaction. 
As noted in the Introduction Chapter, while performance management may be 
undertaken at three distinct levels: the organization as an entity, the programme level, 
and for the individual (Rummler and Brache, 1990; Dewar, 2000; Propper and 
Wilson, 2003), the focus of this research is at the programme level.   
2.6.1 Defining Performance Measurement 
The old adage, ‘You cannot manage what you cannot measure’ reflects the underlying 
belief that information, in whatever form, is required for effective decision-making.  
Drucker makes two basic assertions about performance measurement.  First, that there 
are few factors as important as measurement for an organization, and second, that 
measurement has historically been the weakest area in management (Lynch and 
Cross, 1991:4).   
 
Performance measurement could be defined as the regular generation, collection, 
analysis, reporting and utilization of a wide range of data, qualitative and quantitative, 
related to programme management and results.  Simons (1995:5) offers one definition 
as follows:  
• “Performance measurement and control systems are used to convey data and 
information that can influence decision making and managerial action; 
• The systems represent formal routines and procedures.  The gathering of the relevant 
information is structured, ongoing routinized operation of the organization – not the 
result of chance or intermittent activities; 
• The systems are designed to be used by managers; and 
• Managers used the systems to maintain or alter patterns in organizational behaviour.” 
 
Developing a performance measurement system can assist owners and managers in 
improving their understanding and corresponding organizational decision making.  
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Using a Logic Model approach, such information would be sought for programme 
inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes (Thomas, 2004b).    
2.6.2 Performance Measurement in the Public Sector  
Performance Management frameworks and systems continue to be integrated into 
theories on public administration, where new paradigms of doing business under 
NPM - partnerships, outsourcing, horizontal policies, must be balanced with an 
increased requirement for accountability, including results and outcomes (Osbourne 
and Gaebler, 1993; Aucoin and Savoie, 1995; Peters and Savoie, 1995; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000; Thomas, 2004b).  
 
Performance Management can be defined as the use of performance information, 
together with management tools such as strategic planning, budgeting, 
policy/programme evaluations, organization reviews and personnel appraisals in 
achieving public value (Thomas, 2005).  The literature review revealed that a number 
of common Performance Management frameworks have emerged, including the 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Olve et al., 1997; Kaplan and Norton, 
2001), Performance Prism (Neely and Adams, 2001; Neely et al., 2002) and Logic 
Models (Millar et al., 2001; Kellogg Foundation, 2003).   
 
The adoption of performance management by executives is believed to be central to 
the shift from ‘Administrator’ to ‘Managerialism’ models required in achieving a 
Results-based Management culture (Pollitt, 1993a), with authors arguing that the 
effective monitoring of performance is critical to overall success in public sector 
reform (Pollitt, 1995; Mayne, 1997).  However, Townley (2002) suggests that this 
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performance management has acquired the status of rationalized, institutionalized  
myth. 
 
As in the private sector, the public sector literature demonstrates that governments 
worldwide are exploring the use of Performance Management systems or frameworks 
in management operations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Propper and Wilson, 2003).  
Similarly, Canada began to integrate these concepts into their public sector during the 
1990s.    
 
Examining the question of measuring performance from the public sector 
managers’/executives’ perspective, it can be argued that performance measurement’s 
ultimate goal is to improve performance (Behn, 2003).  This goal can be sub-divided 
into activities designed to improve management planning and control, and those 
affecting accountability (Neely, 1998).   The latter support increased reporting of 
programme results, while the former “is also an invaluable tool for departments to 
demonstrate that they have learned from their shortcomings and challenges, and that 
they are using this information to improve their future performance” (Auditor General 
of Canada, 2003c:13).  The key difference between these two goals is in the timing 
and frequency of information gathering.   
 
Behn (2003), focusing on the public sector managers’ perspective, identifies eight key 
potential objectives of performance management, which are reported in Table 15.  
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Table 15: Public Managers’ Purposes in Measuring Performance 
Purpose Responding to this Question… 
Evaluate How well is my department/branch/directorate/programme performing? 
Control How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right thing? 
Budget On what programmes, people, or projects should funds be spent? 
Motivate How can I motivate staff, stakeholders and citizens to do the things 
necessary to improve performance? 
Promote How can I convince political superiors, legislators, stakeholders, media 
and citizens that my programme is doing a good job? 
Celebrate What accomplishments are worthy of the important organizational ritual 
of celebrating success? 
Learn What is working, not working? 
Improve What exactly should be done differently to improve performance? 
Source: (Behn, 2003:588) 
 
 
Public sector performance management systems and frameworks, theory suggests, 
lead to improved decision-making and management of resources (Treasury Board of 
Canada, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Treasury Board of Canada, 2000).  
However, many obstacles exist to its implementation.  Thomas (2005) provides one 
categorization of management and measurement limitations under four headings: 
technical, financial, institutional and political, as summarized in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Limitations to implementing Performance Measurement Systems 
 
Limitation Contribution to the Research 
Technical  Noting significant headway in the ‘science’ of measurement, difficulties 
remain in attribution, especially societal outcomes  
 Difficulties in identifying ‘SMART’ performance measures (Specific, 
Measurable, Attributable, Reliable, Timely) 
 Lack of agreement over desired results/differing perspectives 
 Loss of clarity from aggregating data to avoid information overload 
Financial  Acquiring comprehensive, valid and consistent performance 
information is costly 
 Measuring what is easily measurable rather than what is truly important 
Institutional  Administrative and technological capability to gather data 
 Employee skills required to analyze performance information 
 Leadership – Ministerial and Deputy Minister levels 
 Impact of negative/poor results on political, public opinion and budgets 
Political  Need to balance the competing interests and values within society 
 Requirement to consider public perspectives into performance process 
 Adversarial political culture 
Source: (Thomas, 2005:20) 
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While performance information can inform and guide decision making and 
accountability, managerial judgement in interpreting the results and choosing what to 
report is required (Steward and Walsh, 1994; Mayne and Zapico-Goni, 1997:17).  
Steward and Walsh (1994:46) reached the same direct conclusion “Performance 
assessment is …. not a matter of performance measures, but a matter of judgement 
which can be informed by performance measures but which can never be determined 
by them.”  Similarly, while a tautology, performance measurement cannot assist 
managers and politicians in identifying what should be done, or how to do it, only the 
results of  previous decisions (Townley, 2001). 
 
Collecting and assessing such performance indicators support, theory suggests, 
improved decision-making and policy adjustments designed to improved strategic 
performance (Mayne, 2001).  However, Pollitt and Bouchaert (2000:131) find that 
most governments have made little progress in acquiring this type of information, 
suggesting that it is very difficult and expensive to collect, and then hard to interpret.  
This experience is mirrored in Canada, which has three decades of intermittent focus 
on formal and routine performance management techniques including evaluation, 
Management by Objectives (MBO) , Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) and others 
(Johnson, 1992). 
2.6.3 Unintended Consequences of Measuring Performance 
Kerr’s (1975) classic article “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B” 
remains as true today as when it was originally penned.  Kerr emphasizes four causes 
or follies fascination with an ‘objective’ criterion, overemphasize on highly visible 
behaviours, hypocrisy, and equity rather than efficiency.   
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As soon as performance indicators are used as a means of control, people begin to 
manage the measures rather than the performance (Neely, 1998).  Meyer and Gupta 
(1994) refer to this phenomenon as the ‘performance paradox.’  Their research shows 
that all measures lose their variability – they ‘wear out’ and lose ability to 
discriminate good from bad performance.   One positive underlying cause for this 
gradual lack of variability can be associated with learning from poor results and 
adjusting to improve performance.  Unfortunately, it can also be associated with 
excessive gaming and manipulation over time and suppression of poor outcomes 
(Meyer and Gupta, 1994:310).  As Stone (1988) suggests, even if no one actually 
falsifies the numbers, people change their behaviour in such a way that the results are 
actually different from what they would have been without the measure.   Thus, 
organizations must continue to keep their performance measures and performance 
targets current; the measures themselves must evolve over time (Neely et al., 
2002:70).   
 
Smith (1995) states that the implementation of performance systems in most 
organizations, including the public sector will have unintended and dysfunctional 
consequences.  Smith identifies eight such consequences, summarized in Table 17, 
below, and links these consequences to a lack of congruence between the goals of the 
agent and the actual goals of the principal. 
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Table 17: Unintended Consequences of Public Sector Performance Reporting 
Unintended 
consequence 
Cause Description 
Tunnel vision  Tendency to measure what is easy to measure, at the 
expense of harder to measure tasks 
 Overemphasize on the indicators actually measured at 
the expense of other equally important performance 
indicators.  Especially significant because many 
public sector objectives defy adequate quantification. 
Sub-
optimization 
 Focus on performance goals of individual, team or 
unit, at the expense of departmental or organizational 
goals. 
Myopia 
Divergence 
between 
organizational 
objectives and 
measurement 
scheme 
 Major public sector objectives occur over long/ very 
long spans of time horizons (e.g. health outcomes).  
This can lead to pursuit of short term targets at the 
expense of longer term objectives 
 Effect can be exacerbated by employee’s career 
perspectives.  
Measure 
fixation 
 Difficulty to establish performance measures which 
capture all dimensions of the objectives, an emphasis 
on measures of success over achieving underlying 
objectives. 
Misrepresent-
ation 
Inability to 
measure 
complex 
phenomena with 
precision  Manipulation of data to show performance in its most 
advantageous manner, from ‘creative’ reporting to 
fraud. 
Misinterpret-
ation 
 Complexity of public sector objectives and impact of 
external environment in achieving performance 
targets, coupled with the lack of comparability to 
similar organizations can lead to a failure to 
contextualise the performance information. 
Gaming  
Difficulty of 
analysing 
performance 
data 
 Managers may choose to forfeit short term 
performance incentives in order to keep future 
performance improvement expectations modest. 
Ossification Inability to 
respond to new 
circumstances 
 Organizational paralysis encouraged by a bureaucratic 
entrenchment in a rigid system of performance 
evaluation. 
Source: (Smith, 1995) 
 
To be most effective, performance management systems (i.e. the organizational 
structures and procedures used to collect, report, and use performance information) 
must be formalized in such a way that performance management activities are 
widespread, routine, and ongoing (Johnsen, 2000). 
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2.6.4 Measuring Public Value 
As noted in Section 2.3.1, in the private sector, value is primarily assessed through 
financial indicators.  Private value is created when services and products produced 
meet individual customer preferences.  The marketplace provides signals through 
pricing levels and sales, leading in turn to profit indicators of the firm (Kelly et al., 
2002).   
 
In practice, the mechanics of defining and measuring private sector value are rarely 
straightforward.  While a long history of innovation in accounting techniques is 
documented and a sophisticated set of techniques to measure and manage private 
sector value creation has emerged, Moore (1995) argues that these cannot be simply 
adapted to capture public value creation.  Interestingly, Moore also notes that the 
private sector is increasingly under pressure to consider public value in their 
operations (e.g. environmental protection and community participation). 
 
Moving from a conceptual theory of Public Value to practical implementation 
requires that executives identify and acquire performance information in order to 
monitor, assess progress, and report on drivers of public value.  Moore (2003) argues 
that non-financial measures, processes, as well as outcome measures must all be part 
of an effective measurement strategy and suggests using the ‘Public Value Scorecard’ 
to address these information requirements.   
 
Within the public sector, for a product or service to create value it is not sufficient for 
citizens to state that it is desirable, especially given the ‘free’ nature of many public 
service programmes.  It is only of value if citizens, either individually or collectively, 
  Page 96 
are willing to give something up in return for it. Sacrifices are not only made in 
monetary terms (i.e. taxes/fees), they can also involve granting coercive powers to the 
state (e.g. in return for security), disclosing private information, giving time (e.g. 
volunteer) or other personal resources (e.g. donating blood). The idea of opportunity 
cost is therefore central to public value; if it is claimed that citizens would like 
government to produce something, but they are not willing to give anything up in 
return, then it is doubtful that the activity in question will genuinely create value  
(Kelly et al., 2002). 
 
In summary, the concept of public value provides an alternative theory for measuring 
public sector performance, makes decisions about allocating resources and select 
appropriate systems of delivery (Moore, 1995; 2004). 
2.6.5 Results for Whom? Measuring Client Satisfaction 
Within the Service aspect of Public Value theory, Moore (1995) argues that it is not 
sufficient for executives to passively respond to public preferences, but rather, they 
should consider the role of service delivery in creating public value.  It is argued that 
actively seeking out client and citizen satisfaction provides an ideal opportunity to 
interact with direct programme benefactors, stakeholders, and citizens in general to 
gauge satisfaction levels.  This increases executive understanding of programme 
successes and pitfalls, increases public trust, and builds sustainable and legitimate 
support for programmes. 
 
While both public and private sectors have clients, public sector programmes 
generally seek different ends (e.g. creating public value) through different means (e.g. 
equity and due process) than profit-seeking private sector services do (Dinsdale and 
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Marson, 1999).  While many public sector programmes benefit Canadians directly, 
other programmes may require Canadians to ‘sacrifice’ to a higher public good (e.g.  
taxation, gun control in Canada), may offer benefits under difficult circumstances 
(e.g. health, unemployment, prisons), or for which client may have unrealistic 
expectations and limited knowledge (Sims, 2001).  Thus, measuring client satisfaction 
is not suitable for all programmes.  Nevertheless, Conroy (2001) argues that where 
suitable, and while significant challenges exist, valid and reliable measures of client 
satisfaction are both highly desirable and useful.    
 
In fact, a key element of Canada’s NPM reforms, “Results for Canadians” is the 
theme of Citizen Focus (Figure 4: Results for Canadians, page 68) which commits the 
government to designing, funding and delivering its programs and services, and 
assessing their results, from the perspective of the citizen and clients.  As the Treasury 
Board of Canada (2000:7) states: 
 “Ensuring fairness, equity and reasonableness of treatment to protect the broad 
interests of citizens; and 
 Providing effective and responsive service to clients – those who benefit from 
a Government of Canada initiative, whatever it may be”. 
 
It could be argued to be self-evident that assessing client results implicitly requires 
data and an impartial system to collect this data, in order to perform an analysis of 
satisfaction levels.  While negative feedback may be monitored through complaints 
and levels of appeals, and periodic evaluations will gather information on longer term 
programme effectiveness, Dinsdale and Marston (2000) suggest that client surveys 
form a key element of programme improvements through: identifying drivers of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction, determining citizens’ and clients’ priorities for 
improvement, developing service standards, and, consulting internal clients.   
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In client satisfaction surveys, a direct causal relation is presupposed between the 
quality of a certain service delivery and user satisfaction.  In Public Value theory, if 
service quality increases, satisfaction is assumed to increase as well.  In reality, 
however, the interaction of expectations, service aspects, and the relative importance 
of these aspects may not necessarily lead to better evaluations by citizens when 
service improves because their expectations change as well.   At a minimum, a single 
client satisfaction indicator will not be sufficient (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). 
 
The Canadians government has developed and made available clients survey tools, 
such as the Common Measurement Tool (Schmidt and Strickland, 1998), as have other 
international governments (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003).  While client 
satisfaction surveys are officially supported by government policy (Treasury Board of 
Canada, 2002a), no evaluations, internal assessments nor academic literature was 
located on their use in Canada.   
 
Canadian research has identified five ‘drivers’ of client service which account for 
over 70 per cent of the variation in clients’ service quality ratings: timeliness, 
knowledge/competence of staff, courtesy, fairness, and outcomes.  When all five 
drivers were rated highly (4 or 5 out of 5), the overall satisfaction rating was 85 per 
cent. If only one of the five drivers was rated low, the overall satisfaction rating 
dropped 25 points to 60 per cent (CCMD, 2000).   
 
Thus, the Canadian public service already has an empirical basis for, and the 
necessary templates and tools supporting the use of client surveys. 
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Interestingly, and contrary to popular belief, the CCMD studies (CCMD, 1998; 2000) 
showed that while Canadian citizens were generally cynical regarding government 
service as a whole, their personal experience in receiving  specific public services and 
programmes was rated as equal to or higher than their experience with private sector 
services (CCMD, 1998; Dwivedi and Gow, 1999).  Interestingly, this survey also 
found that citizens acknowledged that the increased number of goals results in a 
public sector is harder to manage (CCMD, 2000).  These findings were also 
confirmed internationally in both UK and US research (Miller and Miller, 1991).   
 
The literature confirms certain inherent limitations and constraints when conducting 
client surveys (Communications Canada, 2002).  Issues include that most client 
survey data could be made available to the general public upon request under Access 
to Information Legislation (commonly referred to as ‘management in a glass bubble’), 
general lack of managerial experience, and that client responses may lack objectivity, 
reflecting the power imbalance and a citizens’ reluctance to criticise providers when 
needing assistance (Personal Discussions, 2003).  Dinsdale and Marson (1999) 
suggest that this limited take-up of client satisfaction measures may be influenced by 
the risk adverse culture of the public sector.   
 
In summary, while acknowledging that client and citizen satisfaction monitoring is 
not suitable for every area of public sector activity, with few exceptions, acquiring 
data on programme delivery can be argued to enhance overall managerial capacity.  
And, as noted earlier, the literature also suggests that the act of consulting itself 
contributes to Public Value creation. 
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2.6.6 Summary – Assessing Performance 
The literature suggests that measuring public sector performance is often difficult.  It 
can be argued that many public sector activities are in the public sector precisely 
because of these measurement problems; if the benefits were clear and measurable 
they would be in the private sector (Mintzberg, 1996:79).  As a result, a tendency to 
select programme indicators which are readily measurable, often at the output rather 
than outcome level, is noted (Auditor General of Canada, 2003c).  Unfortunately, as 
Townley (2001:305) identifies, “because something is easily demonstrated and 
measured, it rarely captures what is considered to be important in the organization.”  
 
Noting that a good performance measurement framework will not itself sustain RBM, 
it is acknowledged to be an essential element for success in public sector reform 
(OECD, 1995; Pollitt, 1995; Mayne and Zapico-Goni, 1997).  However, unlike the 
private sector, there is an absence of standardized, common, and accepted criteria to 
assess the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of programmes in the public sector 
(Savoie, 1994). 
 
The federal government, led by the Treasury Board, has since the late 1960s advanced 
numerous initiatives on performance measurement and management for results.  
Current initiatives, including business planning and Estimates reform, “Results for 
Canadians”, and Management Accountability Frameworks continue to support these 
goals (Treasury Board of Canada policies).     
 
Existing public sector theories discussed in Section 2.3.3, suggest that especially 
when lacking clear objectives, measures would be ‘gamed’ (Smith, 1995; Propper and 
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Wilson, 2003).  It can be argued that under such circumstances, executives will 
rationally select performance indicators that maximize utility or benefits for the 
programme or individual level.  The literature contains many cases of such distorted 
measures, as well as unexpected consequences in measuring performance.  This 
suggests that common tools and frameworks should be provided by the ‘central 
agencies’ to reduce this type of behaviour. 
 
As Steward and Walsh (1994:45) conclude, “The dilemma of performance 
management in the public domain therefore is to secure effective performance when 
the meaning to be given to it can never be completely defined, and the criteria by 
which it is judged can never be finally established.”  Similar to other national 
governments, implementing Performance Management in Canada has not proven 
simple (Aucoin, 2000; Auditor General of Canada, 2001; OECD, 2002).  This thesis 
will explore, from the perspective of Canadian executives, the validity and usefulness 
of performance measurement in managing for results. 
 
Table 18: Summary of Section 2.6 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
Measuring Performance  Introducing the topic (Drucker, 1974; Kaplan and Norton, 
1996; Wholey, 1997) 
Public Sector 
Measurement 
Applying this concept within the public sector (Osbourne and 
Gaebler, 1993; Pollitt, 1995) 
Including unintended consequences (gaming, dysfunctional 
behaviour, etc) (Kerr, 1975; Smith, 1995) 
Measuring Public Value Linking the Public Value theory to RBM (Moore, 1995; 
Kelly et al., 2002) 
Client Satisfaction Role of clients/ customer in assessing results (Dinsdale and 
Marson, 1999; CCMD, 2000) 
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2.7 Accountability 
 
This section will discuss the literature on public sector accountability, especially the 
impacts of RBM.  Of particular interest to this thesis, the critical role of public 
reporting will also be discussed.  The following topics will be addressed: 
 Public Sector Accountability 
 Accountability under Results-based Management 
 Telling the Story – Public sector Reporting in Canada 
 Performance Reporting – An Under-utilization Problem 
 Executive Accountability – or the Risk/Reward Dilemma 
 
The concept of accountability has long been associated with the process or action of 
being called to account for one’s actions.  Accountability must be to an external body 
with sufficient ‘right of authority’ to call for the accounting and to potentially impose 
sanctions (Mulgan, 2000:560).  Accountability can take many forms.  Romzek and 
Dubnick (1987) divide accountability along four dimensions as noted in Table 19, 
below.  Other models do exist.  Day and Klein (1987) divide accountability into three 
forms: political, managerial and moral, while Stoker (2003:14) focuses on efficiency 
accountability (value for money) and programme accountability (achievement of 
desired outcomes). 
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Table 19: Types of Accountability  
 
 High degree of Control Low degree of Control 
Internal Bureaucratic Accountability 
– Resource stewardship 
– Process execution 
– Direct supervision and 
organizational directives 
Professional accountability 
– Deference to expertise of peers or 
work group, professional standards 
– Public servant values and ethics 
External Legal accountability 
- Contracts, Acts, Regulations 
- Courts of law, Parliament 
Political Accountability 
– Responsiveness to elected official, 
owners, clients or customers 
– Accountability to Citizens/Public 
Sources: (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Glynn and Murphy, 1996) 
2.7.1 Public Sector Accountability 
From the earliest forms of government, tribal chiefs and kings, to governments’ 
exponential growth during the twentieth century (Normanton, 1966:409), 
accountability of the public sector is a topic of long standing interest within 
democratic societies (Wilson, 1885).  It can be argued that historically, public sector 
accountability has served two key principles: to control for the abuses and misuse of 
public authority (i.e. corruption, waste and incompetence), and to provide assurance 
to citizens that expenditures adhere to both law and public service values (Aucoin and 
Heintzman, 2000).  In Westminster democracies, including Canada, accountability is 
widely considered to be a cornerstone of democratic values, providing countervailing 
power to governments (CCAF-FCVI, 1996:44).   
 
Public Sector accountability is the obligation to render an account for a responsibility 
conferred (Wilson Committee, 1975), and describes the act, method or process of 
people, individually or collectively, being held to account for their conduct (Auditor 
General of Canada, 2002b; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005).  A definition for the Canadian 
public sector is, “Accountability is the fundamental prerequisite for preventing the 
abuse of delegated power and ensuring that power is directed towards the 
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achievement of broadly accepted national goals with the greatest possible degree of 
efficiency, effectiveness and probity and prudence” (Royal Commission on Financial 
Management and Accountability, 1979:21).   
 
It has been suggested that within a Westminster democracy, such as Canada’s, the 
responsibility of elected Ministers for actions of their respective departments, both 
policy and administrative in nature, has long been the key element of public sector 
accountability19 (Privy Council of Canada, 1993; Glynn and Murphy, 1996:128; 
White and Hollingsworth, 1999; Barberis, 2000).  Although, it is also argued that this 
level of ministerial accountability has become outdated, as it was historically based on 
accountability for the actions of dozens of employees not thousand or tens of 
thousands (Ehrenworth, 2005).  Notwithstanding, in Canada, Ministers remain 
individually and collectively accountable for the results of their policies (Auditor 
General of Canada, 2002b; Aucoin et al., 2004), while bureaucracies are accountable 
to Parliament through Ministers for the delivery of the programmes (Behn, 1998; 
Bakvis and Juillet, 2004).  It is the latter that is the focus of this research. 
 
The literature suggests that the classic model of establishing public sector 
accountability has been the bureaucratic model.  In this model, accountability is 
clearly hierarchical.  Each layer of the organization is accountable to its respective 
supervisor: staff, manager, executive, Deputy Minister, Minister, and Parliament.  
Historically, public servant accountability has been linked to financial audits in order 
                                                 
19 Widely misunderstood, Ministerial accountability in Canada does not extend to personal 
accountability and responsibility for each administrative decision and action taken within their 
department.  Rather, Ministers are responsible for identifying and ensuring that corrective actions are 
taken to resolve the issue.  While there has been some weakening of the separation of Ministerial and 
public servants accountability over the last decade (Aucoin, 1995:40), this model remains in effect 
today (Privy Council of Canada, 1993; Gendron et al., 2000; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2004). 
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to ensure reliability and completeness of the financial stewardship, as rendered by the 
agents (Glynn and Murphy, 1996:127).    
 
However, it is noted that this bureaucratic model also tends to propagate 
administrative rules, procedures and policies set by central agencies (Thomas, 1998).  
These rules generally focus on accountability for resources, including human 
resources, financial and capital inputs, with programme managers accountable for 
ensuring programme activities and outputs conform with legislative and regulatory 
requirements, and to a lesser extent public service values.  Unfortunately, a tendency 
exists for the rules to become the main focus, even at the expense of achieving 
programme objectives (Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accountability, 1979).  Additionally, when incentives and punishments are closely 
tied to the rules, predictable compliance to protect career prospects may occur 
(Dwivedi and Gow, 1999:75).   
 
In Canada, as in most countries, the role of the Auditor Generals substantially 
changed with the addition of  ‘Value for Money’ audits which are essentially the 
auditing of programme economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Auditor General of 
Canada, 2003a).  In Canada, accountability has been extended through broad-based 
initiatives such as Results-based Management Frameworks (RMAF) (Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2002a) and Programme Authority Architecture (PAA) (Treasury Board of 
Canada, 2004b) requiring that departments identify programme performance 
measures and capacity to evaluate programmes (Johnson, 1992).    
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Within the public sector, it has been suggested that recent changes and additions to 
accountability in the public sector (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2004) have also emphasized 
the assignment of blame.  This may be a reflection of the current political culture or 
the media and society at large, but it also has dysfunctional consequences (Thomas, 
2004b).  Even a cursory review of recent Canadian public sector scandals reveal them 
to be politically motivated, with the bureaucracy following specified instructions; or 
to involve corrupt senior executives, where the fact that accountability instruments 
caught the offender is systematically ignored; or to be a breakdown in administrative 
controls.  The latter were typically failures to follow administrative policy, rather than 
an absence of controls.   
 
Thomas (1998) further suggests that a climate of punishment for errors must be 
balanced in any accountability scheme with the potential for rewards for results, 
especially for positive results.  The HRDC scandal, which Good (2004) describes in 
detail, can be argued to be the largest internal scandal of recent times.  Although few 
criticized the results achieved, a political firestorm followed disclosures of failure to 
follow due process (Sutherland, 2003; Good, 2004b).  This can be expected to have an 
ongoing effect on public servant morale and attention to details.   
2.7.2 Accountability under Results-based Management 
It can be argued that RBM has placed new and increased demands on government to 
improve accountability and programme performance (Boyne et al., 2002), although 
the accountability regime has grown increasingly complex and more confusing 
(Thomas, 1998; Good, 2004b:165).  In moving to a Managerial Model of 
management, from the previous Administrative Model, it is suggested that renewed 
accountability frameworks and instruments have lagged behind (Savoie, 1995).   At 
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the NPM level, securing accountability is almost universally viewed as the ‘the 
missing link’ and ‘the most elusive dimension’ (Aucoin, 1995; Good, 2004b), and to 
which Hood and Jackson (1994:478) refer to as “impoverished and political.”  The 
notion of adopting a private sector accountability model based on results and costs is 
politically naïve (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999).   
 
In addition to the difficulty in determining which results executives are to be 
accountable for (Behn, 1997), accountability under RBM calls for managers to 
demonstrate how their actions have contributed to the achievement of programme 
results (Mayne, 2001; Millar et al., 2001).   Mayne (2001) argues that logical 
attribution, or demonstrating to a reasonable person how activities have contributed or 
supported programme outcomes, is sufficient for NPM accountability.  This requires 
managers to understand and demonstrate how programme outputs and outcomes have 
been achieved (Treasury Board of Canada, 1996; 2000).  Similarly, NPM’s use of 
alternative service delivery (outsourcing) and horizontal partnerships creates the 
development of a joint accountability model (Mayne, 2001).  The foregoing suggests 
a number of systematic impediments to accountability for results.   
 
Table 20 identifies the changing nature of accountability under NPM from two 
sources, one from Canada and one from the UK, which summarize the existing 
literature. 
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Table 20: The Changing Nature of Accountability under NPM  
Accountability Pre – NPM Post – NPM 
Political (overall 
public 
accountability) 
Broad ranging, linking 
ministers directly to 
service delivery 
responsibility 
Remains, but the responsibility has been 
silently and subtly changed to being 
acquitted on the basis that the executive 
enables and chief executives deliver 
Financial 
Accountability 
Focus on notions of 
fiscal compliance – 
Financial Acts and 
Regulations 
Remain, but broadened to address issues of 
efficiency and effectiveness which has lead 
to a focus on the need for supporting data 
and/or control systems 
Professional 
Accountability 
Inwardly focused, self-
regulated multiple 
agency with services 
Radically changed, less self-governance but 
significant differences between professions  
Administrative 
Accountability 
Economy and efficiency, 
includes equity and 
probity 
Addition of Effective, requiring assessing 
outcomes 
‘de-bureaucratization’ calls for increased 
and/or additional accountability  
Management 
Accountability 
Compliance against 
regulations and law 
New and varied but with a focus on 
achievement of delegated targets 
Introduction of horizontal and ASD 
accountabilities 
Source: adapted from (Glynn and Murphy, 1996:130; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000) 
 
In addition to the more traditional forms of accountability identified earlier 
(Table 19), Roberts (2002) suggests that RBM adds two additional forms.  The first is 
accountability of managers to identify strategic goals (direction-based accountability) 
in accordance with current policy goals and the second is accountability for outcomes 
to ascertain what results have been achieved (performance-based accountability).  
Collectively, these represent the ‘Administrative Model of Accountability’ (Roberts, 
2002:659), although critiques such as ‘Harmon Accountability Paradox’ identify 
shortcomings in this model related to agency and public choice theories (Harmon, 
1995).   
 
Public Value theory suggests that demonstrating public accountability can, itself, 
improve public trust (Moore, 1995). Thus, accountability can be viewed by public 
servants as a resource as well as a duty.  Embracing public accountability enables and 
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legitimizes close collaboration by public managers with elected officials and the users 
of public services, increasing the level of public trust in government (Bend, 2004). 
 
In summary, although RBM is currently fashionable and generally presented in the 
government literature as the  ‘one-best way’ in governing organizations, generating, 
among other benefits, enhanced accountability (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1993), 
Broadbent and Guthrie (1992) suggested that early reform effort’s link to 
accountability were limited.  More recent evidence also suggests that RBM reforms 
within the public sector have met with limited success in increased accountability  
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).   
2.7.3 Telling the Story – Public Sector Reporting in Canada 
Accountability, Normanton (1966) argues, can only be discharged through clear and 
effective reporting.  Such reporting permits citizens, parliamentarians, and other 
stakeholders to strengthen their understanding of public sector activities, as well as 
maintain and build confidence in government (CCAF-FCVI, 1996; Bruijn, 2002).  
Under RBM, outcome or performance reporting, while frequently harder than 
resource, process and output reporting, serves to enhance accountability even in the 
most complex situations (CCAF-FCVI, 1996:116). 
 
Public sector reporting of programme performance and results has a number of 
benefits.  It can enhance accountability and trust in government (Moore, 2003), 
provide information for improved programmes and services and better parliamentary 
scrutiny of them (CCAF-FCVI, 2000), and serve as an incentive for departments and 
agencies to manage for the results they have set out to achieve (Auditor General of 
Canada, 2003b).   
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To be effective, public reporting must address several issues.  First, it must focus on 
the few, most important aspects of performance and provide users with both the 
information and context they need to interpret the meaning and significance of the 
results that have been achieved (CCAF-FCVI, 2001b).  Second, it was suggested that 
public reporting should link, preferably electronically, to enhanced, detailed 
information and analysis for those with a desire for detailed assessments and 
accountability (Personal discussions with TBS officials, 2003).   
 
In Canada, CCAF suggests that credible performance reporting enables all 
stakeholders to: 
•  locate the ongoing discussion of performance and performance expectations in 
a meaningful context and provide key reference points 
•  promote accountability as a substantive means for improving performance 
•  provide electronic and paper links to addition performance reporting 
•  develop the capacity of all participants to play their roles in governance, 
management and accountability processes (CCAF-FCVI, 2002:3). 
 
The CCAF has also identified, through a study with key stakeholders, nine principles 
of effective public reporting.  These are reproduced in full in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Guidelines for Effective Public Performance Reporting 
Source: (CCAF-FCVI, 2001b:3) 
 
The formal reporting regime in place at the time of the research interviews (2004) 
required each department to table in Parliament an annual Report on Plans and 
Priorities (RPP) outlining their business plans, programme objectives, indicators, and 
performance expectations for following three years.  The second annual component, 
the Departmental Performance Report (DPR), describes programme performance 
during the previous fiscal year, and must report against objectives laid out in the 
respective RPP, clearly linking planned results to actual results.  This cycle of 
GUIDELINES for PUBLIC PERFORMANCE REPORTING 
FOCUSING ON CRITICAL THINGS 
A good public performance reporting should: 
• Focus on the few, critical aspects of performance 
• Explain the basis on which these particular aspects have been chosen. 
RELATING GOALS AND RESULTS 
A good public performance reporting should: 
• State the goals and performance expectations being sought 
• Relate the results achieved to these stated goals and performance expectations. 
PUTTING RESULTS IN CONTEXT 
A good public performance reporting should put results in proper context by relating results 
achieved to the ongoing capacity to meet or improve on current performance expectations.   
A good public performance reporting should put results in their proper context by: 
• Explaining what the key risks are and how risk has influenced choices made in 
relation to policy, goals and performance expectations 
• Relating results achieved to the risks, and levels of risk, accepted.   
A Good performance reporting should put results in their proper context by describing 
other key performance factors that are central for users to: 
• understand why the entity is doing what it is doing; and, 
• interpret the meaning and significance of the performance information being reported. 
RELATING RESOURCES TO RESULTS 
A good public performance reporting should recognize and explain the important linkage 
between resources and results through the integration of financial and non-financial 
performance information. 
PRESENTING COMPARATIVE INFORMATION 
A good public performance reporting should compare current performance to that of prior 
periods when such information will significantly enhance the ability of users to understand 
or use the performance information being reported.  
A Good public performance reporting should compare performance to that of similar 
entities when such information will significantly enhance the ability of users to understand 
or use the performance information being reported. 
ADDRESSING THE RELIABILITY ISSUE 
A good public performance reporting should state the basis on which confidence is held in 
the reliability of the performance information being reported.
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performance planning and reporting was intended to encourage performance 
management and enhance accountability (Thomas, 2004a). 
 
As of 2005, the Auditor General of Canada (2005) noted only limited progress in 
moving towards outcome based reporting in annual DPRs and/or other public 
performance reporting.  The Auditor General expressed that while the volume of 
reports is impressive, the quality and impacts have been marginal.  Performance 
reports generally have focused mainly on inputs and outputs; few have successfully 
confronted the difficult conceptual and analytical challenges of attributing ‘real-
world’ outcomes to programme activities.  Earlier reviews concluded that few targets 
are stated, result commitments tend to be non-measurable, and few linkages are drawn 
between successive annual planning and reporting documents (Treasury Board of 
Canada, 1999; Auditor General of Canada, 2003c).  Furthermore, a tendency of public 
servants towards ‘information overload’ is noted when reporting  on complex 
programmes (Wilson Committee, 1975; Aucoin, 1995).  This is also reflected in the 
general dissatisfaction of Parliamentarians with the quality of performance 
information available (CCAF-FCVI, 2001a). 
2.7.4 Performance Reporting – An Under-utilization Problem 
It has been argued that one major obstacle to the development of a ‘RBM culture’ in 
the public sector is a limited interest by Parliament, the media, and the public20, 
especially with respect to positive results (English and Lindquist, 1998; Lindquist, 
1998b).  While overall stakeholder participation has increased, performance 
information is still not highly reported by the media and seems to be of relatively low 
                                                 
20 Lindquist suggests (humorously) that more people read annual reports before they are printed than 
after (Lindquist, 1998a). 
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interest to people both inside and outside of government (Lindquist, 1998a:172-6).  
Performance information could be used more frequently by managers, central 
planners (Savoie, 1999), and Parliamentarians (Thomas, 1999; Dewar, 2000). 
 
It appears, although no studies of actual use of performance information were located, 
that anecdotally very limited use has been made of performance reporting (Thomas, 
2004a:17).  Internally, no evidence exists that performance information is considered 
during budget discussions by senior management (Heintzman, 2003:244).  Externally, 
Thomas (2004b) reports that actual use of performance information appears to be 
depressingly low.  Similarly, in one of the few studies of performance reporting, USA 
states once acknowledged as leaders in performance reporting have recently scaled 
back their efforts based on the recognition that performance management has been 
expensive and time consuming, and has had little impact (Wholey and Aristiguesta, 
1999).  
 
The Auditor General’s 1997 observation that Parliament’s use of outcome reporting 
was limited had not changed by 2003 (Auditor General of Canada, 2003b).  
Improvements to information available to Parliament during the 1990s have had little 
impact on the work of members, an observation that has been made in other 
Commonwealth countries also (Lindquist, 1998b:173).  More recently, while 
Parliament acknowledged progress, it has continued to express frustration at the 
limited reporting of results.  Within the volumes of detailed information provided by 
departments, extraction of useful and meaningful programme information remains 
difficult (Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, 2003:29). 
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2.7.5 Executive Accountability – or the Risk/Reward Dilemma  
While it could be argued that public sector executives are motivated to manage 
meaningful and successful programmes for both personal benefit as well as more 
altruistic goals (Maslow, 1943), public sector programmes are delivered in an 
environment which can only be categorized as highly risk adverse.  In the words of 
Osbourne and Gaebler (1993:21), “You can have 99 successes and nobody notices, 
and one mistake and you’re dead.”  Savoie (1995:114-115) has commented even more 
fully on this low tolerance for public sector errors: 
“Public administration operates in a political environment that is always on the lookout 
for ‘errors’ and that exhibits an extremely low tolerance for mistakes…. In business it 
does not much matter if you get it wrong ten per cent of the time as long as you turn a 
profit at the end of the year.  In government, it does not much matter if you get it right 90 
per cent of the time because the focus will be on the 10 per cent of the time you get it 
wrong.” 
 
Behn (1997:17) expands on this theme in a subsequent article: 
“When we hold someone or some organization accountable for something, what do we 
really do?  In some ways, it means that we want to be able to identify who is responsible 
for the organization’s outputs or outcomes, for its successes or failures. But then what?  
That answer does not really clarify things.  What does it mean to hold people responsible 
for success?  What does it mean to hold people responsible for failure? 
 
I know of no definite answer, either theoretical or empirical.  But I bet I know what the 
[public sector] managers who are to be held accountable think.  I bet they believe, from 
their own, empirical experience, that ‘holding people accountable’ means that when they 
fail they are punished and that when they succeed nothing significant happens.” 
 
While Canadian public servants were initially called to take calculated risks under 
NPM, they saw an initial reduction, although small, in the number of controls to ‘let 
the managers manage.’   Unfortunately, the tendency of Ministers has been to 
continue to insist on error-free government.  Moreover, when faced with errors, 
including outright criminal activity by politicians and/or senior public servants, the 
tendency has been to blame the system and to re-impose controls (Good, 2004b).  In 
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short, minister and senior public servant have not fully accepted the uncertainty and 
risk implicit in giving up a degree of control (Thomas, 2004a).   
 
Thus executives face significant conflicting demands, with the consequences of 
reporting poor or bad results often out-weighed by organizational and personal 
consequences, often imposed at the political level21.  Not unexpectedly, good results 
are reported while poor results are sanitized, ‘spun,’ or simply buried (personal 
discussion, 2003). 
 
New Public Management’s (re)-introduction of performance pay for executives could, 
it is argued, motivate individuals to demonstrate and accept greater accountability for 
results.  The literature is split with some suggesting that RBM measurement must be 
mature prior to linking to performance pay systems (Eccles, 1991:135; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996), also noting the potentially benefit of supporting faster diffusion of 
corporate objectives and performance goals through pay linkages.  Other writers argue 
that performance systems must gain credibility first, before links to pay are 
established (Neely et al., 2002:69; Franco, 2003).    
2.7.6 Summary – Accountability 
One of the key weaknesses of NPM is that accountability instruments have failed to 
emerge to meet the changing requirements, especially those of RBM (Aucoin and 
Jarvis, 2005).  As such, the literature suggests that executives will be reticent to be 
                                                 
21 The Human Resource & Development Canada (HRDC) scandal is perhaps the best recent example.  
HRDC’s  release of a desk-audit of grant files revealed a small per centage of files to have 
insufficient or missing documentation.  This event quickly turned into a political firestorm adversely 
affecting 1000’s of employees,  reducing government employee moral nationally, dissolving a 
government department, and ending careers.  No wrong doing other than sloppy clerical work was 
ever found (Good, 2004b). 
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held formally accountable for programme outcomes, especially those for which they 
have limited influence over.  This executive resistance is rational considering that:  
 shared responsibility is essential with clients, stakeholders, other levels of 
government, and other sectors in achieving overall results (Perrin, 2003) 
 external elements frequently play key roles in achieving programme results 
(Wholey, 1983; Mayne, 2001) 
 executives must operate in a highly political and risk adverse environment 
 There are RBM reporting and accountability issues associated with the 
increased requirement for horizontal programme coordination, as well as 
Alternative Service Delivery (Flynn, 2003).   
 
Under RBM, increased managerial accountability for programme outcomes must be 
balanced with appropriate authorities and flexibility.  Noting the lack of control over 
resource levels (Wholey, 1983), administrative requirements or ‘red tape’ further limit 
executives’ ability to react to changing circumstances.  As Aucoin (1995:8) suggests, 
“adopting the methods of the private sector in public administration have floundered 
precisely because they have prescribed a degree of autonomy for public servants that 
has not been acceptable to ministers.”  This flexibility is a key requirement in 
establishing and enabling realistic managerial accountability for results (CCAF-FCVI, 
1996).     
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Table 21: Summary of Section  
 
Topic Contribution to the Research 
Accountability 
Introduction 
- Introduce and define accountability (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; 
Wilson, 1989; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000) 
Public Sector 
Accountability  
- Comparison of accountability within private and public sectors 
(Thomas, 1997) 
- Discussion of the central role of accountability within a public 
sector (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999) 
Accountability 
Under NPM 
- Changes to accountability introduced by NPM (Aucoin and 
Heintzman, 2000; Mayne, 2003a) 
- Critique of RBM’s impact on several aspects of accountabilities 
(Behn, 1998) 
Public Sector 
Reporting in Canada 
- Accountability requires reporting, including criticism on both the 
quality of and the demand for reporting (Moore, 1995; CCAF-
FCVI, 1996; Auditor General of Canada, 2000b) 
Executive 
Accountability 
- Risk adverse culture, including risk of reporting of poor 
performance (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1993; Behn, 2002) 
- Few rewards for embracing RBM (Good, 2004a) 
Performance Pay - Motivating Executives (Kohn, 1993) 
- Contribution to adoption of RBM  
 
Given this multitude of accountability issues, it is hardly surprising that executives 
may seek to avoid being held responsible for programme outcomes (Auditor General 
of Canada, 2002b; Sutherland, 2003).   This research will consider a number of 
accountability issues – leading to an improved understanding of the role of 
accountability in Results-based Management. 
 
2.8 Summary of the Literature Review 
Table 22, below, provides a brief summary of the supporting literature.  An absence 
of empirical studies within the Canadian public sector further supports the originality 
and potential usefulness of this research. 
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Table 22: Summary of Chapter 2 
 
Topic Contribution to the Research Literature 
Management  Nature and history of management (Drucker, 1954) 
 Executive activities and use of information (Carlson, 1951; 
Mintzberg, 1973) 
 Role of Performance Pay (Kohn, 1993) 
Public Versus 
Private Sector 
Management 
 Comparison of key similarities and differences between private and 
public sectors 
 Discussion of the central role of accountability within a public sector 
in order to assess impacts of adopting private sector RBM within 
public sector 
Public Sector 
Reform 
 Changes to accountability introduced by NPM 
 Critique of RBM’s impact on several aspects of accountability 
 Introduce Public Value Theory  
Results-based 
Management 
 Potential and limitations of public sector RBM 
 Role of Client Satisfaction  
 Current limitations of performance reporting 
Assessing 
Performance 
 The low demand for, or utilization of, existing performance reporting 
 Issues surrounding performance measurement and dysfunctional 
behaviour (Smith, 1995) 
Accountability  Accountability for outcomes 
 New role of public sector accountability 
 Few rewards, many issues in embracing RBM 
 Role of Performance Pay as possible motivation to RBM 
 
2.9 The Proposed Research 
Having conducted a thorough review of the literature related to this thesis topic, a 
number of gaps emerged in the collective understanding of Results-based 
Management implementation, including executive responses to changing 
accountability requirements.  Table 23, below, provides a brief overview of possible 
research areas. 
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Table 23: Potential Research Gaps  
Topic Gaps Within the Current Research Literature 
Management - Comparison between public and private sector executive activities and 
use of information  
- Role of performance pay within the public sector 
- Changes to management introduced by Managing for Results 
Results-based 
Management 
- Potential and limitations of public sector RBM 
- Changes to accountability introduced by NPM in Canada 
- Role of Client Satisfaction in assessing performance 
- Current limitations of performance reporting 
Public Value 
Theory 
- Empirically testing the theory 
- Assessing RBM using Public Value Theory 
Assessing 
Performance 
- The low demand for, or utilization of existing performance reporting, 
including political elements 
- Issues surrounding performance measurement and dysfunctional 
behaviour in a public sector environment 
Accountability - Current studies to assess impact of NPM and RBM on accountability 
- Linking personal rewards to RBM 
- Critique of RBM’s impact on several aspects of accountabilities 
- Role of Performance Pay as possible motivation in RBM 
 
 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, it is argued that a shift to Results-based Management 
would require a corresponding change in executive activity(s) to actively manage for 
results, including information sources to monitor and demonstrate programme results.  
Figure 9 shows the overall environment and underlying logic for the research area 
under investigation.    
 
Figure 9:  The Research Environment  
NPM in Canada
RBM increases 
Managerial Scope 
& Accountability
Potential 
Managerial 
Responses
- Results-based Mgmt (RBM)
- Citizen Focus
-Financial Stewardship
- Values and Ethics
- Managing to achieve Results
- Increased Accountability for 
Inputs &  Process
- New Accountability forResults
- Performance Pay
- Require Results information
- Tools,  Frameworks, EIS
- Performance Management
- Client Focus/Satisfaction
- Evaluations, Audit,  Research
A Canadian Public Sector environment which is 
Political, Increasing accountability, Risk Adverse
BUT New administrative requirements tied to programme budgets
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2.9.1 The Research Gap 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Canadian public sector has, at least officially, made a 
major investment and commitment in moving towards Results-based Management.  
However, the literature suggests that as of 2003, limited progress had been made 
(Auditor General of Canada, 2003c).   
 
In examining the literature, an absence of empirical studies on Results-based 
Management, was noted, especially within the Canadian public sector. The literature 
does contain a large number of theoretical and historical assessments of public sector 
reforms, as well as programme case studies.  However, the latter case studies were 
generally not theory-based, but rather consisted of programme evaluations or 
assessments.   Empirical research on the perception of Canadian executives was not 
located and appears to be absent. 
2.9.2 Linking Results-based Management and Public Value Theory 
In exploring this research gap, one theory that the literature suggests has potential to 
increase understanding of RBM is Public Value theory.  As noted, this theory is 
comprised of three key components that individually and collectively generate public 
value: Service, Outcomes, and Trust.  Similarly, Results-based Management focuses 
on the creation of outcomes or results for Canadians, in generating value for citizens.   
 
In summary, in seeking to understand the underlying causes of this limited progress, 
Public Value theory, introduced above, was identified as a theoretical framework to 
build the research analysis on.  The research will endeavour to determine whether the 
application of Public Value theory serves to increase understanding of key differences 
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between the official discourse on Results-based Management and the Canadian public 
sector executives’ responses, reactions and perception of Results-based Management, 
i.e. how are Canadian executives engaging with the concepts of Service, Outcomes 
and Trust in order to ‘deliver’ against RBM and generate public value.   
2.9.3 Summary 
The principle contribution of this thesis to knowledge will be an empirical testing of 
Public Value theory linking to the integration of RBM within the Canadian public 
sector. 
 
For clarity, I approached this research from the perspective of executives and 
examined RBM at the programme level.  While recognising the validity of alternative 
approaches, by focusing on the perspective of individual executives, key aspects of 
public sector management may be revealed.  It should be noted, however, that the unit 
of analysis will be groupings and sub-groupings of executives, not individual 
executives.   
 
The following chapter will present the methodology and methods used in undertaking 
this research. 
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3 Methodology Chapter 
“No matter how carefully one plans in advance, research is designed in the course of its 
execution … the results of hundreds of decisions, large and small, made while the research is 
underway” (Gill and Johnson, 1997:154). 
 
This chapter will present the methodology and research methods used in completing 
this research project.  After the introduction of the research question in Section 3.1, 
Section 3.2 will discuss the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research.  
The remainder of this chapter will define, explain and provide justification for the 
research methods employed.  The chapter specifically incorporates a discussion of the 
approach taken in the research analysis and interpretation of research findings, and 
addresses issues of validity, reliability and generalizability.  
 
In order to situate the research, the following section first presents the research 
questions, objectives, and sub-topics.  
3.1 Research Question 
The research will respond to this question from the executives’ perspective:  
How does Public Value Theory help to explain the limited progress in 
implementing Results-based Management within programmes in the 
Canadian federal public sector? 
3.1.1 Research Objectives 
In order to address the aforementioned research question, the following research sub-
topics were identified from the literature review and Key Informant interviews, to 
guide the research.  They are: 
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 To explore the role of Public Value’s Service component to Results-based 
Management 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Outcome component to RBM 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Trust component to RBM  
 Are there other factors that influence the adaptation of RBM? 
 
In assessing or addressing this overall research question and sub-topics, the research 
will: 
 Explore the progress of RBM through case studies in order to allow analysis 
of and comparisons between one major operational branch of Health Canada, 
the Saskatchewan region, and interviews with senior executives, and 
 Explore, in particular, the view of executives within these different sectors of 
the Canadian public sector. 
The case study selection logic will be discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
 
As the Key Informant interviews suggested, the slow adaptation within the Canadian 
public sector suggests forces at work which, if identified, could lead to a deeper 
understanding of the implementation issues underlying Results-based Management.   
It should be acknowledged that this research has explicitly chosen to examine these 
research questions from the perspective of executives and will not include, compare 
or contrast, the perspectives of politicians, citizens, or non-executive programme 
managers and administrators.   Other stakeholder groups may hold alternative and 
potentially conflicting viewpoints, however research limitations of time and funds 
precluded gathering all perspectives.   Of particular note, the decision to exclude 
political or Ministerial perspectives was based on the considerable differences 
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between the respective roles, experience and ambitions of politicians and public 
servants, including managerial knowledge, depth of programmes/departments 
understanding, and public sector experience. 
 
3.2 Methodology Section 
Within management research, Tranfield and Starkey (1998) argue that the complexity 
of this field requires multiple ontological or epistemological paradigms to achieve a 
full understanding.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that a general failure to fully 
understand and adequately consider and articulate the underlying philosophy, and 
ontological and epistemological basis of research projects has weakened the findings 
from management research during the late 20th century, both in practice and in 
reporting (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  This section will 
attempt to address these concerns. 
 
Given that management research can be considered a heterogeneous and fragmented 
field (Whitley, 1984; Tsoukas, 1994), it can and should draw on knowledge and 
methods from many social science disciplines.  Within management research, 
methodologies are fundamentally based in either an inductive or deductive philosophy 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), both of which have value22.  Similar to other social 
science research, inductive studies have long been a part of management research 
(Gill and Johnson, 1997), supported by the argument that the function of management 
cannot be fully captured and explained through purely deductive tools, and also that 
                                                 
22 This thesis will not address the fundamental differences between these two paradigms.  For a fuller 
discussion see (Gill and Johnson, 1997:28-38) or (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002:chapter 3). 
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empirical research is required to ground theories with practical evidence (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Swamidass, 1991).   
 
In discussing which research tradition is appropriate for a particular research effort, 
both the goals of the research and the epistemology of the researcher are important 
considerations (Smith, 1998).   Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) argue that three elements 
combine to make business and management research distinctive: 
 Multi-disciplinary approach - the level and use of knowledge from other 
disciplines that managers and researchers incorporate into current research 
 Access issues - as managers tend to be powerful and busy people, they are 
unlikely to allow research access unless they can see personal or commercial 
advantages 
 Practical consequence – managers are less likely to participate without the 
research having at least the potential to provide practical solutions, assisting 
them in some aspect of their management. 
 
In order to address such concerns, the first section of this chapter will address the 
research methodology of this research, positioning the research within the qualitative, 
interpretivism philosophies.  This in turn supports the selection of an appropriate 
method, discussed in the second section of this chapter.  This will form a basis for the 
subsequent assessment of the impact of methodological assumptions and perspectives 
on the research (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).     
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3.2.1 Considering Ontology, Epistemology and Method 
“We are confronted with a philosophical choice regarding the nature of 
human action and its explanation which has direct methodological 
implications”  (Gill and Johnson, 1997:133).  
 
It is widely accepted that the philosophical perspectives that forms the base for 
research are critical in that these choices are central to decisions of research design.  
For example, Gill and Johnson (2002) argue that defining the philosophical basis of  
research directly leads to choices of research design, defines the type and kind of 
evidence required, as well as dictates how the data is to be gathered and interpreted.  
This provides an ontological and epistemological basis for answering research 
questions under consideration (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002).    
 
This section will begin with a brief discussion of the underlying assumptions that 
form the philosophical underpinnings of modern research, specifically to ground this 
research in philosophies addressing the nature of the reality under study (ontology) 
and how knowledge of that reality can be best obtained (epistemology).  
 
Ontology Definition 
Webster’s dictionary defines Ontology as the study of the nature of existence and 
being in the abstract (Webster, 1988).  Ontology essentially involves a set of 
assumptions of what can be taken to really exist (Smith, 1998:344; Schacter, 2000).   
Within social science research, the key difference rests on whether the world is 
objective and external, or socially constructed, based on the perspectives of humans 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997:49).  These views are commonly divided into Positivist 
and Interpretivist (or Phenomenologist) ontologies (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  The 
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relatively recent addition of a separate ontological strand under the general title of 
Nominalism is also noted (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002:33).   
 
It is widely accepted that there is blurring between paradigms, as demonstrated in the 
continuum in Figure 10, where as one moves along the continuum the features and 
assumptions of one paradigm are gradually relaxed and replaced by those of another 
((Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Lincoln and Guba, 2005).  
 
Figure 10: Research Methods Continuum 
Reality as
a concrete
structure
Reality as
a concrete
process
Reality as a
contextual
field of
information
Reality as
a realm of
symbolic
discourse
Reality
as a
social
construc
tion
Reality as
a projection
of human
imagination
Positivist Phenomenologist
Approach to social sciences
 
Source: Morgan and Smircich (1980:492), adapted by Hussey and Hussey(1997:51). 
 
Epistemology Definition 
Epistemology, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification, provides much 
of the justification for selection of particular methodologies (Schwandt, 2001).  
Interpretivists at the Phenomenologist end of Figure 10 above, recognize that 
knowledge reflects researcher’s particular goals, culture, experience and history.   
 
This research takes the position that research choices and findings occur within the 
framework of life experiences; knowledge, including the pre-existing knowledge base 
of the researchers themselves, is built through a social construction of the world 
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(Weber, 2004).  The epistemology of qualitative researchers is existential (non 
determinist) and constructivist (Stake, 1995).   
3.2.2 Interpretivist Paradigms  
The aim of interpretative approaches is to understand (verstehen) how people make 
sense of their worlds, with human action being conceived as purposive and 
meaningful rather than externally determined by social structures, drives, the 
environment or economic stimuli (Gill and Johnson, 1997:133; Schwandt, 2001).  
Stake notes that interpretation is a major part of all research (Stake, 1995:9).   
 
Unlike the positivism paradigm, it can be argued that rather than seeking causal 
explanations of behaviour, interpretive research enhances our understanding of action 
through exploring the beliefs, meanings, feelings, and attitudes of actors in social 
context (White and Hollingsworth, 1999).   Similarly, interpretive research does not 
predefine dependent and independent variables, but focuses on the full complexity of 
human sense making as the situation emerges (Weber, 2004).   
 
Interpretive studies generally attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings 
that people assign to them, to illuminate the specific, to identify phenomena through 
how they are perceived by the actors in a situation.  Interpretive researchers start out 
with the assumption that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is best 
achieved through social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared 
meanings.  It produces social scientific accounts of social life by drawing on the 
concepts and meanings used by the social actors themselves.   
 
  Page 129 
Within a management context, interpretism is concerned with the meanings that 
managers and employees attach to the norms, rules, and values that guide the 
organization.  As such, the understanding of these and other cultural phenomena to 
the members of the organization becoming the definitions of the reality of the 
employees who populate the culture (White, 1999:54).  A simpler definition is that 
interpretation is the study of a ‘socially constructed’ management development or 
reaction or tool.  In the human sphere this normally translates into gathering 'deep' 
information and perceptions through inductive, qualitative methods such as 
interviews, discussions and participant observation, and representing it from the 
perspective of the research participant(s). 
 
Several criticisms of interpretivism are noted including: 
 the central concepts of interpretivism (e.g., ‘intention’, ‘reason’, and 
‘motives’) suggest that competent social actors engage in a continuous 
monitoring of their conduct; reality suggests that routine is the predominant 
form of day-to-day social activity, largely directly unmotivated 
 the numerous alternative accounts of social actors’ actions must be explored to 
provide a different and competing account of social actors’ action; there is 
more to reality than is expressed in the language of social actors 
 it fails to acknowledge the role of social structures that both conditions and 
produce social interaction, particularly divisions of interest and relations of 
power; social actors are either completely or partly unaware of structures 
 it is implicitly conservative in that it ignores the possible structures of conflict 
in a society, and hence the possible sources of social change.  
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3.2.3 Qualitative Research 
Management Research has a long history of drawing on qualitative methodologies, 
from Taylor’s qualitative study of labour, through the Hawthorne experiments on 
motivation, to the emergence of case study as a key management research strategy 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Yin, 2003b).    Nevertheless, up to the latter part of the 
20th century, management research was dominated by positivistic or neo-positivistic 
assumptions, with research methods focused on ideals of objectivity, neutrality, 
scientific procedure, technique, quantification, replicability, generalisation, and 
discovery of laws (Alvesson, 1996; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).   This led to a 
predominance of quantitative research methods, with much attention being given to 
describing, coding and counting events, often at the expense of understanding why 
events occurred (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).   
 
During the last three decades, qualitative research has emerged as a field or method of 
inquiry in its own right (Huberman and Miles, 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003a).   
Qualitative research covers multiple disciplines, fields and subject matters, and 
encompasses a complex, interconnected family of terms, concepts and assumptions.  
Epistemologically, it can be traced to traditions associated with foundationalism, 
positivism, post-positivism, post-structuralism, and the many qualitative research 
perspectives and methods connected to cultural and interpretivist studies (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003b).  Denzin and Lincoln (2003b:5) offer this generic definition:  
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world.  In consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the 
world visible… involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world.  
This means that qualitative researchers study things in the natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meaning people bring to them.”  
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Qualitative inquiry is currently an umbrella term for various philosophical 
orientations to interpretive research.  Qualitative methods, while lacking the statistical 
precision of quantitative research, compensate by exploring in much greater depth 
underlying why or how questions (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002:3).  Such studies can 
take many forms and are categorized into numerous methods including: ethnographic, 
naturalistic, phenomenological, hermeneutic, case studies and holistic studies (Stake, 
1995).   One key element of note is that qualitative research, unlike quantitative 
inquiry with its pre-specified intent, is much more evolutionary.  Beginning with an 
initial problem statement, design and interview questions, interpretations are 
developed during the full course of the research and can lead to refinements of the 
research itself.   
3.2.4 The Role of the Researcher 
As an interpretive approach perceives reality as socially constructed, the role of the 
researcher in interacting with participants in order to understand their social 
constructions must be examined and considered.   
 
It is argued that interpretism reflects the way that people make sense of the world, 
through sharing their experiences with others via the medium of language (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002).  ‘Thick description,’ ‘experiential understanding,’ and multiple 
realities are expected in qualitative case studies.  Pursuit of complex meaning cannot 
be just designed in or caught retrospectively (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994), but rather 
require continuous attention (Stake, 1995). 
 
Within interpretivist research the concept of a totally unbiased researcher is not 
realistic.  Researchers themselves become measurement instruments as they interpret 
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(measure) the phenomena they observe. In this regard, interpretive researchers 
understand that their research actions affect the research objects they are studying 
(Weber, 2004).  Researchers must also explicitly recognize that the knowledge they 
seek and find reflects their particular goals, culture, experience, history, and 
experience.  In other words, one can only make ‘sense’ of the world from within a 
framework of existing knowledge (Weber, 2004). 
 
Pure phenomenological research seeking to describe rather than explain, begins from 
a perspective free from hypotheses or preconceptions (Husserl, 1970; Lester, 1999).   
This is not the epistemological stance of this research.  Rather, as more recent 
humanist and feminist researchers argue, the possibility of starting without 
preconceptions or bias is unrealistic (Lofland, 2002).  Instead, they emphasize the 
importance of making clear how interpretations and meanings have been placed on 
findings, as well as making the researcher visible in the 'frame' of the research as an 
interested and subjective actor rather than a detached and impartial observer (Smith, 
1998).  
 
This research was undertaken with a strong and continuous degree of reflectivity.  As 
a researcher, researching in one’s own professional field, the process of critical self-
reflection to account for one’s own biases, theoretical predispositions, preferences, etc 
is critical to avoiding biased results.  As such, as the literature suggests, the researcher 
has specifically taken a reflective stance throughout (discussed further in section 
3.7.3) and located himself within the research question and nature of the inquiry 
(Radnor, 2002).  Through critical analysis of inherent biases and undertaking certain 
specific actions (further discussed in Section 3.7.1), the researcher has limited, to the 
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degree possible, bias introduced by his own perceptions and views (Schon, 1991; 
Schwandt, 2001). 
3.2.5 Summary of Methodology Section 
As Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) suggested, both the choice of research topics and the 
subsequent selection of methods always involves philosophical choices regarding 
what is important and how best to view and analyze an issue.  This research will be 
based on an interpretivist paradigm, with three key aspects of the research topic: 
 The research is exploratory in nature 
 The results desired are socially, not abstractly or naturally constructed, and 
therefore require a qualitative paradigm to be understood 
 The research involves assessing individual perceptions, motivators and 
attitudes which are expected to be quite diverse and highly dependent on 
differing circumstances, suggesting the acquisition of the richness and depth 
that qualitative data provides in understanding this phenomenon. 
 
Obviously, this thesis is not attempting to test or prove the validity of the method 
itself, but rather using an interpretive, case study method to answer the research 
question under consideration.  Where appropriate, elements from other methods were 
used.  For example, the secondary analysis of several large surveys makes use of the 
survey method, and the selection and comparison of case studies incorporate elements 
which could be attributed to the realism perspective.  The point being that a reader 
must decide, from the evidence presented, whether the research question has been 
satisfactorily answered, and whether in forming this answer a sound research method 
was utilized. 
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The research methodology and method choices are visually presented in Figure 11, 
selected from among the various research ontology and epistemology options.   
 
Figure 11: Research ‘Onion Graph’ 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (Saunders et al., 2003:87) 
 
In summary, this research builds on an ontological stance that denotes that reality and 
human activity are not exclusive and that multiple realities can exist as perceived by 
different participants in a study (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  Epistemologically, from 
an interpretative and qualitative research perspective, this research will acquire the 
‘thick data’ necessary to understand the perspectives and motivation of executives in 
adopting Results-based Management, while empirically exploring the application of 
the Public Value theory to this field. 
 
Having defined the underlying methodological philosophies and groundings of the 
research under discussion, the thesis will now address the selection of research 
methods in the following section.   
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3.3 Method Section 
As noted, it is widely agreed that selection of an appropriate methodology rests on the 
nature of the research under consideration and the specific research questions to be 
addressed  (Robson, 1993; Gill and Johnson, 2002; Yin, 2003b).   Appropriate 
methods must then emerge appropriate to this methodology selection.   
 
This section will begin by briefly discussing the research purpose - exploratory, 
descriptive or hypothesis testing, noting the relevance and application within this 
research.  Arguments supporting the selection of the Case Study method are followed 
by discussion of the practices used in conducting the field research.  The section 
concludes with discussion regarding the approach to the analysis and pattern matching 
undertaken in analysing the data. 
3.3.1 Research Purpose – Exploratory, Descriptive or Hypothesis 
In addition to a sound literature search, research must begin with the determination of 
its overall nature or goal: exploratory, descriptive, or hypothesis testing23 (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997).  It is widely agreed that each research strategy has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  The selection of method should be based on the type of research 
question, the control needed over subject behaviour, and the timing - contemporary as 
opposed to historical phenomena (Yin, 2003b).  
 
Exploratory research examines situations about which little is known, seeking to 
acquire a preliminary insight into a field or topic in order to develop an initial 
framework, theory or model.  An exploratory case study frequently resembles a Key 
                                                 
23 Other categories of research exist, for example by: Process – qualitative versus quantitative data 
collection; Logic – inductive or deductive; or Outcome – applied to addressing a specific issue, 
versus basic research making a general contribution to knowledge (Hussey and Hussey, 1997:10). 
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Informant study; the research design and data collection methods usually are not 
specified in advance (Scholz and Tietje, 2002).  The case study was historically 
perceived as the ‘method of choice’ in exploratory research (Platt, 1992b; Yin, 
2003b).  
 
Given the limited knowledge located in the literature review for the topic under 
consideration, it is submitted that this research project is best treated as exploratory 
research, although the use of Public Value as a possible model in categorizing the 
research findings suggests that elements of descriptive research must also be 
considered. 
3.3.2 Contrast and Selection of Research Methods 
Research methods must be grounded in underlying philosophical choices including 
the key decision between the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, which will in 
turn drive the choice of research methods (Payne, 1951; Hussey and Hussey, 
1997:64).  Researchers must consider the nature and type of data required to support 
their research questions during the design phase (Bell, 1999).  Once made, these 
decisions are difficult to change, although other methods may be added (Robson, 
1993:188).    
 
Robson (1993) referred to three ‘real world’ strategies for collecting empirical 
research data: experiment, survey and case study. In addition to Robson’s three 
strategies, other hybrid solutions have emerged, for example, Action Research (Gill 
and Johnson, 1997; Coghlan and Brannick, 2001; Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005).  In 
many of these, the integration of the researcher within the research topic is an inherent 
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aspect of the research itself (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), with such collaboration 
leading to development of shared understanding (Reason and Bradbury, 2001).   
Though tautological, the research must acquire data with the adequate level of detail 
to meet the purpose of the research (Barnes, 2001), whether that be descriptive, 
explanatory or testing in nature (Meredith et al., 1989). 
 
For this research, the experimental method was excluded based on the absence of a 
laboratory-like setting, and survey was excluded based on data collection issues 
(discussed later in the thesis).  Similarly, Action Research was excluded as this 
research was not conducted from an internal practitioner stance.  The following 
section contains a fuller discussion of the rationale and justification for the selection 
of the Case Study method. 
3.3.3 Case Studies in Research 
The case study method is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003b:13), particularly suited for 
“... research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate” (Eisenhardt, 
1989:548), and is “… a strategy to be preferred when circumstances and research 
problems are appropriate…” (Platt, 1992a:46).  Case studies have been used for 
research within many fields24 (Mitchell, 1983; Robson, 1993), especially within the 
social sciences (Silverman, 2001), and management research (Gummesson, 2000; 
Barnes, 2001; Gill and Johnson, 2002).  The Case Study has a long history within 
management research which has increased in importance as researchers 
                                                 
24 Note that the term Case study can also describe a teaching device or the examination of records, 
i.e. individual medical histories.  Such applications do not apply here, and are outside of the 
discussion within this thesis. 
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acknowledged that management cannot be split into discrete, independent functions, 
but rather must be examined holistically.    
 
Case studies, by virtue of their intensive nature, focus on a limited number of events25 
or subjects including: a single incident, individual or event, neighbourhood or group, 
or even an innovation, decision, or programme (Robson, 1993; Silverman, 2001), and 
may include multiple levels of data collection and analysis (Robson, 1993; Yin, 
2003b).  Case studies also include both qualitative and quantitative data (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997).   
 
In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. It is especially useful in 
dealing with time-dependent relationships (Strauss, 1987).   
 
While this research will adopt Yin’s (2003b) case study strategy, it should be noted 
that other academic writers have also made major contributions to the case study 
method including Stake (1995; 2005), Eisenhardt (1989) Hamel et al. (1993) and 
Easterby-Smith (2002).  Certain differences in approach are noted.  For example, 
Stake (2003) sees the Case Study method as closer to the Action Research paradigm, 
and therefore is less concerned with validity and more concerned with the potential 
for the researcher to aid change within the research setting. 
 
                                                 
25 Multiple case studies are not to be confused with ‘sampling’ from other research methodologies, 
but methodologically are closer to duplicating experiments. For a fuller discussion of case 
selection, see (Platt, 1992b)   
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Yin (2003b) suggests that cases studies are suitable for exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory (causal) research26.   This is well supported by other academic writers 
(Platt, 1992b; Robson, 1993; Gummesson, 2000; Yin, 2003b).    
 
As noted, the focus of this research is exploratory.  In general, exploratory case 
studies are undertaken when little is known about the subject area with the goal being 
to acquire preliminary insight into a field or topic and to develop an initial framework 
or model.  Conditions which I argue are present within this research topic.  
Exploratory case studies have long been seen as appropriate within exploratory 
research (Platt, 1992a; Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994; Gummesson, 2000; Yin, 2003b), 
serving ‘to map out’ the research territory, limits, boundaries,’ and to guide the 
development of further research questions and hypotheses.  
 
Exploratory case studies, like all research methods, require a purpose, as well as the 
criteria by which an exploration will be judged successful.  A case study should begin 
with a sound research design which sets out  “the logical model of proof that will 
allow the research to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the 
variables” (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992:77-78).  
 
To assist in developing a sound research design, Yin (2003b) suggests the inclusion of 
a case study design, which was undertaken within this research.  As suggested by Yin, 
five elements were included in the case study design: research question, propositions 
(similar to hypothesis) or purpose for exploratory work, unit(s) of analysis, logic 
                                                 
26   Alternative classifications are noted.  For example, Stake classifies Case Studies as: Intrinsic - 
when the researcher has an interest in the case; Instrumental - when the case is used to understand 
more than what is obvious to the observer; Collective - when a group of cases is studied (Stake, 
2003). 
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model, and criteria for interpreting findings.  Researchers must develop a conceptual 
framework prior to beginning the case study in order to identify “the main features 
(aspects, dimension, factors, variables) of a case study and the presumed 
relationships” (Robson, 1993:148-150).  Research constructs, possibly a priori, 
support the proper development of construct measurement tools (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
for example, the Interview Guide discussed in Section 3.5.2.  Robson states, “any 
failure to carry out the pre-specified design… is often lethal as far as interpretation is 
concerned” (Robson, 1993:150).  It is worth noting that refinements to the case study 
design are appropriate, and were undertaken during the course of research (Mintzberg, 
1973; Hussey and Hussey, 1997:125).  
 
Once an initial understanding of the subject area is acquired, other types of case 
studies, such as descriptive case studies, will have greater potential for determining 
and describing characteristics, influences and effects.  The objective will then be to 
understand the relevance of a phenomenon, frequency and distribution (Pinsonneault 
and Kraemer, 1993).  This may lead, in turn, to explanatory case studies exploring the 
causal effects, including the development of Logic Models (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003b).    
 
The foregoing has provided the rationale for the selection of the case study method, 
linking the research methodology with the acquisition of qualitative research data 
through exploratory case studies.  As well, to guide this research, a case study 
research design was completed.  In summary, the selection of Exploratory Case 
studies was supported by: 
 The absence of studies exploring these issues from an executive perspective 
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 Richness of executive perceptions in developing a fuller understanding of the 
issue(s) 
 The potential of Public Value theory in exploring the slow implementation of 
Results-based Management. 
 
3.4 The Key Informant Interviews 
In preparation for the research case studies, and to ensure a maximum understanding 
of the issues under examination, a ‘pilot case’ was undertaken.  As Yin (2003b:79) 
notes, 
 “It is important to note that a pilot test is not a pretest.  The pilot case is more formative, 
assisting you to develop relevant lines of questions – possibly even providing some 
conceptual clarification for the research design as well.” (italics in original) 
 
The contribution of the Key Informant interviews to this research were to confirm the 
findings from the literature, to expand and develop understanding of the topic under 
investigation, to refine the research sub-questions and develop the data collection 
instruments, as well as to identify potential sources of supporting information. The 
Key Informant interviews were conducted during 2003.   
3.4.1 Selection of Key Informant Interviewees 
The Key Informant interviews engaged sixteen executives including representatives 
from ‘central agencies,’ executives responsible for evaluation, accountability and/or 
performance management functions from several departments, and internal and 
external consultants.  These individuals were selected for their in-depth knowledge of 
Results-based Management, their key roles in developing and implementing the 
policy framework, or their practical expertise.  The selection choice began by 
interviewing the Treasury Board officials responsible for implementing RBM and the 
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Auditor General officials responsible for assessing progress on RBM27.  At the 
conclusion of each interview, executives were asked for referrals to other 
knowledgeable individuals or successful implementations, the snowball technique 
(Robson, 1993). The list of interviewees is contained in Appendix A.  
3.4.2 Impact of the Key Informant interviews on the Research Design 
The Key Informant interviews confirmed, within a Canadian public sector context, 
issues identified in the literature review related to perceived strengths and weaknesses 
of RBM within Canada.  The interviewees also identified areas of potential 
investigation not addressed within the current literature, such as sources of RBM 
information, and ‘operationalise’ RBM by executives.   
 
Overall, RBM was considered an under-research area in the opinions of interviewees, 
who collectively expressed a high degree of interest in the research results.  The Key 
Informant interviews confirmed the necessity of including regional and headquarter 
input, and the importance of examining whether senior executives had different 
perspectives, which supported the inclusion of multiple case study areas.  Key 
Informant interviewees also confirmed the need for face-to-face interviews in data 
collection; in their opinion, RBM surveys would have limited useful application.   
 
The impact of these interviews on the research design, especially in developing the 
interview guideline (interview questionnaire), was considerable.  For brevity, Table 
24 provides a summary of the contribution of the Key Informant interviews to the 
research question. 
 
                                                 
27 This information is readily available on the Canadian government website (www.canada.gc.ca). 
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Table 24: Contribution of Key Informants to the Research Design 
Issues Description Impact or Action Question
* 
Is RBM a suitable 
topic for research 
(practitioner 
perspective)? 
Yes, high degree of interest expressed by 
Key Informants 
1 
Field procedures and 
data collection  
Confirm that interviews are required, 
surveys will not work 
 
Include regional 
perspective 
Saskatchewan Case Study incorporated 
into research design 
 
Include programme 
perspective 
Health Case Study incorporated into 
research design 
 
Research 
Methods 
 
 
 
Case 
Study 
Selection 
Include Central 
Agencies and senior 
executive 
perspectives 
Senior Executive Case Study 
incorporated into research design 
 
Services Service 
Explore client-focus/client feedback 
5 
12 
Outcomes  Use of RBM 
Linked to managerial flexibility  
4,5 
17 
Public 
Value 
Trust Accountability 
Client feedback 
7-9 
12 
Must be linked to accountability  4,9 
Must be linked to reporting 5,9 
Must be linked to budgets, including 
budget reallocation 
5, 17 
RBM Impact of RBM on  
executive 
management  
Role and use of information in 
operationally managing for results 
9-11, 
12 
* Question refers to the inclusion of questions in the Interview Guideline (Appendix C). 
 
3.4.3 Confirmation of Case Selection 
As confirmed by the Key Informant interviews, the research methodology consisted 
of two principle case studies within the federal government of Canada, followed by 
the Senior Executive interviews.  The first case, the Saskatchewan Case Study, 
interviewed executives from all departments with regional offices in Saskatchewan, 
one of the eight regions of Canada.  The second, the Health Case Study, incorporated 
the views of executives from a national health program, including both headquarters 
and regional executives from across Canada.  Within the research design, acquiring 
evidence from multiple case studies allows for cross-case analysis (Yin, 2003b).   The 
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final set of interview focused on capturing the input and perspectives of senior 
executives and validating the research findings from the two case studies. 
 
The Saskatchewan Case study responds to the suggestion from the Key Informant 
interviews that regional and headquarters may have differing perspectives on Result-
based Management.  A number of the Key Informant participants commented on the 
‘policy-centric’ view of Ottawa, including the development of RBM policy itself28, in 
comparison with the program-delivery focus of regional operations29.  Furthermore, 
given that approximately 60 per cent of Canadian federal public servants worked in 
regional settings in 2003, the Saskatchewan Case Study provides a mechanism to 
focus on regional executives’ perspectives.  
 
The Health Case study was selected as it is considered one of the most difficult 
functional areas to measure (Stein, 2001).  Examining one of the most difficult 
programme areas may reveal, in a clearer manner, certain management issues 
underlying Result-based Management.  The Key Informant interviews confirmed this 
proposition, for example, “Health has got to be one of the hardest departments to try 
and implement Results-based Management” (respondent: KI-5). 
 
In order to capture the perspective of the highest level of the bureaucracy, as 
suggested by the Key Informant interviewees, interviews with ten very senior 
mandarins; Deputy Ministers (DM) and Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM) from both 
‘central agencies’ and line departments were conducted under the general heading of 
                                                 
28 The Treasury Board of Canada, the developer of the Results-based Management policy, has no 
regional offices and is located in the national capital, Ottawa Canada. 
29 This difference was also thoroughly addressed in Service in the Field - the World of Front-line 
Public Servants (Carroll and Siegel, 1999), which confirmed the utility of including the 
Saskatchewan Case Study. 
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Senior Executive interviews.  In each interview, the identical interview questionnaire 
was followed in order to acquire consistent data. 
 
In reflecting on the challenge and opportunity of acquiring Senior Executives’ 
perspectives, the following strategy was developed.  By intentionally scheduling these 
interviews last, a discussion of the preliminary research findings was conducted at the 
end of each interview, providing a key validation for the case study results.  
Furthermore, in securing senior executives’ agreement to participate, the opportunity 
to discuss the research findings was offered as an inducement.   
 
Ten interviews, while a small number, were considered adequate to test the research 
findings as they included representatives from the key central agencies leading the 
RBM initiative for the Canadian federal government.   
 
In summary, selection of these specific cases emerged from a combination of the 
Literature Review, the Key Informant interviews, and discussion with interested 
parties.  The overall research design incorporated executive perspectives and insights 
from different geographic regions, functional responsibilities, and levels of executive 
seniority.  The case study selection logic is summarized in Table 25, below.  
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Table 25: Case Selection Logic 
 
Health Case study 
 Health is one of the hardest areas to determine and measure outcomes, with multiple 
stakeholders, long outcome time horizons, etc. 
 First Nations and Inuit Health, one Branch of Health Canada, is very large with a budget 
of $1.8 billion, 30 major programmes, and 2000 employees (in 2003-04) 
 First Nations health is a highly political area with multiple stakeholders, who have 
conflicting goals 
 Within health, multiple results are desired, including conflicting outcomes 
 Will permit the examination of one Branch/programme area in depth 
 Includes regional and headquarters executives permitting analysis of differences 
 Also includes perspective of nine executives responsible for corporate functions 
(Informatics, Human Resources, Audit and Evaluation, Finance, Planning, etc.), 
required to support the health programmes 
Saskatchewan Case study 
 Interviewing each executive in Saskatchewan permits analysis of differences between 
departments with a regional presence 
 Regional executives are responsible for direct programme delivery to Canadians/clients, 
(as compared to policy or corporate roles), and may have different pre-existing or 
current perspectives of results and accountability, including use of client satisfaction 
data in assessing outcomes 
 Key Informant interviews findings suggest that programmes with clear objectives and 
greater control of programme delivery, may support the adoption of Results-based 
Management (e.g. Taxation, Corrections) in comparison with programmes crossing 
jurisdictional boundaries and/or where the choices of individual Canadians/clients have 
large downstream impacts on the results (Health, Education) 
Senior Executive interviews 
 A series of  ten interviews with senior executives responsible for overall implementation 
of RBM within the Canadian public sector to validate research findings 
 Gather Central Agency perspective (PSC, TBS, PCO, AG), as well as executives 
responsible for implementing Results-based Management in other departments 
 Combined datasets permits comparisons between senior and lower-level executive 
perceptions 
Cross Case Analysis 
 After analysis of the individual cases, the data will be merged to undertake secondary 
analysis of differences and similarities between regional and headquarter executives 
 Seek differences in implementation, and explanations of differences 
 
Each case study was selected on its own merit.  However, the selecting of multiple 
case studies enhanced validity (Yin, 2003b), and strengthened the research design 
through analysing the perspectives and insights from different geographic regions, 
regional versus headquarter perspectives, and between levels of executive 
management.  While a greater number of case studies would be desirable, limitations 
of time and funds precluded expansion of this research into other departments or 
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geographic regions. This remains an area for future research, as discussed briefly in 
Chapter 8, Conclusions.  
 
The time frame available to conduct interviews, approximately 15 months, permitted 
a population rather than sample approach.  This had the benefit of removing issues 
associated with sample selection, and served to increase the generalizability of the 
research findings.  Naturally, some participants were unable or unwilling to 
participate.  The number of participants and refusals, which were surprisingly small, 
are also noted in Table 26. 
 
Table 26: Case Study Interviews Statistics 
Case Study Number 
of 
Interviews
Number 
not 
Conducted
Location Dates 
Saskatchewan 
Case study 
32 
(91.4%) 
3 Province of 
Saskatchewan 
February 2004 - 
January  2005 
Health Case 
study 
37 
(90.2%) 
4 Across Canada  
(Halifax, NS – 
Vancouver, BC) 
March 2004 -  
April 2005 
Senior 
Executive 
Interviews  
10 
(100%) 
0 All in Ottawa – 
Canada’s capital 
October 2004 -  
January 2005 
Note: ‘Number not Conducted’ includes interviews unable to schedule and refusals. 
 
In summary, this section has demonstrated the suitability of the case study method in 
addressing this research topic and identified the criteria for selection of the 
Saskatchewan and Health case studies, and the Senior Executive interviews. 
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3.5 Field Research Section 
Primary data collection consisted of semi-structured one-hour interviews to capture 
what executives consider significant in relation to RBM and to frame these issues in 
their terms (Meredith et al., 1989).   Interviews can “yield rich insights into people’s 
experiences, opinions, aspirations.  Interviews, within management research, are 
essential sources of case study information” (Yin, 1994:84).  Interviews also allow 
interviewees to speak for themselves, offering verifiable facts along with their 
opinions, insights and other contextual information (Robson, 1993), and are especially 
suitable for sensitive areas of research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).   
 
As Key Informants confirmed, the public service culture strongly suggests that 
researchers use personal interviews, instead of survey questionnaires, as executives 
are extremely busy, accustomed to delegating such information requests to 
subordinates, rarely write negative comments, and to fully explore widely different 
perceptions.   
3.5.1 Identification of Potential Interviewees 
Given that this research examines the research questions from the perspective of 
public sector executives, each executive within the two case study areas was 
approached to be interviewed.  The names and titles of individual executives were 
acquired from the Canadian government electronic telephone directory 
(www.canada.gc.ca), as well as through a variety of public and internal sources 
including the Saskatchewan Federal Regional Council, Health Canada departmental 
organization charts, personal knowledge, requests to Human Resources, and the 
‘Snowball’ technique of asking each interviewee for the names of other executives 
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whom the researcher should contact.  The ten Senior Executive interviewees were 
selected based on their level and position within central agencies. 
 
Appendix A contains the Master Interview List, with the names and titles of 
executives interviewed.  Not included on this list were the small number of executives 
(7) with whom interviews were not possible, through either refusals (3) or scheduling 
difficulties (4).  In each case study, steps were taken to ensure that the organizational 
viewpoints had been integrated, addressing the ‘loss’ of this data to this research.   
 
Once identified, each executive was sent an email requesting an interview, which 
included a brief description of the research.  Copies of this correspondence are 
included as Appendix B.  This initial contact was followed, typically one week later, 
with a telephone call seeking their participation.   
 
Recent studies of executive workload (Corneil et al., 2002) document that public 
sector executives are very busy, with heavy workloads.  It is believed, but cannot be 
proven, that access was greatly enhanced through the researcher’s credentials as a 
long-service public servant.  In addition, familiarity with the internal procedures, 
language and culture of the Canadian public service enabled the researcher to pose 
relevant questions, probe and influence the direction of discussion into useful areas, 
and challenge executives into revealing and explaining their perceptions more fully. 
3.5.2 The Interview Guide 
Building on findings from the Key Informant interviews and Literature Review, as 
well as internal documents including Treasury Board of Canada Results-based 
Management policies and Auditor General’s assessments, and utilising techniques on 
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questionnaire design widely disseminated in literature (Payne, 1951; Fink, 1995; Gill 
and Johnson, 1997; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Smith, 1998), a semi-structured or 
open-ended interview guide was developed to capture what government managers 
consider significant in regards to RBM and to frame those issues in their terms 
(Meredith et al., 1989).  Given the exploratory nature of this research, open-ended 
questions support Burgess’s (1982) call to probe deeply, solicit expansive responses, 
and thereby uncover previously hidden details and open up new lines of enquiry.   
 
The initial questionnaire was pre-tested on a small sample of public servants who 
provided direct feedback on the instrument itself.  This led to minor refinements and 
adjustments. The complete Interview Guide is included as Appendix C. 
 
The interview guide was structured to flow the discussion through a number of 
research areas and topics.  Within each research topic, the questions found in the 
interview guide were used to initiate discussion. The open-ended nature of these 
questions and relative small number of questions (initially 14) provided flexibility in 
conducting the interviews, and allowed the discussion to flow in a ‘normal’ manner.  
During each interview, all research topics were covered, with no significance or 
impact noted in the order of the discussion of these research areas. 
 
For brevity, Table 27, below, provides a high level overview of how the questions 
mapped to the research sub-topics, the elements of Public Value theory. 
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Table 27: Linking the Questions to Public Value Theory in the Interview Guide 
Public Value Theory Interview Questions and Topics Service Outcome Trust Other 
1. Over the last five to ten years has 
public sector management changed?  √  √ 
2. How would you define accountability 
as a public sector manager?    √ 
3. Has accountability changed over the 
last five years?   How? √ √ √  
4. Do you believe RBM has the potential 
to improve government programs or 
management? 
√ √ √  
5. Is your organization using RBM 
information?  How and for What? √ √   
6. Level of government/department/ 
branch support for RBM.    √ 
7. Exactly what are you accountable for? √ √ √  
8. Who are you accountable to?    √  
9. Overall, how do you discharge or 
demonstrate your accountability?   √ √ 
10. Where do you get your management 
information from?  √ √ √  
11. Do you use/want a Performance 
Management System for RBM? √ √   
12. Discussion of Results and client’s 
satisfactions. √ √ √  
13. The future direction of RBM and 
Accountability.    √ 
14. Discussion of Performance Pay.  √  √ 
15. Discussion of personal motivation to 
work as a public servant.  √  √ 
 
Limited demographic information was collected at the start of each interview which 
included gender, length of public sector employment and length of executive service 
(See note at the end of Appendix A).   
3.5.3 Field Procedures 
As noted in Table 26, the primary data collection strategy for this research consisted 
of 79 semi-structured one-hour interviews.  The interviews were held between 
February 2004 and April 2005, with almost all interviews conducted at the 
interviewee’s work-site.  The Saskatchewan Case study has an obvious geographic 
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boundary - the province of Saskatchewan, where executives work in one of two major 
urban centres.  However, the Health Case study interviews were conducted from 
Halifax, N.S. on Canada’s east coast, to Vancouver, BC on Canada’s west coast, a 
distance of approximately 6000 kilometres and 4 time zones.  The large distances 
involved were a major driver of lengthy time frame required to complete these 
interviews.  As well, executives’ often extremely busy schedules required extensive 
lead times to successfully book, and frequently reschedule, interviews.   
 
The literature suggests that offers of confidentially and anonymity be extended to 
participants to achieve a higher level of honesty and accuracy through reduced risk to 
participants (Folkman, 2000).  At the beginning of each interview, participants were 
offered the guarantee that no attribution of individual comments would occur.  
Interestingly, a significant number of participants declined this offer, but this had no 
impact on the research.  A digital recorder was used to record the interviews in order 
to ensure the accuracy of the subsequent transcripts30, and to enable the interviewer to 
focus on the discussion (Fink, 1995).  Analytical notes were prepared and recorded in 
a research diary immediately following each interview to capture additional details, 
interpretations, and other related information (Radnor, 2002).   
 
Interviewee confidentiality was ensured by assigning a respondent code to each 
interview recording and the resulting transcript.  This code was used during all 
subsequent phases of the research.  The only link between individual interviewees and 
                                                 
30 The literature suggests that all methodological choices, even the process of transcription itself, are 
value-laden (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999).  The transcripts prepared for this research were simple 
records of words spoken, with no attempt to include tone, pauses and body language within the 
transcripts.  Having conducted all interviews personally did help mitigate this limitation. 
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‘their’ transcript was maintained in a separate, secure file.  In addition, all interviews, 
transcripts and data were stored in a secure environment.  
 
As suggested by Yin (2003), a Case Study Protocol was assembled for this research.  
The purpose of the protocol was to outline and document the case study research.  The 
use of a Case Study Protocol enhances reliability and is essential for multiple-case 
research design, as in this research.  As well, this protocol incorporates the research 
questions, logic and processes undertaken during the research itself, leading to 
improved construct validity (Yin, 2003b).   This documentation also incorporates the 
plan for the collection, the analysis of the information and data obtained during the 
course of the research, and all administrative aspects of this research.  
 
In addition, a Case Study Database was maintained during the course of the study.  It 
contains raw material (including interview transcripts, researcher's field notes, 
documents collected during data collection, and survey material), coded data, coding 
scheme, memos and other analytic material.   
3.5.4 Ethics and Attribution 
Ethical considerations must be considered in all research decisions (Bulmer, 2001).  
Although religious and professional organizations historically developed ethical 
guidelines to direct members in their actions and behaviours, for example, (Canadian 
Medical Association, 1995), the issue of ethics in social research is a more recent 
topic of discussion (Frankfort-Nachmias, 1996; Bell, 1999; Bulmer, 2001).  Social 
research by definition involves “the study of human society and of individual relations 
in and to society” (Webster, 1988:941).  In addition, the study of ethics can be 
variously defined, for example: “[in research]…ethics are usually taken as referring to 
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general principles of what one ought to do” (Robson, 1993:30).  Therefore, since 
social science “researchers are constantly interacting with a complex and demanding 
socio-political environment that influences their research decisions…” (Frankfort-
Nachmias, 1996:76), ethical researchers must consider and address the research 
choices which impact not just the research participants, but also on other researchers, 
users of the research, and society at large (Radnor, 2002). 
 
Within Canada, and therefore deemed appropriate for this research, the Canadian Tri-
Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Research 
Councils of Canada, 2003) defines the ethical issues which must be addressed by 
Canadian researchers in the social sciences.  The principles focus primarily on issues 
of human dignity, free and informed consent, and privacy and confidentiality.  Noting 
that human dignity was not considered to be an issue within this research, the 
researcher read and complied with all relevant aspects of these guidelines.   
 
Research participants have the right to know, and to consent to, their participation in 
research activities (Bulmer, 2001).  Consent must be informed and without 
manipulation or deceit to be meaningful, although exceptions can be justified under 
certain circumstances (Sieber, 1992).   Within this research, informed consent was 
acquired through the use of a letter of introduction describing the research.  The 
voluntary nature of participation was clear from the nature of the approach and no 
attempt was made to pressure or persuade reluctant participants. 
 
A number of ethical issues surround the relative power of researchers and 
participants, although Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) note that these issues are 
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frequently reduced or absent in management research.  For this research, the consent 
to participate was clear, as individuals were free to decline when contacted.  For 
clarity, the researcher/interviewer was ‘organizationally' one level below the 
executive level.  Therefore, no implicit organizational pressure to participate or threat 
for non-participation could be implied. 
 
Regarding privacy and confidentiality, as noted in the previous section, a commitment 
was extended by the researcher that attribution of individual comments would not 
occur.  In meeting this ethical commitment certain practical steps were undertaken to 
remove all identifying information from the transcripts (as discussed in Section 3.7.1).   
As well, this thesis, other publications, and public presentations will continue to 
respect the researcher’s ‘no attribution’ commitment.  This approach seeks to 
maintain participant trust and operationally meet all ethic research standards as set out 
by the Research Councils of Canada (2003).  
 
In summary, it is submitted that all relevant ethical issues have been addressed in the 
research design, during the research process, and in presentation of research findings. 
 
3.6 Analysis Strategies 
“Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study” (Yin, 
2003b:109).   
 
Yin (2003) argues for the inclusion of a general analytic strategy for case study 
research to guide the decision regarding what will be analyzed and for what reason.  
As Robson (1993:148) notes, researchers must develop this conceptual framework 
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prior to beginning the case study in order to identify  “the main features (aspects, 
dimension, factors, variables) of a case study and the presumed relationships.”  This 
framework sets out  “the logical model of proof that will allow the research to draw 
inferences concerning causal relations among the variables.” (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1992:77-78).  Eisenhardt (1989) warns that without a sound research focus 
and design, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data.   
 
Method and analysis occur simultaneously in case study research. Within a qualitative 
case study, the researcher is engaged in data interpretation from the beginning of the 
research process to the end (Radnor, 2002), becoming thoroughly familiar with the 
data in order to grasp the details, while simultaneously examining the dataset from a 
distance seeking to reveal patterns and explanations.  Specifically, data collection and 
analysis occur as a cyclical or iterative process, wherein the researcher moves 
between the literature and field data and back to the literature again.  This aspect of 
this research will be discussed in Section 3.7.3. 
 
One of the key elements of case study research is pattern matching, which Trochim 
(1989) considered a highly desirable strategy for analysis.  This type of logic 
compares an empirical pattern with a predicted one.  Internal validity is enhanced 
when the patterns coincide.  However, exploratory research typically focuses on 
pattern finding rather than pattern matching, although the cross-case and secondary 
analysis sought patterns which matched. 
 
Explanation-building is considered a form of pattern-matching in which the analysis 
of the case study is carried out by building an explanation of the case.  Through 
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exploring and seeking out relationship and patterns, and making connections across 
topics and categories, the researcher can begin to generate an abstract 
conceptualization of the phenomena under study.  Explanation-building is an iterative 
process that begins with a theoretical statement, refines it, revises the proposition, and 
repeats the process.  The literature notes the difficulties of this technique including the 
potential for a loss of focus. 
3.6.1 Qualitative Analysis 
Within this research, the qualitative data analysis was guided by descriptions of 
qualitative research techniques developed over the last four decades (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2001; Radnor, 2002).  As 
discussed in Section 3.2.3, data analysis did not begin at the point in time that the 
researcher first sits, literally surrounded with interviews and other research data.  
Realistically, it began with the selection of a research area and questions.  At this 
point, the researcher selected elements from among an immensely complicated and 
interconnected world as being ‘of interest.’  After this selection, the researcher 
adopted a filter with which to view the literature, methodology, and other research 
elements31 .   
 
Although the foregoing emphasizes a systematic approach or procedure for data 
analysis, it should be noted that a systematic approach does not itself provide 
knowledge of the data, the role of descriptive statistics in quantitative research.  The 
end-product of the analysis is highly dependent on the experience, objectivity, and 
thoroughness of the researcher in extracting the knowledge encased in the data.  
                                                 
31 A simple example is how, after purchasing a specific model or colour of car, one becomes sensitive 
to other cars on the road that match his/her selection.  
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Nevertheless, qualitative procedures do assist in conducting a thorough exploration of 
the research data.    
 
Within this thesis, the qualitative data analysis method described by Radnor (2002) 
was selected to guide the research analysis.  This will be fully discussed in Section 
3.7.1. 
3.6.2 Validity, Generalizability and Reliability 
While all research methodologies are concerned with reliability and validity, 
successful research data and findings will be objective, unbiased, consistent and 
unambiguous (Mann, 1985:60).  A careful research design, incorporating ethical 
considerations, is required to arrive at valid, verifiable results, within the context of a 
given societal model.  Methodology texts generally stress maximizing four aspects of 
the research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Yin, 2003b).  Triangulation, discussed in the next 
section, is also a key source of reliability in exploratory research (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Reliability, in case studies, is not measured on its replicability, but rather on whether 
the process of interpretation is sufficiently transparent and logical that another 
researcher, duplicating the research process, would arrive at similar conclusions. 
Silverman (2000) suggests several principles to defend against ‘anecdotalism,’ 
including:  
 Refutability – use ‘Popperian’ Logic to seek out examples which might 
disprove current beliefs (Popper, 1959) 
 Constant comparison – follows the principles of grounded theory in looking 
for new cases and settings which will stretch the current theory 
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 Comprehensive data treatment – performing an initial analysis leading to 
theories and conclusions 
 Tabulations – greater rigour in organizing data and implying that frequency of 
observation extracts knowledge from the source data. 
 
Reliability, was enhanced in this research through development of a Case Study 
Protocol (Yin, 2003b) which encompasses “the principal documentation needed to 
provide the researcher with the necessary focus, organize the visits, and ensure the 
trail of evidence is thoroughly documented.” (Stuart et al., 2002:424).   This protocol 
also aids the researcher in avoiding becoming overwhelmed by the volume of data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Generalizability, also known as external validity within quantitative research, focuses 
on the application of research findings to other, similar situations.   There is 
widespread agreement that generalizability, in the sense of discovering or proving 
universal laws applicable to all similar situations, is neither a useful or attainable goal 
within qualitative research (Schofield, 2002).   However, qualitative researchers lack a 
shared conception of the application of generalizability within qualitative research.   
 
While certain qualitative researchers have actively rejected generalizability as a goal 
(Denzin, 1984), others advance differing arguments, suggesting that the correct 
criteria is to analytic rather than statistical generalization (Yin, 2003b);  Lincoln and 
Guba (2005) argue for ‘fittingness’ – whether the specific qualitative research 
findings are useful in understanding other sites; Stake (1978) argues for 
generalizability as ‘naturalistic generalization’  - building explicit and tacit knowledge 
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to increase understanding of other similar situations.  Other more recent methods 
include Meta-Ethnography, Qualitative Comparative method (Ragin, 1987) and 
Schofield’s (2002) ‘what is, what may be, what could be’ model. 
 
Because the thesis uses a case study approach, the generalisations of findings are 
theoretical rather than statistical (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Yin (2003b:10)  explains 
this succinctly by noting that: 
 “… case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations or universes. In this sense the case study, like the experiment, does 
not represent a ‘sample’, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise 
theories (analytical/theoretical generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisation).”  
 
 
In case studies “… random selection is neither necessary nor even preferable” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:537). Case studies use theoretical sampling which may involve the 
selection of cases such as extreme situations and polarized types (Pettigrew 1988, 
cited in Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Table 28, below, summarizes how this research addresses the issues of reliability and 
validity. 
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Table 28: Case Study Validity and Reliability Strategies 
 
Tests Case Study Tactic Research 
Phase  
Action Taken in this Research 
Use multiple sources 
of evidence 
Data 
collection 
Use of interviews, documentary 
evidence and environmental 
observations 
Establish chain of 
evidence 
 
Data 
collection 
 
Interview data, both taped and 
transcribed; multiple evidence 
sources entered into case study 
database 
Construct 
Validity  
Confirmation of Case 
Study utility and sub-
topics with key 
informants 
Composition Key Informant interviews 
Do pattern matching Data analysis Patterns identified within and 
between case studies 
Do explanation 
building 
Data analysis Some causal links identified 
Do time series analysis Data analysis Not performed in this research, but 
under consideration as part of 
follow-up work 
Internal 
Validity  
Do logic models Data analysis Not performed- requires time series 
data 
Use rival theories 
within single cases 
Research 
design 
Not used because of exploratory 
nature of research and lack of 
existing theory 
External 
Validity 
(general-
ize)  Use replication logic 
in multiple-case 
studies 
Research 
design 
Multiple cases investigated using 
replication logic 
Use case study 
protocol 
Data 
collection 
Same data collection procedure 
followed for each case; consistent 
set of initial questions used in each 
interview 
Reliability  
 
Develop case study 
database 
Data 
collection 
Interview transcripts, other notes 
and links to online and physical 
artefacts entered into database 
Source: adapted from (Yin, 1998) 
 
Incorporated into the research design, the Senior Executive interviews also sought to 
validate results from the two case studies.  This provided an opportunity to refute or 
validate findings, as well as discuss alternative solutions and explanations of these 
issues, increasing the overall confidence in research findings. 
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3.6.3 Triangulation 
Within qualitative research, including qualitative case studies, one key aspect of 
research validation is Triangulation (Yin, 2003b).  This is equally true for exploratory 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Denzin (1978:297) defines triangulation as, “the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon.”  The need for 
triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes.  
Stake (1995) states that triangulation serves to ensure accuracy and to consider 
alternative explanations.  Triangulation increases the confidence that observed 
differences are in fact grounded in the data rather than the method, with weaknesses 
of each technique compensated through strengths in the others (Todd, 1979).    
 
Triangulation can occur at many levels.  Denzin (1984) identified four types of 
triangulation: data, investigator, methodological and triangulation of theories.  
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002:146) comment on these definitions as 
follows:  
 Data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to remain the 
same in different contexts 
 Investigator triangulation, when several investigators examine the same 
phenomenon 
 Theory triangulation, when investigators with different view points interpret 
the same results 
 Methodological triangulation, when one approach is followed by another, to 
increase confidence in the interpretation.   
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Given the complexity of public sector management, including RBM, verification of 
interviewees’ accuracy in discussing management issues is required (Hammersley, 
1998).  The  research design included secondary data analysis of existing surveys, 
including the 1999 and 2002 Public Service-Wide Employee Survey (Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2002b), and Barriers to Modern Comptrollership Survey (2003).  These 
external surveys also assisted in validating the research findings through triangulation. 
 
Table 29 describes how triangulation concepts were applied within this research. 
 
Table 29: Triangulation, as Applied Within This Research Project 
Triangulation Research Response 
Data  Census (not sample) of all executives within each case 
 Incorporates differing perspectives from across the organization    
 Multiple data sources 
Investigator  Not applicable – one researcher only 
Methods  Analysis of secondary survey analysis 
 Secondary analysis of full dataset 
 Use of Key Informant and Senior Executive interviews to confirm 
topic and findings 
 Document analysis 
Triangulation of 
Theories 
 Use of Public Value theory to explain case study findings 
 Reward Theory 
 Principal/Agent Theory 
 Various public management theories (i.e. Bureaucracy). 
Source: adapted from (Yin, 2003b) 
 
Documentary analysis is another potential form of triangulation (Denzin, 1978), with 
Yin (2003b:81) stating “the most important use of documents is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources.”  This research design incorporated the 
contribution from internal documents, located during the Literature Review, as well as 
government information, reports and assessments of Results-based Management 
gathered prior to and during the field research phase.  Additional material gathered 
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during the field research did serve to validate findings.  These sources serve to 
strengthen the research findings through triangulation. 
 
Considering the role of pattern-matching, three tactics were used to search for cross-
case patterns.  First, the dimensions suggested by theory were identified and within-
group similarities and differences were identified. Second, the cases were compared 
and similarities and differences listed. Third, to promote triangulation, data collected 
from different sources and of different types were compared.  As patterns were 
corroborated by evidence from another source, the findings were better grounded 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:541). 
 
Table 30: Data Collection Methods 
Data 
Collection 
Method 
Source Anticipated Contribution  
Key 
Informant 
Interviews 
Exploratory interviews with 
16 Key Informants 
 Confirmed research, major source of 
questions included in Interview Guide 
 Interviews, not surveys 
 Case Study selection 
Document 
review and 
Analysis 
 
 
Analysis and review of 
Results-based Management 
published literature, reports, 
policies and guidelines, as 
well as internal and 
unpublished documentation  
 
 Govt. documents and academic 
literature examined for descriptions of 
RBM: use, evolution, information 
sources, and support, as well as 
limitations of RBM 
 Impact on accountability 
 Used to corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources (Yin, 
1994:81) 
Interviews - 
Health and 
Saskatchewan 
Case Studies 
 
Semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews with a total of 69 
public sector executives in 
two major case studies 
(Saskatchewan & Health) 
 Two case studies 
 Principle data collection instrument 
 Qualitative, interpretative analysis 
(Radnor, 2002) 
Interviews - 
Senior 
Executives 
Interviews with ten senior 
public servants 
 Acquire senior management 
perspective 
 Validate research findings 
Secondary 
Analysis of 
Surveys  
Government-wide employee 
surveys (1999 & 2002), and  
Modern Comptrollership 
Survey (2003) 
 Triangulation with other data sources 
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The foregoing sections have presented and justified the selection of the Case Study 
method, the impact of the Key Informant interviews, and the field procedures 
followed.  The following section will present a detailed description of the analysis 
process, including evidence of reflexivity and secondary analysis of the data. 
 
3.7 The Analysis Phase of the Research 
This section will describe the analysis phase of this research.  Specifically, it will 
include discussion of the specific steps undertaken and the codes used, and will 
provide some idea of the reflectivity and interpretation in conducting the analysis.  
Presentation of detailed analysis steps enhance the research reliability, and that an 
independent researcher following an identical research process would reach similar 
conclusions. 
 
It must be clearly stated that each case study was first analyzed separately, focusing 
on the particularities and complexities within each case (Eisenhardt, 1989:540; Stake, 
2003).  As suggested by Yin (2003b), each case study consisted of a ‘whole’ study, in 
which convergent evidence was sought about the facts and conclusions.  After this 
step was completed (for each case study), the data analysis proceeded from analyzing 
within-case data to searching for cross-case patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989). This allowed 
the unique patterns of each case study to emerge, which subsequently were sought for 
in the other cases, leading to improved internal and external validity. 
 
The specific data analysis strategy or method undertaken for this research, as 
described by Radnor (2002), is visually depicted in Figure 12, below. 
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Figure 12: Radnor Methodology 
STEP 1
Topic
Ordering
STEP 2
Constructing
Categories
STEP 4
Completing
Coded Sheets
STEP 3
Reading For
Content
STEP 5
Generate Coded 
Transcripts
STEP 6
Analysis to
Interpret Data
 
 Source: (Radnor, 2002) 
 
The application of this analytical method within this research is described in detail in 
the following section. 
3.7.1 The Analysis Process 
As noted earlier, the analysis phase began by transcribing the seventy-nine interviews.  
Each transcript was assigned a unique respondent code to ensure anonymity.  This 
step was taken to prevent attribution of executive comments, as well as to minimize 
potential researcher bias through giving greater weight to certain transcripts by virtue 
of the executive’s level, knowledge or position.  A single, separate file was 
maintained which linked these codes to individual executives.  All research interviews 
were stored in secure locations, encrypted and password protected. 
 
Within each case study, after an initial reading of the interviews, the first analysis step 
was the identification of topics.  As noted by Radnor (2002),  this stage is simply 
  Page 167 
designed to help group and ‘hold’ the data in a manageable manner and to provide a 
structure through which categories may be constructed.  Within this research, the 
topics emerged through the preliminary reading of the interviews coupled with topics 
suggested by the original research objectives, question and sub-questions and the 
interview guide.  Seven topics were initially identified (from the first case study 
analysis):  
 Results-based Management 
 Accountability 
 Public Value 
 Executive Motivation 
 Performance Management Systems 
 Managerial Flexibility  
 Other 
 
The second step was the construction of categories within each topic.  In constructing 
categories, the researcher considered both explicit topics, those directly emerging 
from interviews, as well as implicit topics constructed to bring together attitudes, 
perspectives and various relationships within each case study.  During the subsequent 
stages, additions and deletions reflected a growing familiarity with the full data set.  
Choice of topics and category selection were aided by consultation with the research 
diary and additional material collected during the case studies.  Mechanically, this 
step consisted of entering each topic at the top of a separate page and listing related 
categories.  The topics and categories used are summarized in Appendix D. 
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After printing out a master paper copy of the interviews32, which included a computer 
generated line number reference, the third step was to code for content analysis.  This 
was accomplished by reviewing each interview in turn and highlighting specific 
quotes considered to be of relevance to one or more topics and/or categories.  To 
assist in the analysis, seven highlighter colours were used, one for each topic.  In 
addition to highlighting interview transcripts, a reference code was written beside 
each identified section.  The reference code consisted of a respondent code, a topic-
category code and the computer generated line number.  For example, SC-24 PM 138 
would be the 24th interview in the Saskatchewan case study, Performance 
Management category, located on line 138 of the transcript.  The fourth step was to 
transcribe this reference code to one or more category sheets, generated in step two 
above.  Thus, within each topic and category, all quotes of interest could be readily 
located within the data files.  A sample extract from a coded transcript is included as 
Appendix E. 
 
During these steps, additional topics were considered, although none were added.  
However, the Performance Management (PM) topic was discarded as few executives 
reported having access, or desiring access, to a PM system.  It became a category 
within Results-based Management rather than a separate topic.  Similarly, categories 
were added, merged or deleted as the analysis proceeded.   
 
At this point in the analysis, a photocopy was made of the master copy of the 
highlighted paper interviews, which now included the hand written reference codes.  
                                                 
32   It should be noted that the use of computer software was considered, and actively examined.  
However, the researcher was simply more comfortable with a paper-based approach.   
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This step was critical in conducting subsequent secondary analysis of the data.  Using 
the photocopy, the key quotes and extracts were then manually cut from these 
interviews and physically inserted into one or more folders (additional copies were 
made when required).  This was the fifth step.  Topic folders were colour-coded, 
matching the highlighter colours), with an individual folder created for each category.   
It should be noted that sufficient interview text was included in each extract in order 
that the extracts be self-explanatory and make sense out of context. 
 
The final, sixth step required repeated readings, examination and refinement of the 
analysis, leading to the generation of summary statements.  These initial statements 
attempted to capture or summarize findings within categories, while giving a realistic 
appraisal of conflicting opinions and perceptions, and ensuring that observations were 
grounded in a sound interpretation of the empirical data.  This required multiple 
readings of groupings of categories and topics to fully understand different subtleties 
of meaning and led to refinements of statements.  This is the stage where Radnor 
(2002:88) suggests that the interpretive process takes over from the descriptive stage. 
 
The refined statements formed the basis for an improved understanding and response 
to the research question, which will now be systematically presented in the remaining 
chapters of the thesis.  In the following three findings chapters, specific research 
quotes were carefully selected to show a balanced view of the range of responses, to 
permit independent assessment of the findings.  When expanded to cross-categories 
and cross-topic analysis, the improved understanding contributes to a theoretical 
explanation of the phenomena under study.  
 
  Page 170 
In concluding this section, it should be noted, as Radnor (2002) acknowledged, that 
while a systematic approach to interpretive research is helpful, it cannot in and of 
itself reveal findings or conclusions.  It is limited to assisting the researcher extract 
the maximum value from the data through a thorough exploration of the material, 
which the researcher must then interpret.  As the basis of interpretive research is the 
epistemological position that knowledge is socially constructed, and that we live in a 
world of multiply constructed realities, the researcher remains solely responsible for 
the creative and constructive intellectual process of making sense of this data and 
theorizing from it. 
3.7.2 Codes  
As the topic and category codes used by the researcher in analysing this data are 
central to the subsequent findings, a full listing of these codes is included as 
Appendix D.  As noted, these topics emerged from a review of the research questions, 
interview guide, and a preliminary review of the data.  Similarly, an initial set of 
category codes was constructed from the same sources, coupled with additional 
reflection on areas of predominant discussion during the interviews themselves.  As 
noted, this was a highly interactive process with additional categories, and even topics 
being added and deleted as the analysis proceeded. 
 
It should be emphasized that each case study was treated as a separate research study 
and that the topics and categories for each case study were constructed independently.  
Noting that the primary data collection instrument, the interview guide, was identical 
for all case studies, differences were relatively minor, but did exist.  
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3.7.3 Reflexivity 
Qualitative research requires an iterative, reflexive approach.  As Schwandt 
(2001:224) states, “Reflexivity can be a means for critically inspecting the entire 
research process, including reflecting on …. one’s personal and theoretical 
commitments… to determine particular interpretations.”  It seems somewhat artificial 
to describe on-paper how I, as researcher, would sit, think and reflect on what the data 
was saying, and how these reflective periods would then influence my next reading of 
the data.  However, this ‘reflective meditation’ formed a key aspect of the analysis.  
At one level, I was striving to remove my own bias and prior knowledge of the topic 
and to allow the data to speak for itself.  To assist in this goal, I would record 
thoughts, inspirations and new questions in a research diary. Within the analysis 
phase, this reflexivity also led to the selection (and deletion) of additional categories, 
which had emerged from the dataset.  
 
In the earlier stages of the research, reflexivity influenced the ongoing data collection 
itself through the addition of extra questions.  Two of the more significant additions 
and breakthroughs were the development and inclusion of the Logic Model (discussed 
in Section 4.9), and the moment when it quickly became clear that executives did not 
use, nor want, performance management systems to manage for results, leading to the 
inclusion of executive motivation questions into the interview guide and research 
analysis.  
3.7.4 Secondary Analysis of Interview Data 
Within this research, after the ‘in-case’ analysis and cross-case analysis were 
completed, the full dataset was combined, regrouped and further analyzed.   This 
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secondary analysis considered whether different perceptions would emerge according 
to gender, regional verses headquarters, and length of service.  For example, from a 
practical perspective, in conducting the regional/headquarters analysis the ‘regional’ 
Health Case Study interviews were combined with the Saskatchewan Case Study 
interviews (all regional) while the Senior Executive interviews (exclusively Ottawa-
based) were merged with the ‘headquarters’ Health Case study interviews.  
 
The analysis itself followed the identical qualitative analysis process used in 
conducting the case study analysis and described in Section 3.7.1.  The findings from 
this additional analysis are reported in Section 7.8. 
 
3.8 Building Theories 
“Nothing is so practical as a good theory” (Lewin, 1945:129). 
 
Gilbert (2001:17) states that a theory “highlights and explains something that one 
would otherwise not see, or would find puzzling.  Often, it is an answer to a ‘Why?’ 
question”.  Noting that developing theory33 is a principle goal of research (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Swamidass, 1991; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Meredith, 1998), Gill and 
Johnson (2002:26) comment that while “the terms ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ are often 
used interchangeably, in its narrowest sense a theory is a network of hypotheses 
advanced so as to conceptualize and explain a particular social or natural 
phenomenon.” 
 
                                                 
33 The concept of research ‘theory’ itself is contested by authors such as Alvesson and Deetz 
(2000:37-47), who discuss the inadequacy of the simplistic application of the concept itself. 
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Theory is traditionally developed by combining observations from the literature, 
common sense and experience.  Through examining the literature for existing 
theories, researchers identify aspects that are unclear, incomplete or paradoxical 
(Melnyk and Handfiedl, 1998:313), even when the body of knowledge is weakly 
developed (Stuart et al., 2002).  However, theory-building takes time and can be 
difficult (Eisenhardt, 1989:532). 
 
Phenomenological studies are particularly well-suited for exploratory studies and 
theory development.  As Mintzberg (1979:587) states, “Theory building seems to 
require rich description, the richness that comes from anecdote.  We uncover all kinds 
of relationship in our hard data, but it is only through the use of the soft data that we 
are able to explain them.”   
 
To support such an interpretivist perspective, that theory falls from observation, 
qualitative data analysis typically starts with descriptive observations that relate the 
state of the space, actors, activities, objects, acts, events, time, goals, and feeling 
dimensions in the setting.  This description positions the qualitative narrative account 
of significant events during the study; the narrative account may also include focused 
observations on specific dimensions of interest, leading to an explanatory set of 
concepts (Robson, 1993).  It is noted that “a qualitative understanding of the 
quantified factors is still required for theory to be accepted…” (Meredith, 1998:442).   
 
As for all research, prior identification of potential constructs from the literature can 
shape and provide focus for the initial research design in theory building.   
Researchers can then incorporate instrument measures to examine these constructs.  
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Should constructs subsequently prove important during the research, “the researcher 
then has a firm empirical grounding for the emergent theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989:536).    
3.8.1 Building Theories from Case Study 
“Case research has consistently been one of the most powerful research methods in 
operations management, particularly in the development of new theory” (Voss et al., 
2002:195). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989), synthesizing previous work (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Yin, 1984), 
argues that a case study approach is valid for identifying new theories, while 
cautioning of the possibility that theory generated inductively, though empirically 
valid, may fail to address larger problems, and thus lack generalisation capacity.  
Although as noted earlier, Yin (2003b) states that case studies are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions, not to populations. 
 
According to Gills and Johnson (2002), theory building from case studies is most 
appropriate in the early stages of investigation of a subject area, or when a new 
perspective is required, and is frequently used in operations management research 
(McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993; Handfield and Melnyk, 1998).   
 
The development of theoretical frameworks, a collection of theories and models from 
the literature, helps “focus and bound’’ the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Barnes, 
2001:1082).  In the context of exploratory case studies, theoretical frameworks may 
be less important (Hussey and Hussey, 1997:123), or less clear in their structure, 
though they do provide structure for data collection, while permitting exploration of a 
wide range of topics (Barnes, 2001).  
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A legitimate element of case research, especially in theory-building, relates to the 
researchers ability to modify interview questions, even adding cases to the study in 
order to probe emergent themes or to react to unexpected opportunities (Eisenhardt, 
1989:539; Beach et al., 2001).  A key element is the preservation of what Yin (1981; 
2003b) refers to as a chain of evidence, with explicit citation of particular pieces of 
evidence at each phase of the study: data collection, within-case analysis and cross-
case analysis, overall findings, and conclusion.  
 
This case study analysis will attempt to understand the current (2004) level of 
integration of RBM, and the role of Public Value theory.  Sub-theories are expected to 
identify conditions which support and those which obstruct the adaptation of Results-
based Management within the Canadian public service.  Handfield and Melynk’s 
(1998) logic, summarized by Stuart et al. (2002) suggests that exploratory theory 
building is a suitable aim for the case study method (Handfield and Melnyk, 
1998:320-339; Stuart et al., 2002). 
 
3.9 Summary - Methodology Chapter 
As noted, the selection of research methodology should, and must be, driven by the 
research question under investigation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997:140), which in turn 
must drive the selection of method(s).   Having considered the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological issues, this chapter has presented the rationale of 
the selection of a qualitative interpretivist approach and the utilization of the case 
study method. 
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Qualitative case study research, properly done, has explanatory and illuminating 
power regarding the situation under study, examines various perceptions within the 
area of study, and increases the understanding of issues within the research study area 
(Silverman, 2001).  In conducting the case study, the literature has suggested several 
areas that the researcher must carefully review to ensure that the analysis is of high 
quality, including demonstration that all relevant evidence was examined, that all rival 
explanations were addressed, that the analysis addressed the most significant aspect of 
the case study, and that the researcher’s knowledge and experience were used to 
maximum advantage in the study.   These areas were addressed within this research.   
  
Within this research, in addition to meeting the conditions which support the use of 
the Case Study method, the selection of an Exploratory Case study is supported by the 
absence of studies exploring these issues from an executive perspective; and potential 
of Public Value theory in exploring implementation of Results-based Management. 
Like all research methods, exploratory case studies require a prior purpose and criteria 
by which the exploration will be judged successful, which must be, (and were), set out 
in the case study design and protocol.   
 
In summary, it is submitted that this research is properly grounded in both 
methodologies and methods, and is appropriately positioned to make a contribution to 
knowledge within the research topic under investigation.   While external to the 
requirements of a PhD thesis, it is further submitted that this research has the potential 
to make a practical contribution to public sector management.  Within management 
research, a practical application is deemed helpful, if not essential, in gaining access 
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to executive managers, who otherwise may choose not to participate (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002). 
 
The following three chapters present the findings from the Saskatchewan and Health 
case studies and from the Senior Executive interviews.  
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4 The Saskatchewan Case Study 
This Chapter will present the findings from the Saskatchewan Case Study.   
 
The contribution of the Saskatchewan Case Study to the overall research design was 
to capture and examine regional perspectives and cross-departmental perspectives.  
The overall case selection logic was summarized in Table 25.  
 
Having conducted, transcribed and analyzed the thirty-two one-hour interviews which 
comprise the principle data source for this case study, seven key themes have 
emerged.  After an initial discussion of the impact of changes in managerial 
accountability and activities introduced by Results-based Management, each element 
of Public Value will be explored in detail.  In order, this Case Study presents an 
analysis addressing the following themes: 
 Has management changed? 
 Public Value - Services  
 Public Value - Outcomes 
 Public Value - Trust 
 Executive Information and Decision Making 
 Creating Public Value through Citizen/Client input 
 Saskatchewan Executive Motivation. 
 
For readability, all direct quotes from the research interviews are in italics, and while 
direct quotes are attributed to one interview, unless specifically noted otherwise, they 
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were selected as representative of themes, opinions or comments emerging from 
multiple interviews. 
4.1 Background 
The Saskatchewan Case Study included interviews with executives from all federal 
government departments with regional office(s) in Saskatchewan, one of the eight 
regions of Canada.   As the sole researcher, I conducted all of the interviews.  In two 
cases, where the regional offices did not have executive-level management, the most 
senior manager was interviewed.   
 
The Saskatchewan Region is located in the geographic centre of Canada, as shown on 
the map (next page).  It is approximately 2500 kilometres west of Ottawa, the nation’s 
capital and headquarters for most federal government departments.  Saskatchewan has 
a population of one million.  Major federal roles and responsibilities in Saskatchewan 
include heath, programmes for aboriginal (First Nations) people, prisons, policing and 
agriculture. 
 
Of the thirty-five executives employed by the federal government of Canada in 
Saskatchewan (in 2004), thirty-two executives agreed to be interviewed, while three 
were unavailable or declined.  Executive levels, locations and other demographic data 
pertaining to interviewees are included in Appendix A.  
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Figure 13: Map of Canada 
 
 
4.2 Has Management Changed? 
Each interview began by enquiring whether the executive perceived that public sector 
management had changed in the last decade.  This question set the stage for 
subsequent discussions of Results-Based Management and Public Value.  Should 
executives have reported that no or only limited changes had occurred, this would 
have suggested that Results-based Management was not new, leading to different 
research findings.   
 
Saskatchewan executives, broadly, were divided into two camps.  A minority argued 
that changes were modest in terms of management.  However, within this group there 
was a general consensus of increased accountability and administrative requirements.  
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 The fundamentals of public service management have probably been the same 
for 100 years in Canada… and many of these ‘old’ ways remain very 
appropriate (respondent: SC-4) 
 After all, you still have staff to manage, you still have budgets to manage, and 
you still have operations to manage (respondent: SC-23) 
 (We continue to) delivering services in a market oriented environment, with 
limited resources, to citizens who will generally want more... (respondent: SC-
14) 
 I think some of the rhetoric has changed, the buzzwords have changed, but has 
there been a real fundamental change?  I question that.  I really don’t think 
that there has been any dramatic, significant change (respondent: SC-22) 
 Results-based Management adds another tool to our management tool case, it 
doesn’t replace anything (respondent: SC-11) 
 I think that (politicians/headquarters) want to change, but I’m not sure that 
they really can change or are really achieving real change.  We are deeply 
routed in the past (respondent: SC30) 
 About the same, but (management) issues have becomes different (respondent: 
SC-18).  
 
The counter-argument offered by the majority of respondents was that larger, 
significant changes have occurred or are occurring: 
 (Management) has changed an awful lot in the last 5 years, at least in our 
department (respondent: SC-19) 
 The degree of focus on Results-based Management is huge here (respondent: 
SC-7) 
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 We have become a lot more client focused (respondent: SC-29) 
 Executive performance agreements are definitely a new requirement 
(respondent: SC-20) 
 We have definitely become more people oriented than before – team oriented 
rather than top-down control.  I think that’s required by the knowledge based 
nature of our work (respondent: SC-2) 
 Our managerial scope and flexibility has narrowed, more centralized 
(respondent: SC-31) 
 Let’s say that you sure don’t exceed your budget casually anymore… 
(respondent: SC-15). 
 
Notably, all executives agreed that public sector management had changed, differing 
only in their perceptions as to the degree of change, from incremental to significant 
modifications in the role of executives.  To some extent, analysis suggests that this 
diversity of opinion reflects the differing management culture of the departments, as 
well as the degree of change experienced by their respective programmes. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that overall, significant change has occurred in the 
management culture. 
 
Saskatchewan executives confirmed that from a regional perspective, managerial 
control had been centralized.  None saw this as an improvement, expressed 
satisfaction, believed that it could lead to improved results, or noted other potential 
benefits.  Rather, comments centred around the increased costs of centralization from 
a regional perspective.  Many executives argued that increased centralization and 
Result-based Management were contradictions: 
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 After moving towards decentralization during the early and mid 1990s, the 
natural tendency of the centre to re-impose controls has become vogue 
again…(respondent: SC-20) 
 The pendulum has swung back/too far/to the other extreme/a long way 
(various respondents) (Note – the pendulum was a surprisingly common 
analogy) 
 I’ve been here long enough to see the cycles.  We went through an era where 
we tried to increase employee delegation – pushing decision-making to the 
front line.  And I think that this was pretty effective.  But I have certainly seen 
a retrenchment from that trend (respondent: SC-13) 
 We have lost out incremental gains in terms of authorities – a trend to move 
from transfer funding to contribution funding.  (Note: the latter process 
requires detailed reporting and accountability by the recipients) (respondent: 
SC -22) 
 I can see the efficiencies in that (centralization): consistency, but the added 
requirements of paper, sign-off, and red-tape is definitely slowing our ability 
to response… it seems that these costs are invisible to senior and political 
leadership (respondent: SC-9). 
 
The trend towards centralization was perceived as increasing both standardization and 
administrative controls, with a corresponding reduction in regional management 
authority and flexibility.  Executives reported greater levels of frustration, including 
their staff’s, and argued that this trend, in fact, reduced accountability. 
 I am fully aware that as a national government, we have a general need for 
equity.  But you must remember that ‘one size fits all’ means that we are 
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going to have some people with completely ‘misfit’ programmes… 
(respondent: SC-19) 
 A ravishing appetite for more information, and to know what is going on in the 
region (respondent: SC-27).  (Note - one widely used expression was 
‘Feeding the Beast’) 
 We used to have a budget, now we have not had a budget for two years… it is 
managed out of Ottawa (respondent: SC-5) 
 The (senior manager) used to be responsible for everything – so if nothing 
else, you knew ‘where the buck stopped’ if anything went wrong. We are 
finding it quite difficult to get decisions made, because they are made at the 
centre.  And they carry Risk Management to a new level – total risk 
avoidance… (respondent: SC-17). 
 
This aspect of the research, as expected and similar to the literature, reveals a clear 
difference between who the client is.  Analysis suggests that headquarters’ (Ottawa’s) 
client focus tends to be ‘upwards’ to Ministers and Parliament and Central Agencies, 
whereas the region’s closer proximity to the end-user typically encourages a greater 
external client-focus. 
 
Of note, centralization of operations, for example national call centres, directly 
reduces regional management control and flexibility.  As programme demand is not 
consistent year-to-year, executives reported using budget flexibility to balance minor 
fluctuations in different programme requirements – one year the (name) programme 
is a little short of funding, another year Training and Development requires ‘top-up’ 
(respondent: SC-4) .  With centralization, programme budgets are increasingly 
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targeted to specific programmes, this flexibility to adapt to transient regional 
circumstances is being lost.  
 
Horizontality is a major change according to a number of respondents.  Within 
government, the requirement for greater inter/intra departmental cooperation, as well 
as working horizontally with other levels of government and stakeholders was 
frequently discussed.  However, executives interviewed also noted a lack of 
accountability instruments supporting horizontal management, a lack of time to work 
collaboratively, and a lack of leadership at headquarters.  Horizontality was seen as a 
key opportunity to achieve results for Canadians, but at significant time costs.  
 Pick an area, health is probably the easiest.  How many programmes does 
Health Canada have34?  100?  200?  OK.  Now, how many other departments 
have programmes that have a direct impact on the health of Canadians?  A 
dozen at least...   Does the average Canadian care where or who delivers 
these programmes?  No, their goal is good health….That’s the result that 
matters to them…  So for us, it boils down to how can we work together – 
horizontally, across programmes, departments and governments to help 
Canadians get the results that matter to them, …instead of our current 
silos…(respondent: SC-22) 
  It is much easier for me to work within my area - quicker, much easier, more 
control.  Horizontality takes time to build the relationships; you lose a lot of 
control of how you do things, compromise…  It takes a huge amount of time 
(respondent: SC-28) 
                                                 
34 This interviewee was aware that the researcher was an employee of Health Canada at that time.  So 
their questions were not rhetorical. 
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 We have been challenged in a way that we are not really structured to respond 
to, both accountability and reporting, …to say nothing of the current reward 
and incentives structure (respondent: SC-24) 
 Ottawa doesn’t ‘get it’ yet.  They work in narrower stovepipes then we do in 
the region.  And they sure give us a mixed message – Work together, but your 
accountabilities are (to headquarters)… (respondent: SC-1) 
 We need to find instruments and frameworks which support horizontal file 
management – which we can all use… (respondent: SC-18). 
 
Has managerial accountability changed?  Respondents commented at length on their 
hierarchical accountability35, organizationally up through their Deputy Minister to 
Parliament.  However, interviewees also reported a personal responsibility to staff, 
colleagues, and their clients, and the majority mentioned to Canadians as well.  
However, when asked how they discharged this accountability – how they 
demonstrated that they had acted appropriately and achieved results – most responses 
were vague.   
 
In addition, interviewees tended to discuss accountability in two themes: internal and 
external accountability.  Internally, similar to the executives’ information sources, 
accountability was for the most part verbal through weekly staff meetings or 
teleconferences, HR performance discussions with employees and line-manager, 
‘Walk the Talk’, etc.  Externally, at the level of clients and the general public, 
accountability was typically through direct and often informal contact with clients and 
stakeholders.  Executives did acknowledge the formal reporting to Parliament, 
                                                 
35 It would be hard for an executive not to be aware of their specific accountabilities, given that each 
executive has an individual annual performance agreement, which is tied to a performance bonus. 
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although most executives recognized such reports as having limited to no value for 
average Canadians.  
 
Interviewees noted that instrumental to discharging their programme responsibilities 
and accountability is their ability to effectively manage Human Resources (HR) 
issues.  Human Resources, and processes associated with HR, were noted to be an 
area of particular concern to executives.  Executives argue that modernizing HR 
responsibilities and flexibilities in areas such as selection, competencies, and training 
and development, is key in moving to Results-based Management. 
 While we (managers) do have much greater delegation of staffing authority, 
HR is still incredibly rule-bound; you’d almost think that it was compliance 
with the rules that was the goal… hiring and keeping good staff was just a 
minor side-benefit (respondent: SC-10) 
 I think HR sees themselves as traffic cops, not guides – I am constantly 
bumping up against, ‘Oh no sir, you cannot do that’ – no matter how 
reasonable or much sense it makes (respondent: SC-16). 
Executives interviewed considered the private sector HR model to be more aligned 
with RBM, linking accountability to results.  [The private sector] doesn’t know how 
good they have it.  I would much rather have a wrongful dismissal suit on my hands 
and even pay damages for wrongful dismissal and let people get on with their jobs, 
than a toxic situation festering, sometimes for years, when the employer-employee 
relationship breaks down and [HR] rules tie managers’ hands (respondent: SC-19). 
 
Having concluded that at a minimum, executive management has increased 
horizontality, accountability, and centralization, with links to HR flexibility, this 
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chapter will next examine the Saskatchewan Case study analysis through the lens of 
Public Value theory. 
 
4.3 Public Value - Services 
One area of broad consensus was the ongoing requirement for the management of 
resources: budgets, employees and capital assets.  This was not new.  Executives 
agreed that economy and efficiency remain key public sector goals in the provision of 
services and products and confirmed that systems were in place to assist them in 
managing.   As well, participants identified the critical importance of following 
internal process requirements, although sometimes to the detriment of results; frankly, 
if things go wrong, but you’ve followed all the rules and procedures, you’re going to 
be OK, even if you knew that no one could achieve these (desired) results from the 
get-go...  (respondent: SC-17). 
 
Government speeches, policies and regulations all suggest that politicians, and central 
agencies as their agents, are focussed on meeting the needs of citizens36.  However, 
political actions appear to value the compliance with process over results.  For 
example, in one department, the subject of a major political scandal in 2000, ‘the 
billion dollar boondoggle,’ it was the absence of a paper trail, itself the result of major 
downsizing five years earlier, that set off a political firestorm (Good, 2004b).   While 
the resulting investigation eventually demonstrated that essentially no funds were 
missing, in one interviewee’s words - Nobody asked what had been achieved, what 
                                                 
36 For example the “Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the Public Service of Canada” by the Clerk 
as Head of the Public Service (www.pco-bco.gc.ca), or Budget Speeches (www.finance.gc.ca) 
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were the results?  The outcomes?  Had we achieved our objectives? And another, In a 
bureaucratic environment, process is paramount (respondent: SC-24). 
 
All departments and programmes measure outputs.  Similar to resource management, 
bureaucratic systems are typically in place to monitor the output levels, dependent of 
course, on the nature of the programme or service.  Analysis of interviews revealed 
that departments with increased control over the service delivery chain, for example, 
Corrections Canada, Taxation Canada, and the RCMP (police), report output 
measures associated with clearer targets.  This phenomenon was also noted for 
repetitive or standardized programme service delivery functions such as call handling, 
meat inspection and passport offices.  It was noted that respondents from programmes 
and departments with greater control provided comments such as: 
 I am responsible for the quality of the graduate and to ensure that they are 
fully trained and ready to assume their duties(respondent: SC-23) 
 I must admit, it is easier to be accountable when you have hard and fast work 
objectives like ensuring that each eligible client receives their cheque within 
21 days (respondent: SC-15). 
While executives responsible for more ‘social’ programmes reported vague, harder to 
measure objectives, for example: 
 That the regulations are followed, …and that regulated clients are fully aware 
of (regulatory requirements) (respondent: SC-6) 
 …so that ‘food’ is safe for Canadians (respondent: SC-31) 
 Work together (with stakeholders) (respondent: SC-12) 
 …leading to long-term improvements in health (respondent: SC-23) 
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 More competition in this sector/better able to compete with foreign 
competition (respondent: SC-29) 
 Improve quality of life, better place to live (respondent: SC-2). 
 
4.4 Public Value - Outcomes 
There was widespread agreement that executives should, at least conceptually, be 
accountable for programme outcomes.  This was generally seen to be in addition to 
their historical accountability regarding programme resources, process, and outputs.  
When asked, during the interviews, whether they perceived that outcomes or Result-
based Management had the potential to improve programmes or the management of 
programmes, executives consistently agreed - Although some executives were 
admittedly limited in their support: 
 Yes, it has the potential, I guess…. (respondent: SC-10) 
 At a conceptual level, sure… (respondent: SC-24). 
Most expressed a higher level of commitment: 
 Conceptually, it can work and in some areas it is working (respondent: SC-17) 
 Canadians want results, that’s what we’re here to deliver – results, not 
outputs (respondent: SC-2) 
 The understanding of what constitutes Results-based Management is (now) 
much clearer, to us and to our clients (respondent: SC-31). 
Departments where substantial progress in moving to a culture of Results-based 
Management was observed often had implemented a performance management 
system (e.g. automated Balanced Scorecard systems), and executives there were even 
more positive: 
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 Made my job tremendously easier to articulate what resources I need to 
accomplish the objectives and expectations (respondent: SC-27) 
 RBM allows me to report clearly and logically (respondent: SC-1) 
 I think it enables [these programmes] to articulate much more clearly our 
priorities, internally and externally (respondent: SC-14). 
Not surprisingly, the latter departments/programmes typically have clearer goals and 
mandates.  It could be argued that the benefits may reflect more the nature of 
responsibility, and not be readily transferable to other departments. 
 
Excluding these ‘early implementers,’ other departments, when asked about progress-
to-date in integrating outcomes into the management philosophy, were divided, 
revealing different levels of adoption of RBM across departments in Saskatchewan: 
 I think that the outcomes-based measurements that we’re trying to ask 
ourselves to use are changing the way we think about what we do and how we 
assess results (respondent: SC-13) 
 …so the researcher (client) comes in and asks us to participate in building (a 
large capital project), “Wonderful, why? What will you achieve?” we 
respond.  “Achieve?  It will be a great research tool” they respond.  “Great, 
what will that research do for Canadians?  It’s this discussion which helps 
both of us, to identify the results, the outcomes we want to achieve 
(respondent: SC-6) 
 Depends on what you mean by RBM.  If you mean do we attempt to establish 
performance indicators and measure our performance against those 
indicators. Yes.  Does this link to some sort of outcomes desired by 
Canadians?  – Sometimes. Is it meaningful? -  Not often. (respondent: SC-26). 
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One major obstacle consistently identified by executives was the difficulty in clearly 
establishing programme objectives – What exactly are the desired outcomes?  
Executives expressed a realistic understanding, and occasional frustration, at the 
existence of multiple, and occasionally conflicting, goals.   
 It forces you to think beyond the process and the outputs.  And it gets you to 
identify what the outcomes are, if you can! (respondent: SC-8) 
 Is the objective economic development through job creation or addressing 
(this issue) – really it is about both, but which one has highest priority?  that 
is what I mean by goal ambiguity (respondent: SC-22) 
 First, they (politicians and senior management) would have to be very clear 
on what results they want us to achieve…  Now if they do this, then they would 
be accountable for achieving these goals…  no more ‘wiggle-room’ 
(respondent: SC-13) 
 Results for who?  You know, there is often a world of difference between what 
citizens, clients, service providers, (programme) managers, and politicians see 
as the results we should be aiming for… (respondent: SC-9). 
 
To some extent, and especially at an executive level, it can be argued that 
organizational goals and objectives are rarely singular in nature.  A certain degree of 
ambiguity, conflict and trade-off is normal according to interviewees.  However, in 
applying the principles of RBM, executives identified that objectives must, at a 
minimum, be prioritized in order to focus attention on the key elements.  Executives 
reported that this was rarely the case. 
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Similarly, executives interviewed noted that unlike the private sector, within the 
public sector results are frequently impacted by other complementary programmes.  
This specifically included the presence of multiple stakeholders, often in key policy 
and delivery roles, who may have significantly different objectives.  [In this 
programme area] the provincial government sets the programme objectives. In fact, 
we play a relatively supportive role (respondent: SC-6).  In implementing RBM, a 
number of executives commented on the difficulties in managing, measuring and 
attributing programme outcomes in such circumstances. 
4.4.1 Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes 
The diversity of federal health programmes and services offered through the 
Saskatchewan Region, coupled with complex, multiple delivery mechanisms, 
executives identified a number of issues surrounding the difficulty in measuring 
outcomes, as well as in establishing targets.  It should be noted that executives were 
also clear that these concerns did not preclude using Results-based Management, but 
rather went to show that some realistic assessment of the feasibility and limitations of 
RBM is required. 
 
The analysis of the interview data revealed a wide range of concerns on measuring 
programme outcomes, from the role of multiple stakeholders and service delivery 
agents, to data collection, analysis, and outright ‘gaming’ of results.  It is argued that 
the perception of these difficulties in measuring outcomes is of greater importance 
than the exact nature of these difficulties.  During the analysis, three key themes, as 
well as other themes of relatively less importance, were noted. 
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First, a variety of issues associated with the measurement of results were identified by 
interviewees.  A number of these were, as expected, dependent on the specific 
programme under discussion.  Common themes included:  
 Difficulties because of the existence of multiple and differing stakeholder 
objectives 
 All areas of acquiring and analysing performance data 
 Recruitment or training of data analysts, which interviewees acknowledged to 
historically have been in limited demand within regional operations. 
 
Second, executives interviewed indicated a lack of clear mandates, conflicting 
objectives, and multiple objectives with no prioritization.  Especially for social 
programmes, identification of desired results was weak and coupled with occasionally 
unrealistic targets.  Executives noted that results were often achieved through a 
multitude of programmes from different departments, and different stakeholders.  For 
example, 18 federal departments have programmes for Canadian Indians and Inuit 
populations, plus there is the impact from other levels of government, NGOs, and 
professionals. 
 
Third, regional executives consistently mentioned a culture which they described as 
risk adverse, with adversary politics and a perceivably aggressive media.  When 
linked to the Access to Information legislation, every result or outcome measured 
must be considered by executives as potentially public information.  In addition, 
interviewees noted that certain programmes can be inherently unpopular (such as 
regulatory and taxation), that public opinion is fluid, and that social attitudes are in 
constant flux.  All these factors increase the difficulty of measuring outcomes.    
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Issues of a more minor nature, but that consistently emerged from the interview 
analysis nonetheless, included: 
 Incompatibility and inconsistency between corporate systems and  ‘unfriendly’ 
system interfaces required to extract data 
 Dysfunctional Behaviour including intentional manipulation of 
outputs/outcomes/data, and ‘Managing to the measures’. 
 
It should be noted that for the majority of programmes, outcome or results datasets do 
exist37.  Much of this information is available from reliable, external sources, 
especially Statistics Canada.  However, when directly asked, executives indicated that 
they did not use such information in managing their programmes. 
 
So the obvious question, ‘Is your department using Results-based Management?’ 
generated comments covering the full range of answers, as typified by the following 
comments:  
 Results-based Management is a major, useful management tool (respondent: 
SC-23) 
 This department has made a commitment, but it is early in the implementation, 
there are many bugs to work out yet (respondent: SC-5) 
 We are struggling with Results-based Management, how to apply it within this 
portfolio (respondent: SC-12) 
 I have not seen any real concrete, tangible evidence that we are going to make 
a fundamental shift.  But we are collecting a horrendous amount of 
information – at considerable cost too…. (respondent: SC-10) 
                                                 
37 Before most interviews, the researcher would briefly seek out publicly available outcome or results 
reports or datasets.  Typical sources included programme evaluations, Statistics Canada, and 
departmental reports.  For most programmes, although not all, some data was readily available. 
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 We are not using it at all (respondent: SC-25). 
While this reveals differing levels of adoption between departments, it can also be 
argued that it is a function of the considerable diversity of public sector programmes, 
ranging from full and direct control and delivery, to areas where the federal 
government plays a minor and supportive role. 
 
4.5 Public Value - Trust 
As noted in the Literature Review, trust in the Canadian public sector has slowly 
fallen over the last several decades.  Interviewees reflected on the drivers of public 
trust, including the role of the Canadian media in focusing on a few scandals, often 
political in nature, while noting only limited reporting of successes.  For example, The 
sad reality is I do not think Canadians know (our successes).  I think there is so much 
preoccupation in the media with the here and now, the scandal, the bad news…. that 
most Canadians never look at the value of government to them... (respondent: SC-8)  
Nevertheless, there was agreement that public trust is strengthened through solid 
public accountability and reporting, transparency, fairness and enhanced 
communication. 
 
In discussing what executives could do to improve overall trust in both their 
programmes and in government as a whole, a number of themes were identified.  
Executives stressed the importance of fairness and equity in delivering national 
programmes.  Executives interviewed argued that fixed, ‘one size fits all’ programme 
criteria often leads to unequal treatment of Canadians; and suggested that some degree 
of flexibility increases equity (horizontal versus vertical equity). 
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A number of comments focused on the role that client interaction had on Trust.  It is 
hard to trust an anonymous bureaucracy…. (respondent: SC-21).  However, 
executives identified that client feedback was a potential source of RBM feedback.  A 
good deal of what we do (as a government) involves direct contact with clients – this 
face to face contact is the most reliable source of our client’s issues (respondent: SC-
14).  Furthermore, executives noted that consultations were a key opportunity to 
engage Canadians, leading to increased trust: 
 It is well known that buy-in comes through participation (respondent: SC-14) 
 Consultation can certainly improve public trust, However, all too often what 
we call consultation is really information sharing.  Consultations have to 
occur before the preferred solution has been identified… (respondent: SC-14) 
 Active listening to get their insights,… leading to co-construction of solutions 
(respondent: SC-14). 
 
Lastly, executives argued that accountability, reporting and transparency all 
significantly impacted the degree of Trust, with accountability being seen as key.  
Effective government requires solid accountability (respondent: SC-17), to ensure, 
That Canadians get value for their investment, and that we articulate what that value 
is.  We need to continue moving away from the ‘you gave us a dollar, we spent a 
dollar’ mentality to demonstrating the result of spending that dollar (respondent: SC-
27).  Similarly, When we are transparent, we are accountable… (respondent: SC-4).  
It was argued that no other actions or responses can compensate for an absence of 
transparency, reporting and accountability in generating and maintaining trust of 
Canadians in their government. 
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When discussing the reporting on accountability and transparency, executives showed 
a fairly high level of cynicism regarding reporting in general, and reporting of results 
in particular.  Each department publishes an annual performance report.  But most 
people do not read our reports, and even if they did I’m not sure they would 
understand what it means…(respondent: SC-30). This was believed, by interviewees, 
to reflect the political ‘risk adverse’ culture of the Canadian public sector. 
 
Interestingly, executives consistently commented on their personal values in 
discussing trust.  For example, At the end of the day, I operate on personal values and 
ethics.  I would go so far as to state that all the processes and controls in the world 
mean little without the personal integrity to operate within these boundaries 
(respondent: SC-8), and, Trust is when my clients see my personal values, similar to 
theirs, reflected in my work, my actions, my honesty (respondent: SC-19).  In 
discussing trust, these intrinsic values, while hard to measure, quantify or verify, were 
seen by executives interviewed as key to maintaining Canadian’s trust.  
 
4.6 Executive Information and Decision Making 
It is self-evident that Results-based Management implicitly requires ‘results’ 
information as a basis for management decisions.  This would be in addition to 
ongoing requirements for resource, process and output information.  For example, 
within the federal government, the management of finances, human resources and 
capital are well established bureaucratic functions.  In each department, enterprise-
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wide computer systems which capture and report on this administrative information38 
provide the necessary information base for management.    
 
However, to manage requires current information.  Executives interviewed routinely 
reported these enterprise systems as perpetually backlogged (respondent: SC-16) and 
indicated that the systems served principally as accountability instruments.  
Discussing programmes’ financial information, many executives acknowledged the 
existence of their ‘unofficial’ financial information, typically an up-to-date 
spreadsheet used for day-to-day budget management.  Obviously a significant 
duplication of effort. 
 
Executives reported that these enterprise systems, although repositories of vast 
amounts of data, have limited information value.  The systems are widely perceived 
as complex and difficult to use, frequently requiring specialized training to generate a 
simple report.  Typically, executives indicated that support staff are trained to interact 
with the systems.     
 
In exploring executives’ information sources and requirements, this research 
confirmed the limited usage of structured information by executives.  When asked 
what per cent of their management information was written and routinely generated, 
as compared to verbal, informal or casual information, executives’ estimates ranged 
from a maximum of 50 per cent up to 90 per cent of it being informal or verbal.  
Greater use of formal or structured information tended to correlate with management 
responsibility for process functions such as issuing cheques, routine inspections, or 
                                                 
38 For example, commercial computer software in use by the Canadian federal government includes 
SAP for finances and PeopleSoft for HR.  However, each department is free to select or develop 
their unique coding systems. 
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processing tax forms.  Executives from social service areas such as health or farm-
income support reported relatively lower levels of use of structured information in 
managing. Notably, all executives were fully aware of the requirement for 
accountability – programme annual reports, staff performance assessments, etc. - 
where structured information for reporting was noted as a basic requirement. 
 
The foregoing begs the question; Where do executive get their information from?  A 
number of common themes emerged from the interviews.  First, executives 
interviewed consistently noted the extensive amount of time they spent in meetings, 
and that the purpose of meetings was almost always information exchange.  Typical 
comments included:  
 I have regular meetings with my staff, clients, stakeholders, colleagues, 
management team, boss etc. (respondent: SC-7) 
 The majority of my information walks into this office, calls me, or emails me 
(respondent: SC-21) 
 Effective management takes current information - everything else is 
accountability (respondent: SC-11) 
 A lot of it I get by just talking to the managers and asking them what’s going 
on (respondent: SC-29) 
 Look at my agenda, it’s all meetings.  That’s where the information comes 
from, meetings (because I sure don’t have time to read, with all those 
meetings…) (respondent: SC-2). 
 
Internal reports were the second source of information noted.  While they were 
consistently mentioned by executives, exploration and analysis of interview 
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transcripts revealed that these reports were often accountability, not managing, 
instruments.  It’s historic value only.  You can see trends, but it’s not timely enough to 
really manage by (respondent: SC-3).   
 
Nevertheless, all executives did note the (limited) role of routine and occasional 
reports in their information management (i.e. no executive interviewed suggested that 
they form less than 10% of their information base).  When questioned on their current 
information sources used in managing, typical responses included, Briefing Notes, 
Ministerial questions, and audit and evaluation reports.  As well, special reports 
which respond to my specific information needs (respondent: SC-12) were noted.  
However, a very common theme was also, But given the volume of information that 
arrives in my office, frankly I usually do not read something unless someone else 
recommends it…  there are exceptions…(respondent: SC-19). 
 
Other sources of information noted in interviews included: 
 Management by Walking Around (MBWA) 
- Observations are critical, you cannot read everything you need to know, 
and staff do not always tell you everything – for a variety of reasons.  You 
need to get out and see for yourself (respondent: SC-1326) 
- I see something, I ask a question…  the staff know I am engaged and 
aware (respondent: SC-25) 
- People will tell you things casually, informally, things they would never 
write down and email… (respondent: SC-1). 
 In the Field 
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- I get a lot of my information from interacting with clients (respondent: SC-
11) (meetings, business interactions, conferences and social contact were 
examples offered) 
- The clients are usually quite happy to tell you what is not working…. 
(respondent: SC-5) 
- At conferences, at meetings, even within my community (respondent: SC-
7). 
 Occasional Feedback 
- Complaints, Letters to the Minister (includes compliments), appeals, court 
cases (respondent: SC-15) 
- Audits, Evaluations, Auditor General assessments (respondent: SC-12) 
- Stakeholder conferences, reports, requests (respondent: SC-1). 
 
There was a general sense that while the information may be available, it was not 
readily available: You know, if I need information, I need it now or today, maybe 
tomorrow… next week, it’s just more history… I get a lot of crap paper that I do not 
read, because I can’t – there are not enough hours in a day (respondent: SC-21).  As 
well, executives expressed general cynicism regarding the utility of current client-
sourced information, especially for funds in Grants and Contributions programmes 
where external partners were delivering services or programmes.  This latter type of 
information is used almost exclusively for accountability, not management.  I am not 
confident that the information we currently require and collect [under Grants and 
Contribution funding] is useful to us, or the client, or anybody else for that matter.  
We do not use it to develop policy.  We do not use it for forward thinking, strategic 
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planning.  We use it to make sure that every cent was spent appropriately 
(respondent: SC-25). 
 
Executives interviewed acknowledged that they were often consumed fighting fires 
(respondent: SC-7) on the crisis of the day (respondent: SC-16); responding to 
headquarters’ requests for information – feeding the beast (respondent: SC-1); and 
generally managing by the seat of my pants (respondent: SC-22).  Overall, they 
reported limited or non-existent time available for critical forward thinking or for the 
setting of strategic direction, plans and priorities which should form an essential 
component of executive management, the intrinsic motivators for executives.   The 
time constraints may explain the general failure to identify information sources 
supporting longer-term or strategic planning, for example environmental scans, 
SWOT analysis, research findings, etc.  Interestingly, this was one area where 
executives sensed that Results-based Management had potential to improve 
management by changing the time focus: What Results-management has changed is 
that we are definitely looking at a longer term vision (respondent: SC-19). 
 
When asked whether executives desired, or believed they would benefit from, a 
performance management system, for example, a Balanced Scorecard, responses were 
generally negative.  Noting that a number of executives who were actually using 
performance management systems were supportive, other executives mostly 
perceived it as a top-down exercise, useful for accountability,  but not as a tool for 
day-to-day managing for results.  They did not readily perceive its value to their 
management ability.  Comments included:   
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 (Did the Region decide on these priorities?) Well no, they’re identified for us,  
I mean we’ve got a whole list of key and secondary performance targets 
(respondent: SC-12) 
 We have our Balanced Scorecard.  That’s a good source of information.  It’s 
not current information, but it’s a good source of information.  
Question - Does it help you as a manager?  
  Response - Umm… it helps me to be more accountable… (respondent: SC-30) 
 
As well, most executives, even those who saw benefit in RBM, were pessimistic 
regarding cost benefits, time and capacity to analyze the data, opportunities to provide 
contextual information together with the data, and increased risk exposure: 
 … Will ‘they’ look for the trends…,  or a ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to one piece of 
negative data (respondent: SC-24) 
 If we managed only by the number, then up to the point that the Titanic hit the 
iceberg, everything was going very well… (respondent: SC-31). 
 
This case study also confirmed that result-based information must be used for internal 
decision making, especially for budgets, to be taken seriously.  I’ll tell you when I’ll 
get really serious about RBM, the first time I see my [departmental senior 
management team] use results as a basis of resource allocations… (respondent: SC-
28).  This led to an odd dichotomy.  On one hand executives appeared to perceive the 
potential of RBM and to lean towards supporting it; on the other hand, there was a 
general sense that Results-based Management would be hard to implement, with a 
distinct possibility of increased unidirectional accountability, and with dubious 
regional benefits.  Adopting RBM, executives suggested, would also require a change 
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in the political use of information, although no suggestions were offered on how to 
achieve this goal.   
 
4.7 Creating Public Value Through Client Feedback 
It is argued that assessing Public Value creation through services, outcomes and trust 
inherently requires information gathered directly from the end-user, whether client, 
customer, or citizen.  These groups have unique perspectives of programme results or 
outcomes.  Typical sources could include routine satisfaction surveys, longitudinal 
surveys, focus/advisory groups, complaint monitoring, and personal contacts.  
Executives were queried on this topic. 
 
At the service level, assessment relates to the clients’ satisfaction of service delivery - 
the service experience.  Only one department, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), reported regular client contact (every 60 days) to confirm service level 
satisfaction39.  Only one conclusion was possible.  Executives do not systematically 
monitor client satisfaction of service delivery.  One revealing comment was, Yes we 
track client satisfaction.  The last client survey was 4 or 6 years ago (respondent: SC-
12).  In addition, executives were generally unaware of the Canada School of Public 
Service’s40 (CSPS) extensive research on measuring client satisfaction.  Client survey 
                                                 
39  It is interesting to note that in Saskatchewan, the RCMP is contracted by provincial and municipal 
governments to provide policing services.  These clients are free to choose other policing options, 
such as developing their own police force. 
40 The Canada School of Public Service, previously Canadian Centre for Management Development 
(CCMD), is a federal government department mandated to provide executive training and 
development, as well as management research.  Every executive interviewed was aware of its 
existence and general mandate. 
  Page 206 
or satisfaction templates and other ‘approved’ and valid survey material by are readily 
available on the CSPS’s internet site41.   
 
In considering outcomes, executives were asked about client assessments of 
programme impacts, or assessments of their satisfaction levels regarding long-term 
results achieved.  With few exceptions, executives were unable to identify such client-
based information sources. 
 Satisfaction is a function of meeting of clients’ expectations of a programme.  
But the clients’ expectations have grown, demand has grown, and my 
[programme delivery] budget is the same (respondent: SC-13) 
 I would really value more client input, but this is a really risk adverse 
environment -  Frankly, no news is good news (respondent: SC-21). 
Executives interviewed were also generally aware of previous programme 
evaluations, historical client surveys and external reports.  Similarly, in certain cases, 
executives could confirm historical Department client/citizen surveys, but had no 
details.  It was clear that this information was not current, nor central to their 
management.  In general, such information was perceived to be the primary concern 
of headquarters’ policy analysts or national programme managers, not a direct source 
of management information for regions.   
 
Information on Trust was typically gathered through the public media, not 
departmental sources, although limited research demonstrated that Trust information 
was frequently readily available.  Interestingly, executives generally did not perceive 
                                                 
41 (http://www.myschool-monecole.gc.ca/Research/themes/servicequality_e.html) 
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that their actions or programmes were capable of influencing public opinion42, 
excluding the obvious and direct impact on programme clients.  They did 
acknowledge their leadership role in demonstrating public sector values and ethics, 
internally and externally.  When prompted, they confirmed that demonstration of 
values and ethics contributed to public trust.  In fact, a number spoke eloquently of 
their personal beliefs and values. 
  
When asked to explain the general lack of client feedback, executives were creative.  
Among the more interesting comments were suggestions that client feedback could be 
measured through its absence in surveys of ‘current concerns.’  For example, one 
executive suggested that Canadians must be relatively satisfied with travel safety, 
because it was not on the list of Canadian’s highest priorities (respondent: SC-12). 
Negative comments included: 
 I think we survey people to death, and they do not work very well anyways 
(respondent: SC-28) 
 If the government cannot or will not address concerns raised by 
clients/citizens, it is best not to even ask the question – it just raises 
expectations… (respondent: SC-19) 
 I have numerous clients.  My most immediate client is, I think, the executive 
office in Ottawa (respondent: SC-32) 
 The last thing HQ is concerned about is how happy client are.  Their biggest 
concern is how much is this costing (respondent: SC-29). 
 
                                                 
42 Offered up in a humorous manner by a significant number of executives, was the comments that one 
way they could influence public trust would be to ignore the rules / break the law, create another big 
public sector scandal.  Arguably reflecting almost a ‘siege’ mentality.  An interesting subject for 
future research. 
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However, a few positive comments were noted: 
 I work hard to get out and talk to our clients to present all the options to them, 
understand their issues/listen to their concerns (respondent: SC-13) 
 Annually, this department is mandated to contact clients to see how we are 
doing, so yes we do client surveys.   
Question: Have you ever reviewed the results yourself?   
 Response: No. (respondent: SC-32). 
 
The only conclusion possible was that, with a few exceptions, there is a general 
absence of client based information at the executive level.  Even where information 
was available, it was simply not used by executives; I heard that (my department) is 
collecting public opinion surveys every quarter.  Have you ever see one?  No, but they 
are available on the intranet I recall. (respondent: SC-18).   
 
Where such information was found, it was typically in service-intensive programmes 
such as policing.  One other exception should be noted; Veteran’s Affairs indicated 
that they had a well established annual survey of their clients43.  However, the annual 
frequency suggests more of an accountability, than management, role for this data.  
Even when presented with the existence of specific client/citizen survey data on their 
department or programme, most executives saw its value primarily being for the 
headquarters’ policy analysts and for accountability.    
 
 
                                                 
43 One possible explanation is that Canadian veterans (programme clients) are unusually well-
organized.  The Canadian Legion is a social organization of military veterans, with club-houses in 
almost every community across Canada.  It also serves as a highly effective advocate of Veteran’s 
rights and programmes. 
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4.8 Saskatchewan Executive Motivation 
Given the apparent disconnect between Executives’ support for the concept of 
Results-based Management and the difficulties they note regarding its 
implementation, the question arises - What motivates executives to buy-in to this 
difficult concept?  One possibility considered was the introduction of Executive 
Performance Pay (Strong, 1998)44.   
 
In discussing performance pay with executives, a high degree of dissatisfaction was 
consistently expressed.  Executives indicated that the performance bonus was not an 
economic motivator45, nor did it generate public recognition.  Organizationally, pay is 
personal information and executives stated that they never discussed their ratings with 
each other.  Furthermore, faced with 99.7 per cent of executives receiving a bonus, the 
government introduced guidelines effective fiscal year 2003-04, ‘suggesting’ that 5 
per cent of executives receive no bonus46 and limiting the maximum payout (10 per 
cent of base salary) to 20 per cent of executives.  This change, predictably, has led to 
increased discontent and greater cynicism with this system of reward. 
 
Executives spoke positively on the personal performance feedback they received, for 
example, I receive excellent feedback and advice from my manager (respondent: SC-
28), including the value of formal, written assessments of their contribution.  
Increased attention on performance assessments were noted as improving both 
                                                 
44 Performance pay is given at four levels from none (0 per cent) to a maximum 10 per cent for EX1-3, 
or 15 per cent for EX4-5.  
45 For an EX-1 Director, the most common level, a typical bonus would be $4,000 to $6000 before 
taxes with approximately 50 per cent remaining after-taxes. 
46 While Treasury Board officials argued that these were guidelines only, the relative power imbalance 
between TBS and departments would suggest that TBS’s advice is closer to guidelines than simple 
recommendations (personal discussions, 2005). 
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promotion opportunities through documenting previous organizational contributions 
and in hiring subordinate executives.  Executives specifically noted that the stronger 
culture of performance assessment could be directly linked to performance pay.  
Money focuses the attention wonderfully (respondent: SC-11); and, As a long-term 
executive, the linking of performance appraisal process to financial bonuses has had 
a clear impact on the degree of attention paid to (appraisals) (respondent: SC-18). 
 
Unfortunately, a number of cases of less-than-ideal performance assessment were also 
uncovered. First, I wrote my own performance agreement, then I assessed myself 
(respondent: SC-23).  Regional executives also noted certain difficulties in 
assessments by geographically remote managers (typically in Ottawa) and limited 
one-on-one contact time. 
 
When directly asked if the performance pay system (as it existed in 2004) was fair, 
typical comments included, No; Absolutely not; It is very weak; Just scrap it; it is a 
deterrent;[ laughter]; and that, Focusing on performance pay is completely the wrong 
message…(respondent: SC-6).  The worst, but perhaps most enlightening response 
was, There’s no logic.  I received a superior rating for at least 5 years, last year it 
was explained that there was a new requirement to reduce the number of superior 
ratings in the department, and as I was close to retirement, would I accept a lower 
rating?  My boss assured me that the quality of my work was top-notch…. 
(respondent: SC-21) 
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Overall, executives consistently expressed dissatisfaction with performance pay.  This 
suggests that either the entire concept is flawed, or that there has been a fundamental 
error in its implementation within the Canadian federal government.    
Given that the existing bureaucratic motivators seem to be of limited value, and 
arguably even a disincentive, the researcher sought an explanation through higher-
order motivation.  Posing the question, ‘Why do you work for the federal 
government?’, resulted in an almost unanimous response – “To make a difference.”  
In fact, these exact words were offered by almost every executive.  Similarly, 
executives consistently identified personal values of accountability to Canadians, as 
well as to programme clients47.  Although in discussing accountability, these 
responses were often positioned in official, hierarchical terms, it was apparent that a 
personal sense of stewardship existed, and that this stewardship was ultimately, 
clearly, to Canadians.   
 
These latter two research findings support the development of a motivational model 
which will be refined Chapter 8, in linking Results-based Management with the 
intrinsic motivation of executives to work in the public sector. 
  
4.9 Development of the RBM Logic Model 
During the initial interviews, approximately the first 15 to 20, it became clear that 
while executives supported Results-based Management, they were unable to describe 
significant activities they had undertaken, or were doing, to operationalise Results-
                                                 
47 In Canada, formal accountability flows upwards in each department to a Deputy Minister.  However, 
the Deputy Minister does not report to the respective Minister, but rather to the Clerk of the Privy 
Council, who in turn reports directly to the Prime Minister and Parliament.  In fact, Public Servants 
have no direct accountability to Canadians.  
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based Management.  Using the Logic Model as a common tool for ease of 
communication, the model depicted in Figure 15, below, was developed and discussed 
at the end of the remaining 60 interviews (i.e. the majority of the Saskatchewan and 
Health case studies, and all Senior Executive interviews).  There was widespread, and 
frankly enthusiastic, acknowledgement of the potential for this model to explain the 
current culture and environment as executives engaged in Results-based Management, 
for example, That is a very good way of putting it, that is a fantastic way of putting 
it…(respondent: SC-22).  A visual depiction is included below. 
 
Figure 14: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management 
Logic Model Approach
BUT
Inputs Processes Outputs Outcomes
Managerial
Flexibility?Bureaucratic ConstrainedFixed
BUT BUT BUT
 
 
4.10 Summary - Saskatchewan Case Study 
Having presented the description and analysis of the Saskatchewan Case Study, this 
section will summarize key findings from this case study. 
 
Executives interviewed agreed that changes are underway or have occurred within the 
management philosophy of the Canadian federal government.  It was also agreed that 
Results-based Management and supporting Public Value creation, is a major 
component of these changes.  However, significant differences between departments 
were noted.  The research analysis suggested that these differences can be traced to a 
number of factors. 
  Page 213 
 
First, the clarity of programme mandate and the understanding by staff of all levels of 
desired results clearly predicts the level of adaptation of Results-based Management.  
Departments with clear mandates have a greater ability, and incentive, to prove that 
they have/are achieved/achieving their objectives.  
 
Second, the research notes that for certain programmes it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to ascertain results or outcomes.  This can occur for a variety of reasons 
specific to the individual programmes.  However, it was found to be more prevalent 
for programmes with ‘social’ objectives, as compared to those targeting ‘harder’ 
objectives such as economic development or income support. 
 
Third, programmes are tackling increasingly complex issues, especially social issues.  
As a result, programme outcomes must be attributed to the complex interactions 
between interrelated programmes, multiple stakeholders, and clients’ personal 
decisions.  Thus, to realistically manage for results requires a great deal of horizontal 
activity.   Executives defined a number of constraints blocking increased horizontal 
operations including time constraints, systematic restraints, and hierarchical 
accountability and reward structures.  I’d like to work closer with (complementary 
programme department) but neither of us has the time – and frankly, it’s the same up 
the line (referring to time constraints of  more senior executives within her 
department) (respondent: SC-29). 
 
Fourth, the research found that internal control over service delivery has a significant 
impact on Results-based Management.  For departments addressing issues such as 
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incarceration, taxation and policing, while the level of demand is outside of 
programme control, the service delivery components, (i.e. prison guards, tax auditors 
and police officers) are employees.  No other service delivery agents, for example, 
independent professionals, other orders of government, or third-party delivery agents 
under Grants and Contribution funding, are present.  This permits a higher degree of 
control by the department in terms of quality, consistency and levels of service 
provided, as well as in setting and enforcing regulations.  This greater control, it is 
argued, leads to reduced risk in setting and measuring programme objectives.  
 
Executives in many departments noted the absence of clear links between budgets and 
results.  For example, There is a fundamental choice between fixing the amount we 
can spend and then achieving the best results for this investment, or identifying the 
needed or desired results, and then using this in making our budget decisions...  We 
have to choose one way or the other…. (respondent: SE15).   It was noted that the 
failure to make the link between budgets and results tended to generate rationale, but 
dysfunctional behaviour.  One example offered was a telephone call centre with a 
target of responding to 95 per cent of calls within 3 minutes.  The failure to increase 
resources to respond to growing demand resulted in a reduction of incoming 
telephone lines, because busy-signals did not count as calls waiting.  
 
In summary, while executives appeared to support the concept of Results-based 
Management, they collectively expressed a general sense that Results-based 
Management within the public sector cannot be applied equally to all programmes.  
Nevertheless, the Saskatchewan Case study does confirm a willingness of executives 
to accept greater accountability for outcomes, provided it was partnered with adequate 
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resource levels, appropriate managerial discretion in addressing regional differences, 
and decision-making authority capable of influencing programme outcomes.  
Accountability without the ability to influence outcomes was widely perceived as 
unrealistic, or worse, as empty rhetoric.   
 
One concluding comment, which nicely summarizes the variety and diversity of 
opinions heard in Saskatchewan: 
The situation here is probably similar to that in Ottawa, there is lip service paid to 
it (Results-based Management), but I’m not always sure that there’s real genuine 
commitment to Results – true evidence-based decision making, clear objectives 
with reasonable resources and targets, linked to budget allocations.  I think it 
(results) will continue to grow on us, but to-date?  I am just not sure…  But, you 
know, I do hope we figure this out, I think we’re on the right track...showing 
Canadians what we are really achieving, for them, with their tax dollars 
(respondent: SC-12). 
 
The thesis will next address the Health Case study in Chapter 5. 
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5 The Health Case Study 
This Chapter will present the findings from the analysis of the Health Case Study.   
 
The Health Case study was incorporated into the research design for two primary 
reasons.  The first, as noted in the Key Informant interviews and supported in the 
literature, is that health is generally considered to be one of the hardest areas to 
implement Results-based Management.  It is argued that examining one of the most 
difficult areas for RBM may identify constraints not readily apparent in other areas 
where results are, at least conceptually, easier to implement.  The second, was to 
include a case study which examined a national programme from the perspectives of 
both headquarters (Ottawa) and regional executives.  The overall case selection logic 
was discussed earlier in Table 25.   
 
This case study analyzed thirty-seven one hour interviews with Health executives.  
Separate transcription, coding, and analysis were conducted independently from the 
Saskatchewan case study.  During the coding phase, which although conducted 
independently, the seven key themes noted in the Saskatchewan case study also 
emerged, although modified by inclusion of one major and several minor categories. 
This reflects the use of the same interview guide in conducting the research 
interviews. 
 
The Health Case study findings are presented under the following themes: 
 Has management changed? 
 Public Value - Services  
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 Public Value - Outcomes 
 Public Value - Trust 
 Executive Information and Decision Making 
 Difficulty of Measuring Health Outcomes 
 Creating Public Value through Citizen/Client input 
 Health Executive Motivation. 
 
Similar to the Saskatchewan case study, for readability, all direct quotes from the 
research interviews are in italics.  While direct quotes are attributed to one interview, 
unless specifically noted otherwise, quotes were selected as representative of themes, 
opinions or comments emerging from multiple interviews. 
 
5.1 Background 
Under the Canadian constitution, the federal government has responsibility for the 
health care for one million First Nation and Inuit people in Canada48.   Approximately 
50 per cent of this population live in one of 640 communities, or reserves across 
Canada, many of which are quite remote, accessible only by air or ‘winter roads’49.   
Reserves are the geographic location for most, but not all, of the thirty-plus 
programmes offered by the First Nations and Inuit Health Branch (FNIHB) of Health 
Canada.      
 
                                                 
48 In Canada, provincial governments have constitutional authority for health costs for the remaining 30 
million Canadians (2005), with certain minor exceptions (military, prisons, etc.) 
49 Winter Roads are created each year by clearing and maintaining a ‘highway’ primarily over frozen 
lakes and rivers in Northern Canada, in winter months. 
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The Health Case Study interviews were distributed as follows: nineteen executives at 
branch headquarters in Ottawa, four additional executives responsible for Health 
Canada’s corporate programmes which directly support this programme, also in 
Ottawa, and fourteen executives from the eight regional offices located across 
Canada.  There was one executive who declined to be interviewed and two others 
where scheduling problems eventually precluded meeting.  The list of interviewee is 
included as Appendix A. 
 
Similar to the Saskatchewan Case Study, the following sections present the Health 
Case study analysis through the lens of Public Value theory, followed by other 
relevant findings. 
 
5.2 First Nations Health Background 
As confirmed in both case study interviews and the literature, Health is one of the 
most complex government programmes in Canada.  The respective roles of provincial 
and federal government in Canada, the presence of a number of separate professional 
groups (e.g. Doctors, nurses, health managers, etc.), as well as the central nature of 
health care to human well-being, especially in health emergencies, all contribute to a 
highly visible and political environment. 
 
It could be argued that three trends over the last 15 years have shaped the current 
management culture within this Branch.  First, Canada, in common with other nations, 
has experienced widespread sustainability concerns regarding health care costs 
(World Health Organization, 2003).  At the same time, Canadian’s health care has 
been rated the top priority in almost every general public concern survey over the last 
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five years (EKOS, 2005), focusing public attention simultaneously on costs, access, 
value for money, and quality (Canadian National Budget, 2004). 
 
Second, the federal government’s First Nation’s Self-Governance policy of the early 
1990s saw the transfer of a number of, but not all, health programmes to First 
Nation’s control.  This resulted in certain delivery agents changing from government 
employees to First Nation band employees.  This transfer was coupled with reduced 
accountability and focused primarily on audited financial statements, i.e. greatly 
reducing accountability for outputs and outcomes.   
 
Finally, of critical importance in understanding management perceptions there was a 
major scandal in 2000, in which the Branch’s most senior executive, the Assistant 
Deputy Minister (ADM), was accused of numerous unethical and illegal behaviours.  
The ADM was fired and criminally charged.  At present, this case is before the courts.  
While individual guilt remains to be proven, there is a widespread perception of, at 
best, gross mismanagement.  The current ADM was nominated to the post in 2000, 
and has overseen the replacement of the FNIHB senior management team.  At the 
time of this research (2004), five of six Director Generals had less than two years in 
their positions, and five of the eight Regional Directors were equally new.  Almost the 
entire management team was relatively new.  However, it should be noted that these 
executives were recruited from other executive positions within the Canadian public 
sector. 
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5.3 Has Management Changed? 
Unsurprisingly, especially given the aforementioned circumstances, health executives 
perceived that the practice of management had changed, with increased 
accountability, planning, budgeting, and client focus.  Managerial authority was seen 
as somewhat cyclical with some degree of increased and/or greater delegation of 
authority, or letting the managers manage, noted over the last decade.  But a number 
of executives interviewed commented on a recent increase in administrative 
requirements with increased control imposed by the centre (Ottawa). 
 
Human Resource (HR) management, and the myriad of rules associated with HR was 
a particular source of irritation to executives.   Some recent loosening of the 
restrictions had been noted and received widespread approval.  This was perceived to 
lead to more effective HR management, although the continued existence of other HR 
red tape, especially in hiring, was consistently noted. 
 
Discussion of financial management was seen as a key, but ongoing bureaucratic 
requirement.  Executives interviewed believed that the biggest change in health 
financial management was a strong focus to not exceed budget, Certainly a focus in 
this branch, as compared to others [branches] where I have worked (respondent: 
HC-5).  As well, a distinct tendency to provide new funding in narrow ‘silos’ was 
noted, which reduced the flexibility to manage effectively through re-allocation of 
funds at the region, or band level. 
 
One change that health executives discussed was the increased role and awareness of 
the public, which for FNIHB executives tended to be the First Nations people of 
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Canada.  The role of the Access to Information Act was often noted as a key change 
by interviewees.  The population has more access to information and more 
knowledge, and this has changed the dynamic of what a public servant is responsible 
for… (respondent: HC-23)  The higher level of public scrutiny, requirement for 
greater transparency, and general public awareness of government spending was 
sometimes was perceived as having a negative effect on effective management - 
Managing in a fishbowl (respondent: HC-32). 
 
Executives also noted the increased role of planning in management.  You cannot be 
accountable, at least in any meaningful way, without careful and systematic planning 
of what you are actually setting out to do…. (respondent: HC-25).   
 
As expected, within this group of executives there were a number of references to the 
FNIHB scandal, and the role and reaction of the media in expanding the scandal.  
Responding to the FNIHB, and other external Canadian political scandals, executives 
noted a clear tendency towards greater central control and reporting mechanisms50.  
As well, a much higher degree of risk awareness, and/or risk aversion was noted and a 
number of examples provided reveal the perception that those factors reduce 
management effectiveness and flexibility. 
 
The following two quotes summarize the differing viewpoints in discussions on 
managerial changes.  Certainly there is a desire to hold managers accountable not 
just for the prudent stewardship of financial resources and compliance with rules and 
                                                 
50 Outside the scope of this research, it was argued by executives that internal controls are ineffective 
when the head becomes corrupt, as he/she can simply override or fail to act on any findings of 
impropriety demonstrated by the control systems.  A certain degree of executive cynicism was noted 
in the interviews – I mean, would all of these controls have stopped (ADM)?  Frankly I don’t see 
how… (Respondent HC-24) 
  Page 222 
regulations, but also to show the results that are being achieved at the end of the day 
(respondent: HC-12). The other predominant view was less optimistic.  The change 
appears to be, at least up to now, in the language mainly. I’ve seen lots of ‘pocket 
changes’ but I am not sure that anyone, at least here, has a clear view of the big 
picture of how public sector managers are to manage (respondent: HC-16). 
5.3.1 Horizontal Management 
Horizontality emerged as a common theme within the Health case study.  Considering 
health as the long term mix of prevention and treatment programmes coupled with 
individual choice, greater horizontal cooperation was generally seen as a prerequisite 
for improving long term health outcomes.  Internally, the other key (federal) 
department was seen as Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC), with limited mention 
made of other federal departments51. 
 
Interviewees confirmed the perceived benefits from increased horizontal cooperation 
across provincial governments, regional health authorities and independent medical 
practitioners.   However, this requires time and personal commitment to establish and 
maintain these relationships.  In addition to these time constraints, current Ottawa 
organization, accountabilities, and the reward structures were all considered 
limitations to RBM.    
 Health is such a partnership between many players, governments, medical 
professionals, drugs.  Does the average Canadian care where or who delivers 
                                                 
51 In Canada, repressive legislation still in effect, holds First Nations as wards of the state.  Authority 
for every aspect of First Nation people living on-reserve primarily rests with Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC), except for health issues which are the responsibility of Health Canada.  
Two other federal departments play relatively minor roles: Canadian Mortgage and Housing Canada 
(CMHC) for mortgage financing on-reserve, and Human Resources Canada (HRC) addresses 
unemployment nationally, including on-reserve.  Many other departments have programme elements 
which target Aboriginal or First Nation individuals. 
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these programmes?  No, their goal is good health….That’s the result that 
matters to them…  So for us, it boils down to how can we work together – 
horizontally, across programmes and departments to help First Nations get 
the results that matter to them …instead of our current silos… (respondent: 
HC-10) 
 I wish I had more time to invest in the horizontal relationships really 
necessary to have an impact on health outcomes (respondent: HC-36) 
 In this region, the Federal Regional Council has an aboriginal sub-committee 
which has really helped – if nothing else, we get together and discuss the 
issues from a people, not programme, perspective (respondent: HC-14) 
 Look at programme [name] for example.  Now the Ottawa folks [policy 
analysts and individual programme managers] have a very good 
understanding of each programme; what it does, how it works, etc in a large 
urban setting.  What they miss, is how it [this programme] interacts with the 
other thirty programmes we [this branch] offers, to say nothing of all of other 
government programmes…  in a remote, small community of say 200 people, 
with the nearest town 350 miles away by air, there are no roads…. 
(respondent: HC-11). 
 
5.4 Managerial Accountability 
Addressing changing accountability, regional executives clearly articulated dual 
accountabilities to clients and to headquarters.  Regional executives have greater 
contact with local First Nations, local stakeholders and organizations, than their 
headquarters colleagues do, and are much closer to the individual impacts of limited 
resources.  Health executives perceived their primary accountability as achieving 
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maximum benefit from limited resources, in the face of almost unlimited demand.  
Typical comments were: I’m accountable to deliver the best possible (program) 
within the policies and directives we have, and the budget we have. That is the 
primary accountability (respondent: HC-20), and I have to get the best possible use 
for those dollars to be accountable to functional leadership in Ottawa (respondent: 
HC-14).  All executives acknowledged the importance of keeping central agencies 
and Ministers satisfied to ensure continued funding, but this was perceived to be 
primarily a headquarters function.   
 
In analysis of whom executives stated they were accountable to (question eight in the 
interview guide, Appendix C), five themes emerged: Canadians, vertical 
(hierarchical), horizontal, downwards (employees) and personal.  Interestingly, 
interviewees consistently noted their accountability to Canadians, including 
programme clients.  Even executives working in corporate functions and serving 
internal clients, generally expressed accountability to Canadians for their programme 
stewardship.  I am personally responsible, and accountable, to Canadians 
(respondent: HC-2), could have been attributed to most interviews.  However, in 
absolute truth, executives are not accountable to Canadians; they are accountable to 
Parliament through the departmental and Ministerial structure. 
 
Every executive interviewed could describe their standard hierarchical accountability, 
reinforced by the mandatory performance assessments and performance pay system 
currently in place.  As well, horizontal accountability to colleagues was consistently 
noted.  The latter could be argued to reflect the increased attention to cohesive and 
collective management.   
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Executives interviewed also noted their downward accountability to staff, often 
described in terms of being accountable to provide the resources, environment, 
infrastructure, clear communications and directions necessary for staff to function 
effectively.   Finally, executives noted a strong sense of personal accountability tied to 
their intrinsic values and ethics, ‘look myself in the mirror’ accountability.  It could be 
argued that these personal values reflect executives’ self-selection for public service, 
and are key sources of personal motivation, including implementing RBM. 
 
Executives reported a wide-spread perception that accountability, at least the 
responsibility that matters to the ‘centre,’ was principally negative accountability; do 
not let the minister/programme/department/government become the source of 
negative media coverage, or worse a political scandal.  Furthermore, as noted in the 
literature review, recent Canadian political scandals have tended to result from input 
and process failures, not output or outcomes failures (Good, 2004b).  Thus, as 
expected, executive attention tended to focus on the need for compliance with 
accountability rules and regulations which was often perceived to be ‘micro-
management’.  For example: 
 I think it is management of risk at the zero tolerance level (respondent: HC-
14) 
 Within health the accountabilities are twisted.  You are not accountable for 
health, you are accountable for the delivery of a programme which follows all 
the rules…(respondent: HC-21) 
 Value for Canadians?  I would say no value.  Well, OK, a little value I guess, 
but at this level of attention, it is more like killing an ant with a hammer 
(respondent: HC-28) 
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 Rather than dealing with these issues on an exceptional basis, they’re dealing 
with it on a generalized basis (respondent: HC-34) 
 It is almost an insult – it’s like they expect us to steal $100 and think nothing 
of risking our careers to do it…. (respondent: HC-9) 
 I carefully review each contract now… whereas previously, I would have 
relied on my manager or programme officer (respondent: HC-3). 
Interestingly, each area complained about the level of reporting – regions to 
headquarters, branch to departmental level, and departmental to central agencies.   
 
Executives commented positively on the link between effective operational planning 
and accountability for results.  However, the issue of funding flowing in little pieces of 
money from all over the place (respondent: HC-15) was also raised.  As well, [the 
requirement] in our branch, we have to do detailed work-plans [down to the task 
level] for everything (respondent: HC-17) was seen by the regions as drawing 
resources from programme delivery to administrative requirements and encouraging 
micro-management by Ottawa.   One executive commented that the headquarter – 
region – First Nation structures and processes are not in sync with the results the 
branch is trying to achieve (respondent: HC-24).  Other executives noted the failure 
to identify and systematically collect the data needed for subsequent programme 
evaluations, in order to be accountable for outputs and outcomes.  Comments included 
the need to provide (from the centre) necessary resources to collect and analyze this 
data.  
 
One interesting point was the general failure to bind accountability to consequences, 
either personal or organizational, except in the rarest of occasions.  Several executives 
  Page 227 
commented on the recent attention to budget deficits in several regions: Within 
several regions of this branch, (budget deficits) had become operating norms, with no 
consequences attached.  If you do not have a clear message – like come in on budget 
or else – and consequences for failure - then why would you think already busy 
people would focus on what has been, up to recently, an administrative item…. 
(respondent: HC-24), If I was ‘ADM for a day’, heads would roll, that would send the 
right message! (respondent: HC-19). 
 
Having discussed changes and influences on executive management and 
accountability, this chapter will next discuss examine the Health Case study through 
the lens of Public Value theory. 
 
5.5  Public Value - Services 
Health Case study executives confirmed the importance of managing resources: 
budgets, employees and capital assets.  This was not seen as a new requirement.  
Executives agreed that economy and efficiency remain key public sector goals in the 
provision of services and products and confirmed that systems were in place to assist 
them in managing.   As well, participants identified the critical importance of 
following internal process requirements, although sometimes to the detriment of 
results. 
 
As background, within the Health case study, health programmes could broadly be 
divided into two streams, prevention programme such as Stop-Smoking, Head-start, 
or Environmental Protection and Treatment Programmes, for example, Non-Insured 
Health Benefits (NIHB), Diabetes Treatment or Tuberculosis tracking.  Certain 
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programmes address both aspects of health, such as Dentistry and Eye Care.  In 
addition, the branch executive management, the Assistant Deputy Ministers, 
professional practice divisions such as the Office of Nursing and Office of Medical 
Services, and other directorates ensure effective corporate management including 
planning, audit, evaluation, contracts and negotiation.  Adding to this complexity, 
programmes can also be classified by who provides the end or direct service, which 
can range from First Nations band employee to independent professional or federal 
employee; and also be classified by funding arrangement, which can also range from 
direct (paid by federal government on a per-service basis) or through First Nation 
band block or transfer funding52. 
  
As a result of this variety of programmes, service providers and funding mechanisms, 
executives report considerable diversity in their attention to services, reflecting 
programme responsibilities ranging from service as the primary focus to other areas 
where programme delivery is a transferred responsibility, and Service is not an 
executive responsibility.  In areas where service is directly provided by employees, 
executives agreed that strong client service delivery has a positive impact on both 
programme outcomes and on public perceptions and value. 
 
For example, the largest branch programme, the Non-Insured Health Benefits (NIHB) 
programme consumes approximately 50 per cent of the branch’s budget 
(approximately $ 800 million Canadian).  NIHB is a medical drug and benefits 
insurance programme for First Nations, provided by the federal government at no 
direct cost to individual First Nations people.  Similar to private sector health 
                                                 
52 First Nation programme funding is through one of four types: Stacked, Integrated, Transfer or Self-
governance, with greater autonomy as one moves from left to right. 
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insurers53, NIHB has limited control over expenditures54, which are authorized by 
medical professionals.  Furthermore, NIHB typically reimburses expenses already 
incurred and pays the service provider, not the First Nations client (i.e. pharmacists 
and dentists).  Within NIHB, economical and efficient provision of services is the 
primary programme outcomes.  It is readily apparent that measuring the ultimate 
impact of NIHB on health outcomes is not possible, while noting that Public Trust is 
enhanced through consistent, fair and equitable treatment of clients. 
 
The Health Case study included interviews to gather ‘corporate’ perceptions.  In 
corporate roles, the primary responsibility is to provide the infrastructure necessary 
for programme delivery, including HR, finance, IT, etc.  Often operating as 
gatekeepers, corporate systems must also verify that procedures are being followed, 
and demonstrate accountability.  The outputs are frequently policies and procedures, 
frameworks or reports while the outcomes are mostly intangible such as culture, 
probity and fairness: 
 My primary function is advisory.  As you know, I do not have any line 
authority, responsible for the resulting choices, but I’m held responsible to 
make sure that I present (to the management team) timely and accurate 
information, solid analysis, and my recommendations (respondent: HC-2) 
 My function is kind of like insurance, no one really wants to have to use 
insurance, but we all want to have it when something goes wrong… 
(respondent: HC-25) 
                                                 
53 In Canada, primary health coverage is free.  Individual Canadians can choose to purchase additional 
insurance.  For example, Blue Cross is one commercial Canadian insurer, while GSMIP is the 
equivalent federal employee supplemental health insurance.  This programme offers equivalent 
insurance to First Nations at no direct cost to individuals (i.e. no insurance premiums). 
54 NIHB does have some control, for example which drugs or procedures are approved for 
reimbursement, and through negotiation of professional fees such as pharmacy dispensing fees.   
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 I’m not here to catch (them).  I am happiest when we have a clean audit….  
Then, we have clearly demonstrated that everyone has followed the prescribed 
rules and regulations… (respondent: HC-7) 
 I have to manage, effectively manage small crises so they do not become big 
crises (respondent: HC-18). 
Similarly, branch policy functions also have different accountabilities 
 …to develop strategies that would be approved, achieve general consensus, 
and that will work when implemented (respondent: HC-33) 
 To coordinate the development of strategic goals and priorities (respondent: 
HC-20). 
Within corporate functions, programmes measure outputs.  Similar to the financial 
management systems, bureaucratic systems are typically in place to monitor the 
service or output levels, depending, of course, on the nature of the programme or 
service.  
 
5.6 Public Value - Outcomes 
There was general agreement that executives should, at least conceptually, be 
accountable for programme outcomes in addition to historical accountability of 
resources, process, and outputs.  Health executives also agreed that outcomes or 
result-based management had potential to improve programmes or management for 
programmes, and consistently supported the concept.   
 
Discussion with health executives confirmed general themes from the literature, that 
health is widely accepted, in practice and academic literature, as the end-product of a 
complex set of inter-related programmes, personal choices and environmental 
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impacts.  First Nation and Inuit Health Branch programmes were widely believed, by 
the executives interviewed, to make a positive contribution to health outcomes.  
However, at the same time, the impact on health outcomes from external factors such 
as economic well-being, education, environment and personal choices was fully 
acknowledged.  As well, other programmes are offered by provincial governments 
and NGOs (ex. The Canadian Cancer Society).  Thus, as executives interviewed 
suggested, the contribution attributable to branch programmes is often unknown.   
 
At the macro level, the desired long term health programme outcomes are broadly 
known - the prevention of health problems and effective treatment of ill health.   
Regarding the former, it can be argued that significant difficulty exists in determining 
and documenting ‘non-occurrences.’  Traditional scientific experiments demand the 
presence of a control group.  However, ethical considerations preclude this practice 
with humans.  Similarly, health interventions frequently require significant 
timeframes to monitor.  For example, the long term impact of stop-smoking programs 
may require decades to assess.  Lastly, it was noted that it is often very difficult or 
impossible to establish causal relationships and attribution, both in terms of the 
underlying cause and the effectiveness of the intervention.  At the same time, 
executives noted that certain programme outcomes areas are much easier to monitor, 
for example, tobacco usage (e.g. longitudinal survey, receipts from ‘sin’ tax, etc.) or 
incidents of positive AIDS/HIV tests, which are monitored and reported nationally.   
 
A number of interviewed executives addressed the need for defining clear objectives 
and goals.  For me, accountability is knowing what you want to achieve, knowing the 
resources and  measures you want to put in place in order to achieve those results, 
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and then actually doing that (respondent: HC-29).   Executives spoke of the difficulty 
in addressing what can be conflicting priorities.  Within the Health Case, executives 
suggested that major macro-level programme objectives included improving First 
Nation’s health, increasing First Nation self-governance, reducing health inequities, 
and working collaboratively with other departments and levels of government.  
However, a number of regional executives suggested that the highest branch priority 
was (at that time) balancing the budget or avoiding a budget deficit. 
 
When addressing Results-based Management in general, executives’ comments 
included: 
 Are we there in terms of Results-based Management?  Our primary goal to 
improve health outcomes for First Nations.  I do not think we are fully focused 
on Results, there are too many other objectives ‘muddying’ the field…. 
(respondent: HC-5) 
 It forces you to think beyond the process and the outputs.  And it gets you to 
identify what the outcomes are, if you can! (respondent: HC-1) 
 First, they (politicians and senior management) would have to be very clear 
on what results they want us to achieve…  Now if they do this, then they would 
be accountable for achieving these goals…  no more ‘wiggle-room’ 
(respondent: HC-26) 
 Results for who?  You know, there is often a world of difference between what 
citizens, clients, service providers, (programme) managers, and politicians see 
as the results we are aiming for… (respondent: HC-12). 
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When asked specifically whether FNIHB was using Results-based Management in 
managing health outcomes; there was a wide variety of responses:  
 No (respondent: HC-15) 
 We’re trying (respondent: HC-25) 
 Sometimes, we just don’t have sufficient funds/resources to achieve everything 
we need to do to achieve a given set of results… (respondent: HC-24) 
 We can have all the Results-based Management that we want, then we run up 
against transfer (a First Nation funding mechanism) where data is no longer 
provided to us (respondent: HC-6). 
5.6.1 Difficulty of Measuring Health Outcomes 
Given the diversity of federal health programmes and services offered through this 
branch, coupled with the complex and multiple delivery mechanisms, executives 
identified a number of issues surrounding the difficulty in measuring and establishing 
outcomes.  Nevertheless, executives were also clear that this did not preclude using 
Results-based Management within health care, but rather that some realistic 
assessment of where it is feasible is required. 
 
The analysis of the interview data revealed a wide range of issues, from the role of 
multiple stakeholders and service delivery agents, to data collection, analysis, and 
outright ‘gaming’ of results.  For the purposes of this thesis, the exact nature of these 
difficulties is relatively less important than the overall perception by executives of 
significant and inherent difficulties in assessing results of health programmes.  Three 
key themes, among with five themes of a more minor nature, emerged. 
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First, as noted earlier, health outcomes are the end result of a complex interplay of 
individual choices, genes and environmental impacts.  Numerous programmes, funded 
by federal and provincial governments, and NGOs, and often delivered through 
independent professionals, make attribution of results to specific contributor(s) 
difficult and often impossible to ascertain.  As well, preventative (as compared to 
treatment oriented) health programmes are perceived as harder to measure; How do 
you measure something that did not happen? (respondent: HC-12). 
 
Second, a large number of measurement issues were identified, which varied widely 
depending on the programme, funding and delivery process, and service delivery 
method.  Issues included:  
 Difficulties in identifying, agreeing with stakeholders and acquiring sound 
data 
 Extensive privacy concerns and legislative issues regarding personal health 
information 
 Interpreting data correctly – lack of epidemiologists or skilled employees 
 Measuring of non-event (preventative programmes). 
 
Third, every executive was fully aware of numerous studies which consistently 
conclude that First Nation people continue to have lower, sometimes much lower, 
health outcomes than Canadians in general.  Within health, time lags between actions 
and improvements in health outcomes are frequently decades (e.g. a smoking 
cessation programme leading to reduced lung cancer rates).  Improving health 
outcomes requires long-term effort.  Executive comments included: 
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 I do what I can to move the yard sticks (make progress)… But, it’s so hard to 
measure it even over a decade… (respondent: HC-34) 
 Maybe what I can do in this job is just put processes in place so people can 
have a dialogue (respondent: HC-13) 
 Help First Nation people understand their choices, and the long-term impact 
of their choices (respondent: HC-9). 
 
Issues of a more minor nature, but that still consistently emerged from the interview 
analysis: 
 Data Analysis issues including: 
- Counting versus understanding 
- Perception of a limited availability of skilled analysts and epidemiologists 
- Difficulty in acquiring and establishing baseline data 
 Incompatibility and inconsistency between corporate systems and  ‘unfriendly’ 
system interfaces required to extract data 
 Dysfunctional Behaviour including intentional manipulation of outputs,  
outcomes and data, and ‘Managing to the measures’ 
 Risk adverse environment with an adverse politics and a perceivably 
aggressive media. 
 
It should be noted that reliable long-term health outcome data is generally available 
from external sources – life expectancy, quality of life indicators, disease rates, etc.  
In Canada, Statistics Canada and National Aboriginal Health Organization (NAHO) 
are two organizations, among many, who coordinate or conduct national and 
longitudinal health surveys.   Executives, when asked, were broadly aware of such 
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reports and information, but did not make use of them in managing.  An exception 
was noted within the Policy function, where there was a much greater awareness and 
use of this material in developing health policy.  
 
5.7  Public Value - Trust 
Without digressing into a full discussion of Health care economics, primary health 
care is free for Canadians55.  Doctors, hospitals, emergency treatment do not require 
user payment.  When Canadians, and not just First Nations, talk of their entitlements 
to health, they are talking about what they perceive as a fundamental right, and not as 
a client… (respondent: HC-2).  Faced with functionally unlimited demand, 
governments, as funding providers, limit the supply of services.  Recalling that health 
is the number one public survey concern, the foregoing creates stress on public trust 
concerning health issues.   
 
Canadian health expenditures have increased substantially – the highest growth rate 
for public programme financing56 - to cover rapidly rising costs.  As well, a 
significant number of new or expanded First Nation health programmes have been 
announced in budget speeches or the Speech from the Throne which opens each 
session of Parliament57.   
                                                 
55 It should be noted that many elements of health care are not generally covered by the government, 
for example: pharmaceutical drugs, dental, vision, non-emergency transportation, etc.  Although 
programmes often do exist to cover or partially cover such expenses for the elderly, those on social 
assistance, etc. 
56 Statistics Canada reports overall health expenditures rose from $90.1 billion in 1999, to $121.4 
billion in 2003 (Statistics Canada, 2005). 
57 Major First Nations health funding, policy and programme announcements found in Canadian 
Parliament’s Speech from the Throne and Annual Budgets, include Home and Community Care 
$100M/yr, Sustainability Funding $1,000M/6 yrs, Suicide Prevention $45M/5 yrs. 
  Page 237 
Executives were pragmatic, but stressed the need to clarify to stakeholders, 
Parliament, First Nations, and programme recipients whether the branch’s overall goal 
is to provide the best health care within a given resource base or to identify and 
actively seek the resources necessary to achieve a specific health outcome.  The 
comment, A clear message may not increase client satisfaction, but it contributes to 
increased public trust (respondent: HC-18), summarizes a number of executive’s 
comments.  Similarly, executives interviewed report that Canadians, for a variety of 
reasons, are seeking greater assurances of Value for Money and probity in all 
government expenditure.   
 
Regional executives said their major contribution to increased public trust was 
through the relationship developed with stakeholders, which they describe as critical 
given the multiple programmes, funding mechanisms and service delivery functions.  
The foundation of relationships is broadly seen as effective, meaningful and honest 
communication.  
 Regular communication, transparency, sharing information with them 
(respondent: HC-11) 
 We have to find better ways of working together, rather than the tendency of the 
federal government to act paternalistically, sometimes in subtle ways, sometimes 
not... (respondent: HC-32) 
 There is a huge element in personal confidence, personal trust, and personal 
acceptance (by First Nations) that’s the key (respondent: HC-13). 
Given the lack of more formal client feedback mechanisms, these informal contacts 
provide much of the management information regarding programme service delivery 
and outputs. 
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Key elements of public trust, equity, fairness and consistency of treatment were 
stressed as critical in delivering national public sector programmes.  It was also 
clearly noted that achieving equity sometimes requires different approaches, funding 
levels or treatment (e.g. transportation costs differences between isolated and urban 
community).  This, it was suggested, requires some degree of managerial flexibility in 
determining what would be fair and equal. 
5.7.1 Accountability and Reporting 
 
Public trust was widely perceived to be enhanced through proper accountability and 
transparent reporting.  Executives, when asked how they discharged their 
accountability and how they demonstrated that they had acted appropriately and 
achieved results, tended to focus on internal process accountability.  This 
accountability was typically described as the prudent use of financial resources, 
meeting budgets and monitoring accountability of service delivery agents, and notably 
not achievement of outputs or outcomes.  For example, I’ve always said I keep public 
money with greater attention than I keep my own money (respondent: HC-31).   
 
Given the branch scandal in 2000, executive attention almost naturally focused on 
accountability for following rules and regulations in operating programmes.  
Regardless of the results you achieve, in the public sector, how you get your results is 
critical (respondent: HC-1).  Executives widely noted that public trust is not 
increased through disregard for public sector probity and equity, even to those 
benefiting from the breach of rules. 
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The interviews also explored the contribution of consultations in developing and 
maintaining trust.  Within FNIHB, this aspect of trust was perceived to have a long 
and difficult history. 
 The history of consultation [in FNIHB] has been extremely poor, although in 
fairness the federal government has made real progress in moving from a 
rather paternalistic attitude to a willingness to work together with First 
Nations (respondent: HC-7) 
 Consultation can certainly improve public trust, However, all too often what 
we call consultations is really information sharing.  Consultations have to 
occur before the preferred solution has been identified… (respondent: HC-17) 
 Gone are the days when a public servant can sit in their office and design a 
programme without talking to stakeholders (respondent: HC-10). 
 
Executives discussed the impact on trust through partnerships with First Nations, but 
found that the imbalance of power, (When one party controls first base (respondent: 
HC-28)), to be a significant deterrent in those processes.  However, in one region 
where First Nation health care funding is actively and formally co-managed by First 
Nations and regional executives, a high degree of satisfaction is reported by both 
sides.  (Note – the research made no attempt to confirm this opinion from the First 
Nation’s perspective).  
 
On a related issue, during the mid to late 1990s, the federal government policy of First 
Nations Self-Governance (on-reserve) saw the emergence of ‘transfer funding’ where 
health programme funds were bundled or block-funded, with First Nations Bands 
(reserves) given flexibility to allocate funds to address specific health issues.  
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Approximately 50 per cent of reserves have adopted this financial arrangement.  
Transfer funding requires significantly reduced programme accountability, limited to 
audited confirmation that mandatory programmes were delivered and that all funds 
were expended on health issues.  One trend noted by regional executives was the 
tendency of new or expanded programmes targeted funding – funding which must be 
used for the stated purpose only – greatly reducing both regional and First Nations on-
reserve flexibility.  This was perceived by regional staff and also by First Nations 
clients58 as increasing both standardization and administrative controls, and reducing 
programme flexibility.  Regional executives suggested that linear accountability, by 
programme dollar, fails to address the complex interplay of factors and influences in 
achieving health outcomes and reinforces the confusion over overall desired 
outcomes.   
 
Executives interviewed indicated that public trust can be enhanced through reporting.  
However, other than the routine annual reports to Parliament which most executives 
recognized as having limited to no value for average Canadians or stakeholders, 
external accountability was through direct and frequent contact with clients and 
stakeholders.  It was noted that a number of executives were not cognizant of several 
annual programme reports produced by Directorates within the Branch, although 
admittedly these executives were appointed within the previous two years (more 
experienced branch executives were aware).   
 
                                                 
58 Targeted programme funding inevitably requires additional reporting and accountability 
requirements.  While somewhat external to this research, the Auditor General of Canada has been 
highly critical of the excessive reporting requirements of First Nations bands - both in terms of 
volume of reports and the failure of the government to do anything with the reports once received 
(Auditor General of Canada, 2002c).   
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In analysing discussion of programme reporting, a fairly high degree of cynicism was 
noted.  For example:  
 The biggest downfall in government is in reporting… (respondent: HC-20) 
 There are sure a lot of required reports… First Nation reserves to regional 
offices, regions to headquarters, headquarters to central agencies.  But you 
have got to ask yourself one thing, what happens as a result of reporting?  If 
there’s no follow-up, no potential for improvements… (respondent: HC-70) 
 I sure hope that the clients do not base their trust of us on the way and level of 
our public reporting…. (respondent: HC-19). 
Although some potential for improvement was also noted.  I think the internet and 
technology are vastly changing how we interact with clients, including accountability 
and reporting. (respondent: HC-8). 
 
A different aspect of reporting, reporting and accountability of First Nation service 
providers to the federal government, as compared to accountability by the federal 
government, was the subject of considerable executive dissatisfaction: 
 We demand all of these reports from First Nation (programme delivery) but 
what do we give them in return.  Meaningful feedback? I’m afraid not… 
(respondent: HC-13) 
 The biggest downfall in government probably is reporting, over reporting on 
one hand… which means that ultimately nothing gets reported on very well…. 
Coupled with a failure to report what is actually important or meaningful… 
(respondent: HC-35) 
 There is a failure to use information currently available (respondent: HC-6). 
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As such reports primarily serve governmental accountability requirements, and have 
limited, at best, value to First Nation stakeholders, such reporting was widely 
perceived by regional executives to negatively impact trust.   
 
There was some evidence within the Health Case study that the existence of audit and 
evaluation functions themselves contribute to trust, not serving simply as ‘policing’ 
and corrective functions, but also to reassure Central Agencies, Parliamentarians and 
Canadians that funds are being expended prudently and properly and that value for 
money is achieved for clients and government. 
 
5.8  Executive Information and Decision Making 
Health Case study executives reported that their information sources were primarily 
verbal or informal, estimates ranged from 66 per cent to 90 per cent.  Management 
information is typically acquired through regular staff and management meetings, HR 
performance discussions, and informal conversations with stakeholders.  Significantly 
less attention, in general, is paid to routine or occasional reports.  While internal, 
corporate functions typically had better data available through enterprise IT systems 
or as a direct result of internal processes, corporate executives reported only a slightly 
higher usage of structured information.    
 
The findings from the Health Case study in understanding executive information 
sources were very similar to those from the Saskatchewan Case study, Section 4.6.  
No additional or alternative findings were noted, although the examples provided 
focused on health issues.  As such, and for brevity, Table 31 below provides a 
summary of the Health Case Study on executive information sources. 
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Table 31: Executives’ Information Sources, Health Case Study 
Source Comments/Description 
Meetings  I attend, call, hold regular meetings with my staff, clients, stakeholders, 
colleagues, management team, boss etc. (respondent: HC-8) 
  ‘Management by Walking Around’ 
Staff 
 
 A key source of information was direct and subordinate staff – briefings, 
reports, ‘heads-up,’ and casual conversations 
Routine 
Reports 
 Regular reports form an important part of my information sources, but 
overall, I make limited use of structured information (respondent: HC-18)  
 Comments on timing, validity, and usefulness of corporate system 
information (respondent: HC-21) 
 Understanding through-put (process responsibilities) is a critical factor 
(respondent: HC-3) 
Occasional 
reports 
 Evaluations and assessments  
 Briefing Notes (especially at higher levels of management) 
 Special reports, at executive’s request or via general circulation for 
information 
 Personal reading – external research, reports and information  
In the Field  I get a lot of my information from interacting with clients (meetings, 
conference, formal meetings social and casual contact ) (respondent: HC-
32) 
 First Nations have become politically astute, and can effectively complain 
and mount campaigns (respondent: HC-27) 
Occasional 
Feedback 
 Complaints, Letters to the Minister (includes compliments), appeals, court 
cases  
 Audits, Evaluations, Auditor General assessments 
 External reports and research 
 Stakeholder conferences, reports, requests 
 
When asked whether executives desired, or believed they would benefit from an 
automated performance management system, for example, a Balanced Scorecard, 
responses were generally negative, expressing reservations on several fronts 
including: 
 Most, but not all programmes, lack current performance measurement and 
management information (respondent HC-14) 
 Various discussions of the high cost of identifying, acquiring and managing 
data, including First Nation funding and accountability mechanisms, and 
privacy issues related to health data 
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 Questionable benefits, both in terms of management capacity and the potential 
for increased accountability without increased flexibility or risk tolerance 
(respondent: HC-11) 
 Time lags inherent in health outcomes data (respondent: HC-29) 
 Time and capacity to analyze the data, opportunities to provide contextual 
information together with the data, and increased risk exposure 
 Risks associated with central agency involvement and public access 
 Given the long time horizons in health, not a tool for day-to-day managing for 
results (respondent: HC-7) 
 Concerns regarding high-level objectives and goals. 
 
Health Case study executives confirmed a significant growth in time pressures, 
indicating a general perception that workload levels have increased over the last 
decade.  Executives specifically complained of the limited or non-existent time 
available for critical forward thinking.  The potential impact from identifying and 
participating in developing overall strategic direction was itself reported to be a key 
intrinsic motivator for executives. 
 
Finally, Health Case study executives confirmed Key Informant interview findings 
that when and if result-based information is used for internal decision making, 
especially budgets, it will increase executives’ attention on RBM considerably.  Only 
one example of this level of integration was noted during these interviews.  Adopting 
RBM, executives also noted would require a change in the political use of 
information.  However, this was widely perceived to be beyond the scope of 
executives’ ability to influence.   
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5.9 Creating Public Value Through Citizen/Client Input 
As argued, assessing Public Value creation through services, outcomes and trust 
inherently requires information gathered directly from the end-user, whether client, 
customer, or citizen.  These groups have unique perspectives on programme service 
delivery, outputs and outcomes.  
 
Within the Health Case study, while both programme and regional executives 
consider First Nations to be the clients, there is a complete absence of client 
satisfaction data or surveys, systematic feedback instruments, focus groups, or other 
methods of assessment.  Programme evaluations, conducted every five years, were 
noted as one possible source of information.  This was also true for corporate 
functions, where the clients are presumably Health Canada executives and/or 
employees.  In (corporate function) we do have a lot of service standards, but frankly, 
we have not been measuring our outputs against them... (respondent: HC-30). The 
conclusion is that the Canadian public sector culture does not support direct dialogues 
with programme clients.  At all levels, client satisfaction assessment and awareness 
appears to be based on complaint levels and informal feedback.   
 
The possibility of executives’ inability to address or react to client feedback – why 
raise expectations needlessly (respondent: HC-16) – was raised, but discussion noted 
that executives do have some flexibility and the research concluded that this was 
spurious. 
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One possible area of public trust was through consultations related to policy 
development.  Excluding public consultations by Parliamentary Task Forces (outside 
the scope of executives), consultations were described as: 
 There is a lot of talk about consultations, involving First Nations… now there 
are (approximately 75) separate and distinct First Nations bands in this 
region; headquarters seems to think that we can consult with all of them in a 
week or two... (respondent: HC-22) 
 First Nations are sick and tired of people in government talking about 
consultations… when what they see is unidirectional information flows and no 
opportunity to participate (respondent: HC-4) 
 I do not think that government knows who the client is…. (respondent: HC-29) 
Similarly, internal consultations addressing changes in corporate functions, were 
described as either absent or meaningless. 
 
In considering outcomes, executives were asked of external assessments of 
programme outcomes, or independent evidence of long-term results (e.g. reduced 
hospital admissions).  With few exceptions, executives were unable to identify current 
information sources.  When prompted, most executives were aware of previous 
programme evaluations, historical health surveys and external reports.  However, this 
information was clearly not current, nor central to their management.  In general, such 
information was perceived to be the primary concern of headquarters’ policy analysts 
or national programme managers, and not a direct source of management information 
for Health executives.   
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5.10  Health Executive Motivation 
Continuing to explore the apparent disconnection between Executives’ support of 
Results-based Management and the difficulties noted in implementing Results-based 
Management, especially within the health sector, the researcher questioned whether 
executive Performance Pay had an impact. 
 
Health Case study executives expressed general dissatisfaction, or at best neutrality, 
regarding performance pay.  Executives confirmed that performance pay is not an 
economic motivator, nor did it generate public recognition.  Organizationally, pay is 
personal information and these executives stated that they never discuss their ratings 
with each other.  The perceived introduction of quotas by the Treasury Board 
Secretariat59 appears to have increased executive dissatisfaction and cynicism, even 
for executives who received a performance bonus during the last performance 
appraisal cycle. 
 
On a positive note, executives did report that the introduction of performance pay has 
brought a much higher level of rigor to the performance appraisal process.  In addition 
to, in some cases, significantly improved feedback, the link to financial rules (related 
to the payment of the bonuses) is strongly perceived to assist in completion of the 
appraisal process in a timely manner.   Executives consistently valued the increased 
feedback from their manager, the satisfaction of knowing formally and in writing the 
level of satisfaction with their performance the previous year.  Interestingly, these 
improvements are also reported as improving attention on subordinate employee 
appraisals in general. 
                                                 
59 As noted earlier, TBS claims that these quotas are guidelines only. 
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Satisfaction with performance pay did increase with rank.  It is argued that two 
drivers of this finding are that the higher levels of management have greater control 
and autonomy in achieving results, and secondly, as discussed in the Saskatchewan 
Case study, the maximum bonus increases with executive level. 
 
Given that the literature suggests that performance pay has had a limited impact, and 
potentially serving as a disincentive, the research explored executive motivation for 
public sector employment.  Posing the question - ‘Why do you work for the federal 
government?’ continued to result in an almost unanimous consistency in their 
responses – To make a difference.   
 
The direct programme nature of Health Case study executives saw a high degree of 
perceived accountability to clients and Canadians.  Health case study executives 
consistently identified personal values of accountability, in addition to the official, 
hierarchical accountability and a sense of stewardship.   
 
5.11 Summary - Health Case Study 
Executives agreed that there has been a shift in the management philosophy and 
culture of the Canadian federal government, with senior executives and 
Parliamentarians increasingly asking ‘results’ questions and gaining familiarity with 
Logic Models and other ‘results’ tools and frameworks.  There has been an initial, but 
limited, movement towards basing decisions on the evidence or the results obtained.  
Executives did note that there are intrinsic differences between the public and private 
sectors - Some of the things that the public sector does can not be quantified based on 
immediate outcomes or tangible results (respondent: HC-2).  This increased 
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awareness appears to be top-down, where it is reported to be a routine subject area at 
the senior management meetings.   
 
First, within health, the research confirms that for certain programmes it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to ascertain results or attribute outcomes.  This occurs for a variety of 
reasons, specific to individual programmes.  With the presence of multiple 
stakeholders, it was noted that increased horizontal coordination requires addressing 
time constraints, systematic restraints, and hierarchical accountability and reward 
structures. 
 
Second, the fundamental nature of Canadian politics, including risk adversity, in 
identifying programme outcomes is a significant impediment to RBM.  One comment 
which provided an excellent example of this aspect was: 
So, if we sat down and addressed what the ultimate outcome could be, and we collectively 
agreed that by some miracle, we could reduce the (disease incidence) to 5 per cent of the 
population.  That would be incredible progress.  Now can you imagine what would 
happen if the Minister of Health stood up in the Parliament and say, we have been wildly 
successful because only 5 per cent of First Nations now suffer from (disease).  There 
would be a public lynching (respondent: HC-19).   
 
Within public sector programmes, the only politically acceptable solution is often 
total eradication, regardless of the impossibility of achieving this.  Such behaviour 
was reported to lead to increased executive cynicism on all aspects of Results-based 
Management. 
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Third, health programmes face sustainability issues, with the result that budget 
management is a central priority within this branch/department.  Executives expressed 
concern over the perceived absence and difficulty of links between budgets and 
results.  For example, There is a fundamental choice between fixing the amount we 
can spend and then achieving the best results for this investment, or identifying the 
needed results, and then using this in making our budget decisions...  We have to 
choose one way or the other…. (respondent: HC-25).  As one interviewee stated, the 
acid test of performance measurement (in support of results-based management) is 
being able or willing to reallocate resources to higher priorities, or better performing 
programmes (respondent: HC-34).  During the health case study, only one example of 
evidenced based budget reallocation was noted. 
 
Fourth, executives continue to support Results-based Management, and the increased 
use of evidence based decision making for both health care and management of health 
care.  Health research does have a long history of evidence-based decision making 
including the standard double blind clinical study.  So in one sense, Results-based 
Management is already integrated into the professional culture of medical 
practitioners.  Although, in fairness, this may not be reflective of health managers, as 
the health management cadre may not have previously been health practitioners. 
 
An absence of structured client satisfaction surveys of any kind, internal or external, 
was noted.  The claim that informal feedback and complaints provide executives with 
a sense of satisfaction levels lacks credibility, given the relative ease of acquiring 
more rigorous data which clearly would assist in assessing programmes. 
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Finally, programme executives themselves reported a personal accountability to the 
public and clients for programmes.  It was noted that discussions over desired 
outcomes could itself lead to improvements in programmes delivery and outcomes, as 
well as increasing trust.  Executives articulated the need for stakeholder involvement 
in the selection of performance indicators.   
 
Interestingly, interviewees also expressed an openness for increased accountability for 
outcomes, as long as it was tied to the necessary managerial flexibility to influence 
results. Hold me accountable for what I have control over, the ability to influence, but 
hold me fully accountable… (respondent: HC-30).  
 
In summary, while executives appeared to perceive the potential for Results-based 
Management and supported the concept, they collectively expressed a general sense 
that Results-based Management within the Health sector was extremely difficult and 
often impossible to achieve.   
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6  Senior Executive Interviews 
 
This Chapter will present the findings from the analysis of the Senior Executive 
interviews.   
 
The Senior Executive interviews consisted of ten interviews with very senior 
mandarins, Deputy Ministers (DM) and Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM) from both 
‘central agency’ and line departments.  The contribution of the Senior Executive 
interviews in the overall research design was to capture and examine the perspectives 
of senior executives and to validate the research findings from the Health and 
Saskatchewan case studies.  The overall case selection logic was summarized in  
Table 25.   
 
The Senior Executive interviews were conducted following the identical Interview 
Guide as the other case studies (Appendix C).  These interviews were scheduled at the 
end of the data collection phase, permitting discussion of the emerging research 
findings from the two case studies.  This discussion occurred at the end of each 
interview.  To fully capture the senior executive perspective, the five interviews with 
Assistant Deputy Ministers from the Health and Saskatchewan case studies were 
merged with this data prior to conducting the analysis.  Thus, a total of fifteen 
interviews were included in this analysis.  
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This focus of this chapter is to present the findings and analysis on key differences 
between senior (DM, ADM levels) and other executives (Director, Director General 
levels) and to validate findings.   During the analysis, seven key themes emerged: 
 Mandate 
 RBM Slow Progress 
 Public Value theory 
 Intra-departmental differences 
 Accountability and RBM 
 The Logic Model 
 Information and RBM 
 
For readability, all direct quotes from the research interviews are in italics.  While 
direct quotes are attributed to one interview, unless specifically noted otherwise, 
quotes were selected as representative of themes, opinions or comments emerging 
from multiple interviews. 
 
6.1 Background 
The Key Informant interviews (Section 3.4) suggested that an examination of senior 
executive perspectives (DMs and ADMs) would be of interest.  This was 
subsequently incorporated into the research design.  Notably, executives employed at 
these levels are not focused on a programme, or group of programmes, but rather are 
responsible for either a full policy area or an entire department.   
 
It can be argued that the flexibility of more senior positions is considerably greater 
than that of Director and Director General positions.  Having come up from within the 
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system, I know that there are real differences between executive levels, both in 
responsibilities and flexibility (respondent: SE-6).    
 
6.2 Mandate 
At the senior executive level, executives noted that their overall mandate is often 
clearer than when disaggregating objectives to the programme level, I understand the 
mandate of this department, at the highest level, it is sometimes easier to understand 
than at the programme level (respondent: SE-7).  As well, as a result of their 
organizational position, they have excellent links to the political level, government 
wide policy direction, and cross-departmental contacts.  The view from the top 
(respondent: SE-3). These are all aspects which lower level executives acknowledged 
can be frustrating.   
 
Senior executives interviewed suggested that it was frequently easier to determine the 
current state of an overall policy area, such as health, employment or agriculture than 
for a programme.  For the former, national data on macro level indicators are tracked 
and publicly reported by Statistics Canada.  One specific example addressed health.  
We have a clear mandate to continue to improve Canadians’ longevity and the overall 
quality of health delivery. Compare this to trying to understand the specific mandate, 
and contribution of a specific programme, say to improve safe sex practices 
(respondent: SE-5).    
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6.3 RBM - Slow Progress 
This group confirmed that progress in Managing for Results has been slow and 
inconsistent between departments.  There’s progress, but I think there’s more to do…  
(respondent: SE-11).  Executives confirmed that certain programmes are simply not 
suitable for Results-based Management.  For those programmes, it is the programme’s 
processes and outputs which are critical to manage.   Noting signs of progress, one 
suggested that, [A]t the moment, a large part of government is engaged in results-
based planning, not results based management (respondent: SE-2).   
 
When presented with the research Logic Model (Figure 14, page 212) these 
executives agreed with its components and conclusions.  A couple of representative 
quotes include, Those are very perceptive, and accurate questions…. (respondent: 
SE-13) and, I think that some of it relates to trying to determine what are the results 
for which we want to be accountable (respondent: SE-9).  Executives also understood 
the need for managerial flexibility in moving to Results-based Management.  It’s 
obvious that you can’t hold someone accountable for something for which they have 
limited control over... (respondent: SE-13). 
 
6.4 Public Value Theory 
In examining the senior executives’ perceptions regarding Public Value and RBM 
within the Service and Outcome elements, senior executives confirmed the findings 
from the Saskatchewan and Health case studies.  There was naturally a certain 
diversity in perspective, but analysis led the researcher to conclude that fundamental 
differences were absent. 
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Interestingly, the Trust component of Public Value did have increased understanding, 
focus and attention at these levels, Trust is absolutely key (respondent: SE-8).  As 
expected, senior executives expressed an increased level of concern regarding the 
impact of declining trust in general.  We are the stewards of public trust…and, without 
trust Canada becomes something other than a democracy (respondent: SE-4), as well 
the limited potential for increased administrative requirements, imposed by the centre, 
increasing public trust. 
 
It was also clear from the discussions that senior executives’ vision of trust extended 
far beyond the clients’ trust in a programme.  Trust was perceived as having key role 
in both Parliament’s and Canadians’ confidence in government.  You cannot have an 
effective public sector without public trust (respondent: SE-2) and, Trust is the end 
result of a long, long process, not the result of a government programme in creating 
trust (respondent: SE-15).  On a related topic, these interviewees also discussed the 
difficulty in attempting to balance the trust-needs of Parliament versus programme 
clients, it is like having two demanding lovers at the same time (respondent: SE-2). 
 
6.5 Intra-Departmental Differences 
A number of senior executives interviewed suggested that the differing degree of 
adaptation of RBM across government could be partially attributable to the diversity 
of public sector programmes, even within departments.  In this department, we have 
literally hundreds of programmes, ranging from full and direct programme control 
and delivery, to areas where the federal government frankly plays a relatively minor 
and supportive role (respondent: SE-10).   
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Similarly, and directly confirming findings from the Saskatchewan Case study, the 
Senior Executive interviewees acknowledged a wide range of adaptation of Results-
based Management between departments, ranging from limited progress to 
meaningful adaptation of this concept.  There is certainly a wide range, or degree of 
adaptation of RBM (respondent: SE-4).  Senior Executives agreed that departments 
with clear mandates, such as Corrections, RCMP (national police), PSC (external 
hiring) and Taxation, appear to have adopted Results-based Management to a greater 
degree than departments with a more ‘social’ mandate, such as Health, Agriculture, 
Indian and Northern Affairs.  As well, the topic of leadership, in the context of RBM, 
was also a frequent topic of discussion. 
 
Interviewees agreed that the level of service delivery control would play a role in 
executives’ willingness to adopt RBM, for example, Long experience has taught me 
the difference between simply instructing an employee to focus on, for example, some 
aspect of the service delivery of a programme, and the complexity added in 
negotiating with another stakeholder to accomplish this same objective – especially 
when it comes to my personal accountability for results (respondent: SE-8). 
 
Not included within the Case Study analysis were a small number of interviews with 
senior executives of federal Special Operating Agencies (SOA)60.  Such agencies 
operate at ‘arms-length’ from the government, and are not bound by government 
regulations on hiring, purchasing, finance61, etc.  Agencies are expected to be 
                                                 
60 This aspect of the original, preliminary research design was removed when it quickly became 
apparent that SOA executive perspectives were closer to the private sector than the public sector, 
perhaps reflecting the SOA’s profit making or cost-recovery requirements.  A potential subject for 
future research. 
61 For example, funds do not fundamentally lapse at the end of each fiscal year, as they do with all 
government departments.  
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financially independent, and operate as a quasi-private sector enterprise.  The 
Canadian Post Office and the Farm Credit Corporation are two examples of SOAs.  
While beyond the scope of this research, these separate interviews did confirm, 
through triangulation of research findings, that clear mandates and objectives (as 
required by SOAs) are reflected in greater acceptance and usage of Results-based 
Management. 
 
6.6 Accountability and RBM 
As could be reasonably predicted, senior executives were more cognizant of and 
engaged by, accountability to Parliament.  At the senior executive level, interviewees 
reported that their primary accountability lies with the Minister and officers of 
Parliament such as the Auditor General.  And, as one interviewee noted, 
Accountability results for a Minister are maybe different than what they would be for 
an average Canadian. Or for a stakeholder group (respondent: SE-7).  Executives 
interviewed also commented on the need for accountability on management issues, 
values and ethics, and programme outcomes. Unlike business, it’s not what you 
achieve. Public sector success rests strongly on how you achieve it (respondent: 
SE-7). 
 
Senior executives confirmed the need for expanded or modified accountability 
instruments in support of Results-based Management, Frankly, I  don’t think we have 
it right yet (respondent: SE-6).  They did confirm that progress towards this goal was 
actively underway, a prediction that has been partially confirmed through policy and 
process changes supporting Results-based Management announced since completing 
these interviews. Executives also noted the requirement for a stronger link between 
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annual budgets and results.  While inherently difficult and certainly a long term goal 
in itself, a stronger link would support the implementation of RBM significantly.  
Lastly, senior executives reported that, The realities of politics is a daily reality at this 
level (respondent: SE-1), and can be a serious impediment to Results-based 
Management. 
 
It was reported that the closer proximity and accountability to Ministers and 
Parliament also comes at a cost of greater distance from programme clients.  At this 
level, client interaction occurs principally at the national policy level, and almost 
never at the individual client level.  Frankly, I basically never meet [clients], except 
on rare occasions when I am touring [a client site] (respondent: SE-7).   
 
6.7 The Logic Model 
Each Senior Executive interview included discussion of the Logic Model developed 
within the context of this research (presented as Figure 15, page 270).  This model 
continued to find wide-spread acceptance at this level, with executives interviewed 
suggesting that it clearly revealed many of the outstanding issues in implementing 
RBM.  They also confirmed that the integration of RBM must balance accountability 
for results with the necessary authority, flexibility and autonomy to influence 
outcomes, The heart of RBM (respondent: SE-10). 
 
6.8 Information and RBM 
The nation’s capital, Ottawa, is the home to the great majority of ADMs and DMs.  
As a result of their organizational positions, and assisted by this geographic 
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proximity, senior executives confirmed their improved access to information, 
including current cross-departmental, emerging policy and political focuses, and 
management trends.  Senior executives also noted a broader perspective on the impact 
of external drivers.  By the time you become a senior executive, you’ve had a chance 
to see how (such external influences) work at lower levels (respondent: SE-9). This 
was reported to be a key difference between their current positions and earlier 
employment at lower executive levels, The view from the top (respondent: SE-6). 
 
This research confirmed the limited usage of structured information by senior 
executives.  When asked what per cent of their management information was written 
and routinely generated, as compared with verbal, informal or casual information, 
senior executives’ estimates ranged from a minimum of 60 per cent, up to 90 per cent 
informal or verbal.  Similar to the other case studies, greater use of formal or 
structured information tended to correlate with programme responsibility for process 
functions such as issuing cheques, routine inspections, or processing tax forms.  
Senior executives from social service areas such as health or farm-income support 
reported relatively lower levels of use of structured information in managing.   
 
It can be argued that the increased access to information and context makes RBM 
relatively more attractive as a management and accountability tool for senior 
executives.  As one interviewee indicated, As we roll up the various and inevitable 
programme successes and failures, a more balanced picture emerges.  Contrast this 
to a single programme, where funding might be at-risk due to poor performance 
(respondent: SE-12). 
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One other theme that arose frequently was that programme budgets are more flexible 
at this level – senior executives have greater authority to reallocate funds between 
programmes and even between policy areas, and they have full control of when to 
seek increased or new programme funds from Parliament or the Treasury Board 
Secretariat.  Although, senior executives were also fully aware of the limited 
availability of this option. 
 
6.9 Summary – Senior Executive Interviews 
This chapter has reported on the research findings from the Senior Executive 
interviews. These interviews, by virtue of using the same interview questionnaire as 
the other two case studies, have contributed a senior executive perspective, as noted 
above.  In addition, discussion of the initial research findings from the two major case 
studies at the end of each of each interview has served as a key validation of the 
research findings. 
 
Having presented the findings from the case study analysis and interviews with senior 
executives, the thesis will next explore how these findings serve to answer the 
research sub-topic in Chapter 7 – Discussion. 
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7 Discussion 
7.1 Revisiting the Research Question and Objectives 
Recalling that the primary research proposition of this thesis is: 
How does Public Value Theory help to explain the limited progress in 
implementing Results-based Management within programmes in the 
Canadian federal public sector? 
with the following objectives or sub-research questions: 
1. To explore the progress of RBM through case studies in order to allow 
analysis and comparison between one major branch of Health Canada, the 
Saskatchewan region, and interviews with senior executives  
2. To explore, in particular, the view of executives within elements of the 
Canadian public sector. 
This chapter will consider what has been learned from the research.   
 
The chapter will begin by exploring the contribution to understanding offered through 
exploration of the research sub-topics identified: 
1. To explore the role of Public Value’s Service component to Results-based 
Management 
2. To explore the role of Public Value’s Outcome component to RBM 
3. To explore the role of Public Value’s Trust component to RBM  
4. Are there other factors that influence the adaptation of RBM? 
This will be followed by an examination of management theories and other emergent 
findings from the research.  The chapter’s structure is: 
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 Public Value - Services  
 Public Value - Outcomes 
- Difficulties in measuring outcomes 
- Managerial Flexibility and the Logic Model concept 
 Public Value – Trust 
- Programme accountability and reporting 
- Citizen/Client feedback – A curious absence 
 Summarizing Public Value contribution to understanding RBM 
 Applying and examining other management theories 
 Revisiting Moore’s Strategic Triangle 
 Other factors impacting executive adaptation of RBM 
- Executive pay and rewards 
- Executive motivation 
- Executive information sources 
 Additional analysis of research interviews 
 Future of Results-based Management and accountability. 
 
This chapter continues to use italics to indicate direct interview quotes, and the term  
‘executive,’ unless otherwise specified, will refer to comments, findings and 
conclusions emerging from the research interviews.  Except where stated otherwise, 
this material draws on similar conclusions reached independently in the case studies.  
For readability, references to ‘case studies’ are intended to refer to the Health and 
Saskatchewan case studies and the Senior Executive interviews. 
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7.2 Public Value Service and RBM 
Recalling that theory suggests that Public Value Service is created through cost 
effective provision of high quality, efficient and effective programme delivery 
(Moore, 1995) that also incorporates key public sector values such as probity and 
equity (Kelly et al., 2002), the evidence suggests Public Value theory does assist in 
understanding Results-based Management from a Service perspective.   
 
It is self-evident that the provision of programmes and services, generally to 
Canadians, is necessary to achieve results or outcomes.  In providing programmes, 
research interviewees were unanimous that management of budgets, employees and 
capital assets, as well as the management of systems and processes required for direct 
service provision (outputs) remain central to effective public sector management.  
Similar to the private sector, economic and efficient programme delivery was also 
noted by executives as critical to ongoing programme sustainability.  However, as 
noted in the literature (Allison, 1997; Smith, 2004), executives interviewed stressed 
that public sector programmes must also address issues such as impartiality, fairness 
and equitable service provision, which are seen as integral to the creation of Public 
Value.   
 
Noting the impact of fraudulent, and media inflated political scandals in Canada over 
the last decade, the research found that executives are fully cognizant of the 
importance of following internal process requirements in service delivery, even to the 
detriment of results.  Executives suggested that such controls had increased in 
importance, as evidenced through additional accountability requirements, and argued 
that programme delivery must reflect key public sector values, regardless of results.   
  Page 265 
Triangulation of these findings included one internal study, Barriers to Implementing 
Modern Comptrollership62 (Industry Canada, 2002), which found that sound 
management practices are important, but not important enough to be given priority 
over other tasks.  Notably, more that half of managers surveyed indicated that they 
lacked the time to manage properly, and didn’t have the resources and tools to do a 
good job (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003e).  These problems, it can be argued, 
would limit creation of Public Value within the Service element.  
 
The research findings from the case studies suggested that executives are more willing 
to be measured on aspects of their work environment where they have greater control.  
It was noted in the case studies, especially the Saskatchewan case study, that 
departments with a ‘process’ mandate and/or increased control of service delivery 
function reported a greater integration of Results-based Management.  Examples of 
departments with control over service delivery included RCMP (national police 
force), Corrections Canada (prisons) and Canadian Revenue Agency (taxation).   It is 
further argued that greater control of service delivery, programme outputs and/or 
internal processes leads directly to the availability of sound performance data, which 
in turn can support the integration of Results-based Management.  Conversely, its 
absence can be argued to constrain RBM integration. 
 
The case studies also replicated this general finding at the programme level.  For 
example, one health programme with repetitive, standardized service delivery 
functions appeared to have adopted RBM to a greater degree than other health 
                                                 
62 Modern Comptrollership (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003e) includes performance management as 
one of ten themes under this initiative.  The Barriers to Modern Comptrollership survey involved 16 
focus groups and 1,186 survey respondents.  The sampling framework for the e-mail survey was 
managers, including but not limited to executives, and functional specialists.  Response rate was 
noted as 19 per cent. 
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programmes.  Similar programme-level examples included telephone call centres, 
meat inspection agencies and passport offices; all which tended to report greater use 
of RBM.  As well, Health Case study executives also indicated difficulty in finding an 
appropriate set of performance measures, particularly when working with outside 
partners.  Triangulation of this finding was found in a separate TBS study (Treasury 
Board of Canada, 2003e). 
 
In summary, given the intrinsic nature of the service provision element to attainment 
of results, it can be stated that the Service aspect of Public Value theory does assist in 
understanding implementation of Results-based Management. 
 
7.3 Public Value Outcomes and RBM 
It can be argued that Public Value Outcome offers the greatest potential explanatory 
power in understanding Results-based Management. 
 
Executives clearly understood that to be a ‘results-based manager’ explicitly required 
understanding and measuring programme outcomes.  Analysing and interpreting the 
research findings, executives suggested that key conditions that supported RBM 
included clear programme objectives and sufficient resources and managerial 
flexibility to achieve them, access to timely results information including client 
feedback, accountability instruments linked to managerial flexibility and control, 
public reporting with easy public access to supplemental resource information, and 
finally, improved linking of results to personal motivation. 
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However, the research findings also demonstrated that executives as a whole were 
doing relatively little to actively manage for results in practical, meaningful ways.  
Why was this?  The following sections discuss two key themes which emerged from 
the data63:  
1. Difficulties in measuring outcomes 
2. A level of managerial flexibility sufficient to impact programme outcomes 
Each is discussed below. 
7.3.1 Difficulty of Measuring Outcomes 
It is argued that one cannot speak of implementing Results-based Management or 
discuss Public Value Outcomes without access to information on the programme 
results being achieved; RBM implicitly requires measurement of outcomes.  In 
discussing this topic with interviewees, a number of central issues emerged 
concerning the difficulties in measuring programme outcomes.  As noted in Sections 
4.4.1, 5.6.1, and 6.8, central issues included identification of desired results, 
attribution, various measurement difficulties, and the presence of a highly risk-
adverse political culture.  Others issues were noted less frequently.  
 
It is suggested that for the purposes of this thesis the exact natures of these difficulties 
are relatively less important than the overall perception by executives of significant 
and inherent difficulties in assessing programme results.  Executives were also clear 
that such difficulties do not preclude using Results-based Management, but that a 
                                                 
63 It was tempting to consider Leadership as key to changing to a ‘results’ culture; an idea which is 
thoroughly supported in the academic and practitioner literature.  However, executive level 
employees are themselves the leaders.  Thus, it can be argued that the Leadership issue centres on 
their own personal motivation rather than on leadership from higher level executives. 
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realistic assessment of suitability is required, along with acceptance of the occasional 
political use of performance information. 
 
External research confirmed the research findings that executives see performance 
measurement as difficult (Thomas, 2005), with some activities lending themselves 
more readily to measurement than others64 (Auditor General of Canada, 2005).  
Executives, especially in the Health case study, noted some difficulty in determining 
an appropriate number of performance measures, including a tendency towards 
excessive measurement, particularly in programmes with higher political risk. 
 
As a result, and as suggested in the literature review chapter, a certain amount of 
gaming of measures was predicted and did in fact emerge during several interviews.  
Interestingly, this gaming was rationalized, at least within executive discourse, as a 
rational response.  If the centre provides [a certain level of resources], and tells me I 
must achieve an irrationally high productivity, and ties my bonus and career 
advancement to it, then the results are predictable…  (respondent: HC-21).  This was 
also noted when failing to convince headquarters of the lack of utility of specific 
performance measures.  Well if they won’t listen to reason, I’ll just give them what 
they want, who’s got time to argue (respondent: SC-6). 
 
While executives interviewed identified a number of legitimate concerns surrounding 
the absence of programme outcome information, to some extent this appears to be a 
‘horse and cart’ argument.  The data will not appear by itself, nor will concerns be 
                                                 
64 In one external study, managers (including but not limited to executives) in focus groups noted that 
there are barriers to performance measurement in areas where measures are less meaningful, or 
where the results of programme investments may emerge slowly (Treasury Board of Canada, 
2003e). 
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addressed in an abstract setting.  Rather consensus on outcome and measurement 
issues will emerge only in response to the executives’ initial demand for timely results 
information.   
7.3.2 Managerial Flexibility and the Logic Model Concept 
In creating Public Value through sound programme management at the Outcome, as 
well as at the Service and Trust levels, a degree of managerial flexibility must be 
present.   This section will discuss executives’ perceptions on the level of flexibility 
inherent in the current (2004) management culture.   
 
As noted earlier in Section 4.9, after approximately the first 15 to 20 interviews, in 
order to assist executives in defining and explaining how they ‘operationalise’ 
Results-based Management, the Logic Model reproduced as Figure 15, below, was 
developed.  The Logic Model concept was and remains (as of 2005) a key tool in 
advancing Results-based Management65.  The interviews confirmed that all 
executives were familiar with this concept.  
 
This model was discussed at the end of the remaining 60 interviews.   There was 
widespread, and frankly enthusiastic, acknowledgement of the potential for this model 
to explain the current culture and environment as executives engaged in Results-based 
Management.  Each component of this model will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
 
                                                 
65 For example, a programme logic model is require in all funding submissions to TBS (Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2002a). 
  Page 270 
Figure 15: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management 
Logic Model Approach
BUT
Inputs Processes Outputs Outcomes
Managerial
Flexibility?Bureaucratic ConstrainedFixed
BUT BUT BUT
 
7.3.2.1 Input Levels 
Within the context of this model, two general themes emerged in the interviews 
linking inputs and Results-based Management - those relating to resource levels 
themselves, and those concerned with the management of resources. 
 
Without delving into the complexity of Canadian government budget allocations, it is 
sufficient for the purpose of this research to state that most programmes automatically 
receive an annual funding allocation, typically adjusted for inflationary pressures66 
(Perrin, 2003).  At the department and branch levels, some internal flexibility does 
exist to meet changing programme demand levels, both nationally and regionally.   
However, executives considered the concept of fixed budgets realistic for most 
programmes, and confirmed that these resource levels directly impact the level of 
services possible, regardless of programme demand. 
 
Addressing the management of resources, executives noted that the requirement for 
sound management of resources is not new.  Executives were also acutely aware of 
the importance of maintaining public and Parliament’s confidence to avoid budget 
reductions and programme termination.  However, the regional perspective was 
                                                 
66 A minority of programmes provide mandatory benefits to all entitled clients (e.g. Canadian 
Unemployment Insurance).  For these, the enabling legislation specifies that sufficient funds must 
be available and cannot be limited by budget pressures. 
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typically that this was principally an Ottawa issue, not a regional one.  To the extent 
that it resonated personally for executives, it was mostly from a negative perspective; 
the requirement to avoid fraud, political scandals, criticism by the Auditor General, 
etc. 
7.3.2.2 ‘Red-Taped’ Processes 
Executives agreed that a well run bureaucracy must support key principles of probity, 
consistency, accountability and equity.  This was also supported in the literature 
(Savoie, 1994; Weber, 1997).  Interviewees also noted that bureaucracy remains a 
cornerstone of an effective public service management.  However, at least from the 
perspective of executives interviewed, the current level of forms, approvals, rules and 
regulations, and documentation (collectively referred to as ‘red tape’) were considered 
to be excessive, serving principally to demonstrate compliance with various 
administrative rules and requirements.  All executives acknowledged the importance 
of controls, including their link to public trust.  However, interviewees noted that 
these controls, imposed by Parliament, central-agencies and departments, have 
increased over the last five years, which was perceived as contrary to the objectives of 
RBM. 
 
Interviewed executives suggested that excessive bureaucracy generates several key 
organizational problems including: 
 consuming large amounts of staff and management resources which are then 
unavailable for programme management and delivery 
 reducing managerial flexibility to address unique situations, forcing a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach 
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 increasing staff frustration due to the slowness of the process and level of 
paperwork required 
 declining staff, including executives’, morale, generated by a perceived lack of 
trust in public servants. 
As well, many executives considered there to be a conflict between the insistence on 
fairness, transparency and accountability and the demand for timeliness and 
responsiveness. 
 
These findings have been confirmed in other research on the Canadian public sector.  
For example, the 2002 Public Sector Employee Survey reported that fully one third of 
executives indicate that their work suffers because of too many approval stages 
(Treasury Board of Canada, 2002b:Question 12C).   It was noted that senior 
executives were less critical, although this may reflect the lesser impact of increased 
accountability on them67. 
 
Finally, executives reported that the message received through several recent public 
sector and political scandals was clear; when failing to follow internal processes, the 
outputs and outcomes achieved can easily become irrelevant.   
7.3.2.3 Outputs and Legislation  
It can be argued that the bureaucratic culture requires that executives remain within 
legislative/regulatory authority, even when evidence exists that other approaches 
outside the legislative authority could be beneficial to outcomes.  However, legislative 
                                                 
67 The Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) level often provides the accountability by verifying or ‘sign-
off’.  For an ADM this is a minor administrative procedure, one of literally dozens of forms and 
documents they sign-off each day.  Informally, ADMs indicated that they trust their staff, as they do 
not have the personal time or resources to cross-check every transaction.  For the sub-ordinate 
executive each layer of sign-off leads to increased delays, frustration, a perceived loss of trust, etc.  
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and regulatory68 limitations were generally acknowledged as a relatively minor 
limitation to Results-based Management and Public Value creation for most 
programmes.   
In many cases, programme demand consistently exceeds resource limits or supply; 
this was especially prevalent within the Health Case Study.  The failure to link 
resources to achievable outputs was considered by many executives to be a major 
stumbling block in meaningful Results-based Management, including accountability 
for outcomes.    
7.3.2.4 Outcomes 
In each case study, executives argued that outcomes, the final quadrant of this RBM 
Logic Model, are at least partially a function of:  
 Relatively fixed budgets - (government) is a lot more about achieving the best 
outcomes possible with a fixed budget than about setting the desired outcomes 
and determining the budget necessary to achieve them (respondent: SE-2) 
 Significant administrative restrictions - human resource and contracting 
regulations were most frequently noted in the interviews as impacting 
programme delivery 
 Certain legislative/regulatory limitations.   
 
Furthermore, executives consistently suggested that the capacity and authority to 
adjust, adapt and target programme resources, process and outputs had been reduced 
over the previous five years, noting a tendency for greater centralization and increased 
accountability, including micro-accountability.  This increased ‘micro-accountability’ 
                                                 
68 The modification of legislation requires Parliamentary action, while regulatory changes can be 
approved within the bureaucracy, which is a much simpler process. 
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was broadly seen as reducing programme flexibility and equity.  However, executives 
were equally clear that these limitations and constraints in no way reduced the 
importance, within all aspects of this Logic Model, of sound management practices 
and principles.   
 
There were similar comments regarding executive accountability for programme 
outcomes.  Without latitude for decision-making with reasonable potential to 
influence outcomes, accountability for outcomes was perceived to be simply a farce. 
 
For certain programmes, including many of the health programmes, a subset of 
executives interviewed found that the clarity of programme objectives or desired 
results were weak.  In expanding on this thought, executives suggested that 
Parliamentarians desired results that were artificially high and not connected to 
resource levels, that the presence of multiple stakeholders and/or partners was not 
fully recognized, and that a tendency to see individual programmes in isolation rather 
than as part of a collective whole in achieving outcomes was a problem.  In addition, 
for a minority of programmes, potentially conflicting objectives were not prioritized. 
7.3.2.5 Summary, the RBM Logic Model 
In summary, this logic model was widely approved by executives interviewed. It 
successfully captured a key executive perception that meaningful management and 
accountability for results can only be achieved when coupled with sufficient 
managerial flexibility to impact the results achieved.  I think that over my career, 
there has always been this tension and trade-off between ‘let the manager manage’ 
and the desire for centralized control – sometimes this pendulum moved one way, 
sometimes the other…(respondent: HC-3).  This empirically confirms a key research 
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finding in response to the question of other impacts for Results-based Management.  
Notably, a recent USA study reached similar conclusions (Moynihan, 2005). 
 
Secondly, for certain programmes, a disconnection between desired outcomes and 
resource levels was noted; You know, sometimes there is a tendency to forget that 
delivering (this programme) takes money, cold hard cash.  We can do a great job 
managing and delivering… but the budget sets the absolute limit of how much we can 
deliver – and it is certainly beyond my scope of decisions (respondent: HC-13).   
While not widespread, executives did identify a number of cases where sufficient 
resources were not present to meet the official programme targets permitting at best, 
attainment of a lower level of achievement and potentially leading to other 
predictable, but dysfunctional behaviour. 
7.3.3 Summary, Public Value Outcomes  
Summarizing Section 7.3, executives acknowledged that Public Value Outcomes are 
linked to RBM.  Interviewees believed that actively managing for results, which itself 
requires some degree of managerial flexibility to be meaningful, has the potential to 
improve programme performance.   As a minor aside, the use of the Logic Model 
proved to be an excellent communication tool in discussing these concepts with 
executives.  This section has also identified several significant constraints in 
operationalizing RBM.  The research concludes that Public Value Outcomes does 
assist in understanding the limited progress in implementation of Results-based 
Management. 
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7.4 Public Value Trust and RBM 
Public Value theory suggests that Trust is at the centre of the citizen-state 
relationship, giving legitimacy to government programmes and actions (Moore, 
1995).   While it would be an oversimplification to speak of trust as a measurable, 
concrete entity (Bhattacharya et al., 1998), Kelly et al. (2002) suggest that Public 
Value is increased through a higher level of trust between citizens and government.  
However, this research suggests that Public Value Trust is not well linked to Results-
based Management, at least within the perceptions and actions of those executive 
interviewed.   
 
Two themes emerged during the research analysis regarding public trust: trust 
associated with a programme or group of programmes; and overall trust in 
government.  While executives acknowledged the importance of maintaining public 
trust in ‘their’ programme, typically they did not comment on how their programme 
contributed to the larger picture of Canadians’ overall trust in the public sector.  The 
exception was the potential for decreasing public trust through unethical or illegal 
actions. 
 
Executive’s trust in their superiors and parliamentarians was found to be somewhat 
limited in a number of the interviews.  While far from universal, this distrust emerged 
more frequently in regional interviews, where increased centralization was seen to be 
in conflict with RBM’s requirement for greater managerial flexibility.  In addition, 
internal trust was also clearly adversely affected by a series of scandals (all 
headquarters based) in the early 2000s, widely reported in the public media.  As the 
literature notes (Good, 2004b), central agencies and Parliament have tended to react to 
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these scandals by imposing greater control.  In addition to the direct loss of autonomy, 
a number of executives interviewed expressed a sense or feeling that they are no 
longer trusted.  You would almost think that I was willing to risk my career by 
[awarding a contract improperly] in exchange for a ticket to a hockey game or a free 
meal… (Respondent: HC-18).  
 
Returning to the discussion of trust at a programme level, two further sub-themes 
emerged from the analysis.  The first was under the broad heading of accountability 
and reporting, and the second related to programme client and stakeholder interaction. 
7.4.1 Programme Accountability and Reporting 
Executives interviewed suggested that public trust could be enhanced through 
increased, meaningful reporting at the public level.  However, in addition to 
addressing difficulties in measuring resources, outputs, and outcomes, executives 
noted that results reporting must also overcome a risk-adverse and error-free 
government culture.  These findings were  confirmed in recent literature (Johnsen, 
2005).  Similarly, one recent internal study reported that “the overall perception was 
that departments are averse to risk and that managers who take risks are not 
rewarded” (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003e:2).   
 
Executives were aware of the limited value of (then) current reporting levels, and 
confirmed CCAF-FCVI (2002) findings related to the importance of accurate, useful 
and valid public reporting, (included earlier as Figure 8).  Improved reporting was 
perceived by interviewees to have the potential to increase public trust.  However, this 
issue was consistently seen to be a headquarters’ problem, not a regional one. 
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As could be predicted, the research did note differences in executives’ focus on 
reporting between headquarters and regions.  At the regional level, executives were 
typically focused on programme delivery, with reporting considered a minor issue, 
and very limited external reporting being found.  Headquarters staff were widely 
acknowledged as having the lead in departmental reporting to central agencies and 
annual reporting to Parliament.  Senior Executives interviewed spoke of differences 
between reporting to Central Agencies and Parliament and reporting to the general 
public.  
 
Considering accountability, it could be argued that Results-based Management’s 
increased emphasize on outcomes has expanded executives’ programme 
accountability.  For the individual executive, formal accountability is typically 
defined in their annual performance appraisal process.  However, given the multitude 
of stakeholders common to most public sector programmes, enhanced accountability 
for outcomes must be tied to team and stakeholder effort, which may involve other 
levels of government, stakeholders, and external partners (Marsden, 2003).  These 
accountabilities, interviewed executives suggested, should include relationship 
building, team processes and the ability to work together, all of which are very 
difficult areas to quantify and objectively measure.  Furthermore, the research 
interviews identified a relative lack of consequences for results – for either poor or 
high performance – at programme or personal levels.   
 
Finally, one interesting conclusion, empirically demonstrated in these interviews, was 
that executives were not at all reluctant to accept increased accountability for results, 
as long as a corresponding degree of flexibility was also present. 
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7.4.2 Citizen/Client Feedback – a Curious Absence 
It is argued that both Results-based Management and Public Value creation inherently 
require information gathered directly from clients, stakeholders, and/or citizens in 
assessing programme service delivery, output and outcomes.  This is supported in the 
literature (Moore, 1995; Benington, 2005).  However, at least at the executive level, 
this information was conspicuous by its absence. 
 
The research revealed an almost complete absence of client satisfaction data or client 
surveys, systematic feedback instruments, focus groups, or other structured sources of 
client/stakeholder programme assessment.  This was true regardless of executive 
function or level, regional, headquarters or corporate. The research conclusion is that 
public sector implementation of Results-based Management has failed to generate 
dialogue with these client groups.  Similar findings were noted in another external 
study, where participants noted a fundamental lack of measurement and therefore 
information regarding clients’ expectations, needs, performance indicators, or client 
data in general (Treasury Board of Canada, 2003e).   
 
Explanations offered by executives included that citizens/clients are insufficiently 
informed to reach sound conclusions regarding service quality.  Citizens cannot see 
the big picture (respondent: HC-25).  While other executives suggested that they are 
constrained in their ability to react to client feedback.  Why raise expectations 
needlessly? (respondent: HC-28).  However, further discussion confirmed that 
executives did have some flexibility, so this possibility was moot.  A number of 
executives noted that results of client surveys are accessible to the public and media 
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under the Access to Information Law of Canada, and could be potential sources of 
political embarrassment or conflict69.  
 
In summary, this research concluded that client feedback was generally absent, and 
therefore not a current source of managerial information for Results-based 
Management.  The interviews confirmed that this finding can also be extended to 
other external information sources on programme performance including applied 
research, external reports, and programme evaluations.  The latter appears to be used 
primarily for accountability, with limited use in managing70.   
7.4.3 Summary of Public Value Trust 
Reviewing the contribution of Section 7.4 Trust in understanding the limited progress 
in implementing RBM, the research finds that Trust, in general, made a smaller 
contribution than Service or Outcomes in understanding implementation of Results-
based Management.  Similarly, the interviews confirmed that limited attention, in 
terms of executives’ time, was focused on trust issues.  When asked directly, 
executives typically would report activities which centred on ‘Value and Ethics’ 
programmes required by the headquarters and central agencies71.   
 
For executives at the lower and mid-levels, what did not emerge from the research 
data was a sense of personal commitment to increased public trust in government.  
Rather, to the extent that overall public trust resonated with executives, they generally 
                                                 
69 Under the Canadian federal Access to Information Act, performance information would be subject to 
release upon request, regardless of the quality of the data, results achieved and/or political 
desirability of release. 
70 The latter point is somewhat contrary to the relevant section of the Evaluation Policy (Treasury 
Board of Canada, 2001a). 
71 A number of cynical comments regarding mandatory retraining for every manager (including 
executives) as the central agency response to one scandal were noted in the interviews. 
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perceived it as externally generated, the result of others actions, influenced greatly by 
media, politicians, and headquarters.  They saw themselves with little or no ability to 
influence public trust, at least positively.  Further analysis suggested that the most 
senior level of executives did not share this view and demonstrated improved 
understanding of this admittedly complex area of public sector management.    
 
At the same time, in interpreting this data, executives interviewed appeared to posses 
a high degree of personal integrity.  As will be discussed further in Section 7.7.2, 
executives spoke eloquently and at some length of their ‘calling to public service’ and 
the personal values that they bring to their jobs.  To some extent, Trust, within a 
Public Value context, did not resonate with executives because they already see 
themselves as stewards of public trust, and furthermore they see these as principally 
intrinsic values that are difficult to change.  You either are trustworthy or you’re not.  
Really, how can you develop a programme to make someone more trustworthy? 
(respondent: SE-3). 
 
From a completely different perspective, that of internal trust, analysis revealed a 
degree of mistrust over the potential use of results information, both internally and at 
the political level.  Similar concerns over client feedback information were also noted.  
As well, and again as noted earlier, executives interviewed expressed concern over 
increased personal accountability for results without sufficient managerial flexibility 
to influence results, but they also expressed a willingness to accept greater 
accountability if linked to greater flexibility.   
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7.5 Summarizing Public Value’s Contribution to 
Understanding RBM 
Having discussed the role of the individual elements, this section will consider the 
overall contribution of Public Value theory in understanding the limited progress 
noted in implementing RBM.  What has been learned? 
 
At the macro level, the research concluded that, within the perception of those 
executive interviewed, creation of public value is a key overall objective of public 
sector programmes.  For clarity, it should be noted that interviewees were not asked 
directly for their perceptions of Public Value theory as Key Stakeholder interviews 
confirmed that ‘Public Value’ was not part of the Canadian public sector lexicon.  
Rather, this research conclusion is based on interpretation and analysis of the data. 
 
Engaging the lens of Public Value theory to increase understanding of RBM, the 
research concluded that the Service, Outcome and Trust components did not have 
equal weight in creating Public Value.  As noted in the preceding sections, Service 
and Outcomes were perceived by executives interviewed as having stronger links to 
RBM, while Trust was weaker.  Each is summarized below. 
 
Service, and the sound management of programme delivery, has a long history within 
the public sector.  Executives interviewed agreed that without sound management of 
programme resources, process and outputs based on key public sector values of 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity, outcomes frequently become 
irrelevant.  These values are central to achieving and maintaining public value.  While 
a number of concerns regarding the measurement of services were advanced, and 
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client feedback was notable by its absence, Service was seen as central in 
understanding implementation issues for RBM. 
 
Similarly, Outcome was acknowledged as clearly linked to RBM implementation.  
Interviewees believed that actively managing for results, which itself requires some 
degree of managerial flexibility to be meaningful, has the potential to improve 
programme performance.  A number of constraints were identified.  However, 
executives did believe that outcomes have, and will continue to grow in, importance 
(further discussed in Section 7.9).  The research concludes that Public Value 
Outcomes assists in understanding the limited progress in implementation of Results-
based Management. 
 
Finally, Trust had limited executive attention.  Executives interviewed could rarely 
articulate what they actually did to influence public trust, saw themselves principally 
as stewards of public trust in a passive, not an active role, and expressed some 
limitations of their own trust of senior executives or Parliament.  Trust, for executives, 
had a relatively limited application that focused primarily on public accountability, 
reporting and the absence of scandals. 
 
Figure 16, below provides a visual depiction of these findings.   
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Figure 16: A Conceptual Map of RBM Constraints, Using Public Value Theory 
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From a different perspective, Figure 16 could also be considered a conceptual map of 
the failings of RBM, or RBM implementation, as examined through the lens of Public 
Value theory.  Thus, RBM (in 2004) in the Canadian federal government has been 
relatively successful in terms of managing Service results, has struggled to address 
outcome measurement issues and increase managerial flexibility to manage for 
results, and, while acknowledging the cultural contribution of Value and Ethics 
programmes, has made little progress in increasing executive attention on Trust.  As 
such, Figure 16 is argued to be a significant analytical and empirical contribution of 
this research. 
 
Having considered Public Value theory and concluded that while it does assist in 
understanding many aspects of Results-based Management, it was apparent that 
certain limitations to RBM implementation had been identified which, it is argued, do 
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not fall within the explanatory power of Public Value theory.  Specifically, these 
limitations are programme executive compensation, motivation, and information 
sources, each of which will be addressed in Section 7.7.  Prior to the aforementioned 
discussion, the thesis will first consider the contribution of other management theories 
in understanding Results-based Management implementation in the following section. 
 
7.6 Assessing the Contribution of Other Management 
Theories 
As introduced in Section 2.3.3 of the Literature Review, this section will explore the 
contribution of other managerial theories including Principal/Agent, Public Choice 
and Strategic Triangle theories in understanding RBM implementation. 
7.6.1 Principal/Agent  
Recall that Principal/Agent theory addresses the potential for conflicting goals and 
objectives of public servants (as agents) and politicians (as principals) (Box, 
1999:23).  At one level, the research interviews suggested that the complexities of 
Principal/Agent theory do not over-ride the apparent compatibility of the long-term 
objectives of both the principals and the agents, which is to make a difference for 
Canadians.  Executives, perhaps by nature of their position in the organization, are 
fully cognizant of the need for public accountability and probity in achieving 
consistent service for clients.  However, as both case studies noted, there is a 
significant level of frustration by what is widely seen as an overly burdensome level 
of administrative control and micro-managing, a ‘red-tape’ approach to 
accountability.   
 
  Page 286 
Academic and practitioner literature document the relative imbalance of power 
predicted by Principal/Agent theory.  Within the federal government, when added to 
the significant difficulty of principals, or their representatives (especially the Office of 
the Auditor General) to monitor and understand complex national programme72 
activities, outputs, and outcomes (Auditor General of Canada, 2002b; Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2003e), it would appear that practitioners (agents) have a distinct 
advantage (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005).  This was indirectly confirmed in interviews, 
where executives suggested that their own personal values and ethics were paramount 
in maintaining programme integrity; there’s always some way to get around the 
rules…    
 
Examining Results-based Management from the perspective of increasing internal 
control will, interviewed executives suggest, be resisted when not partnered with 
sufficient managerial flexibility, the opportunity to participate in defining goals and 
targets, and removal of excessive administrative controls.   
 
In summary, Principal - Agent theory confirms the research findings related to vague 
and conflicting programme objectives, the greater tendency of regional executives to 
be client-focused, and the costs of monitoring agents; all of which are sources of 
resistance to implementing Results-based Management. 
7.6.2 Public Choice Theory 
Public Choice Theory applies the economic principles of self-interested individuals 
and the marketplace to individuals’ actions in collective decision making (Kaboolian, 
                                                 
72 For example, the evaluation of one (of 30) major programmes noted in the Health Case study 
required over one year and in excess of $ 1 million (Can $)  to complete. 
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1998).  In the marketplace, although most people base some of their actions on 
concern for others, the dominant motive; whether they are employers, employees, or 
consumers, is a concern for themselves.  Public choice economists make the same 
assumption - that although people acting in the political marketplace have some 
concern for others, their main motive, whether they are voters, politicians, lobbyists, 
or bureaucrats, is self-interest (Whiteside, 2005).  
 
For the purposes of this research, it could be argued that Results-based Management’s 
demonstration of results supports stable or increased budgets.  Even a failure to 
achieve results, if they could be tied to insufficient budgets, may generate political 
pressure to increase budgets.  However, as the research reveals a rather limited take-
up of Results-based Management, this remains a relatively theoretical discussion, 
although an interesting area for future research. 
 
Secondly, Public Choice’s focus on self-interested individuals is not supported by the 
research findings, in which executives claim to be strongly motivated by public 
service.  Given that financial self-interest would be better served through private 
sector employment, where higher financial rewards were available (Strong, 1998), no 
evidence was found that would link Public Choice theory with increased personal 
power or promotions through Results-based Management.    
 
In summary, Public Choice Theory does not contribute to an improved understanding 
of Results-based Management. 
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7.6.3 Moore’s Strategic Triangle 
Having confirmed the role of Public Value theory to Results-based Management and 
identified a number of constraints not covered by this theory, the research almost 
naturally considered the role of Moore’s Strategic Triangle.  As noted in Figure 1, 
repeated below as Figure 17, Public Value is one third of the Strategic Triangle, the 
others parts being Organizational Capability, and Legitimacy and Political 
Sustainability (Moore, 1995).  The contribution from each will be discussed in turn.   
 
Figure 17: Moore’s Public Sector Strategic Triangle and Public Value Model  
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7.6.3.1 Operationally and Administratively Feasible 
The research interviews included many references to the organization’s capacity in 
discussing the feasibility of RBM.  Executives suggested that Public Value Service 
and Outcome, and to a lesser extent Trust, must be linked to adequate resource levels, 
employee skills and training, and data collection systems to implement and support 
RBM.  These aspects and linkages were generally perceived to be weak at the time of 
the interviews.  
 
  Page 289 
Executives were specifically questioned (Interview Guide, Question 6) on 
organizational support for Results-based Management: policies, tools, frameworks, 
training.  Many respondents, especially regional ones, found organizational support to 
be insufficient or of limited value.  Similarly, the majority of executives indicated that 
corporate information systems were at best user-unfriendly and offered limited value 
in engaging in Results-based Management.  In summary, concerns were frequently 
expressed over the organization’s current capacity to embrace Results-based 
Management more fully. 
 
It was noteworthy that executives, especially in the Health Case study, expressed 
concern over the availability of employees skilled in data collection and analysis, 
including trained epidemiologists.  As these skills are normally acquired through 
university degrees and/or professional training, the ability to address this gap through 
internal training was limited.  As well, these skills were perceived to be in high 
demand by other employers.  
7.6.3.2 Legitimacy and Political Sustainable 
The research interviews contained numerous comments relating to Legitimacy and 
Political Sustainability.   In fact, it was a rare interview that did not touch on these 
points at some point during the discussion.  All executives were aware of the 
importance of maintaining programme legitimacy, including the requirement to 
manage programmes and risks at the political level.  During the interviews, these 
tasks were frequently perceived as a joint responsibility of clients, stakeholders and 
public servants, in demonstrating both need and results achieved.  However, this 
concern was often expressed in negative terms (avoid scandal), rather than positive 
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(demonstrate success).  The research suggests that this reflects a failure to recognize 
or operationalise this potential benefit of Results-based Management. 
 
In summary, the research findings support the argument that the understanding of 
limitations and implementation issues surrounding Results-based Management is 
increased when Public Value Theory’s parent theory, the Strategic Triangle (Moore, 
1995) is included.  
 
7.7 Other Factors Impacting Executive Adaptation of RBM 
Are there other factors that influence the adaptation of Results-based Management?  
This was the fourth research sub-topic.  In analysing the research data, two other 
themes emerged.  The first considered executives’ intrinsic motivation and reward 
systems, as they relate to Results-based Management, and the second detailed a 
discussion of executive information sources and accountability issues.   
 
These issues represent emergent research findings developed during the course of the 
case studies, as supported by the literature on case study research (Yin, 2003b) and 
reported in Sections 4.8 and 5.10.   
7.7.1 Executive Pay and Rewards 
As discussed, the research noted an apparent disconnection between the perceived 
value of Results-based Management and the limited progress in its implementation.  
In exploring the potential role of performance pay, the thesis will present the 
performance pay issue first, followed by general motivation, which mirrors the 
manner in which the research itself evolved.   
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When asked about their performance pay, executives consistently expressed general, 
and in many cases increasing, dissatisfaction; There is almost a fundamental 
disconnect between why I became a public servant and the idea of performance pay 
(respondent: HC-19).  Each case study confirmed that performance pay was not an 
economic motivator, nor did it generate public recognition.  As noted, the perceived 
introduction of quotas has increased executive dissatisfaction with performance pay; 
You know in this [area] we have ten or eleven ‘seasoned’ executives, each with half a 
dozen years in their current job.  Just how do we identify someone who is not 
performing to meet our new guidelines? It even begs the question why we have not 
done something by now about this ‘problem’ (laughs) (respondent: SC-27).   
 
The degree of consistency of executive dissatisfaction with performance pay suggests 
that either performance pay is not appropriate for the public sector, or that its 
implementation is fundamentally flawed within the Canadian federal government.   
These findings were broadly supported in the practitioner (Boyle, 2001) and academic 
literature (Kohn, 1993).  As well, a recent internal survey (Appendix F) revealed only 
50 per cent of public sector respondents believed that the function of management 
was valued within their work environment, and only 29 per cent agreed that 
management and performance were tied to rewards and recognition (Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2002b).   
 
On a positive note, executives did report that the introduction of performance pay has 
brought a much higher level of rigor to the performance appraisal process.  In addition 
to, in some cases, greatly improved feedback, the link to financial rules (related to 
budgets and timing of bonus payments) was strongly perceived to assist in completion 
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of the appraisal process in a timely manner.   Executives consistently valued this 
increased feedback and expressed satisfaction in receiving formal, written 
assessments of their performance; There is a real motivational value in hearing 
formally that I have done a good job (respondent: SC-7).  Interestingly, these 
improvements were also reported as improving the practice of employee appraisals in 
general, including employees not eligible for performance bonuses. 
 
Satisfaction with performance pay does increase with rank.  It is argued that two 
drivers of this phenomenon are that the higher levels of management have greater 
control and autonomy in achieving results; As you ‘climb the ranks’, your 
discretionary authority certainly increases (respondent: SE-2).  Secondly, Directors 
and Director General levels (classified EX-1 to 3) receive a maximum bonus of 10 per 
cent and a reported system-wide average of 7 per cent, while Assistant Deputy 
Ministers receive a maximum of 15 per cent (Deputy Ministers can receive up to 25 
per cent).  The literature broadly suggests that a potential bonus of 10 per cent of base 
salary is required to have an impact (Kohn, 1993; OECD, 1997).  This is the 
maximum allowed for the EX 1 to 3 levels under the current system, received by only 
17 per cent of executives during the most recent appraisal cycle (Treasury Board of 
Canada, 2004).   
 
The research concludes that performance pay, at least as it is currently practiced73, 
does a poor job of supporting Results-based Management. 
                                                 
73 Given the consistency of this general dissatisfaction with performance pay, additional research was 
undertaken to better understand the internal drivers underlying performance pay, locate supporting 
material (academic or practitioner), and to examine evaluations of its effectiveness.  Within this sub-
research stream, interviews were conducted with members of the Advisory Committee of Executive 
Retention and Compensation (which recommended the current version of executive performance 
pay), TBS employees responsible for policies and overall monitoring, and representatives from the 
  Page 293 
7.7.2 Executive Motivation 
Given the current dissatisfaction with performance pay, the research sought an 
explanation of executives’ higher-order motivation.  Within approximately the first 20 
interviews, the question, ‘Why do you work for the federal government?’ was added 
to the end of the Interview Guide.  The result was absolutely consistent.  To make a 
difference.  Executives, surprisingly often, revealed a personal calling to public 
service and stated this as a core value underlying their passion for their jobs.    
 
In this thesis, I argue that achievement of programme outputs, even when 
accomplished in an economical, efficient and effective manner, have a limited (at 
best) effect on this intrinsic motivation; programme outcomes are what matters.  This, 
it is suggested, contributes to understanding the disconnect between executives’ 
general support for RBM coupled with their limited progress in implementing RBM.   
 
Interpreting the discussions, analysis suggested that executives were also motivated 
by personal values of accountability to Canadians74, as well as programme clients.  
Although in the interviews accountability was often positioned in official, hierarchical 
terms, it was apparent that a personal sense or duty of stewardship existed.  
Executives consistently agreed that RBM was a useful tool in discharging this 
accountability to Canadians, including official accountability. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Association of Professional Executives (APEX).  During the course of these interviews and internal 
document review, no additional practitioner or academic research, related material, or evaluations 
were identified.  This suggests that this is an under-researched area.  Currently, (as of 2006), a 
national survey is underway to further explore this subject by the researcher and APEX. 
 
74 Although all executives acknowledged that their primary, official accountability was to Parliament, 
this was clearly not a motivational driver.  Rather, motivation was linked to citizen accountability. 
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In summary, this research argues that a natural link between the attainment of results 
and executive’s desire to ‘make a difference’ exists.   
7.7.3 Executive Information Sources 
As noted in the literature (Mintzberg and Bourgault, 2000), this research confirmed 
that public sector executives do not make extensive use of formal or structured 
information in managing.  Such information typically serves an accountability and 
reporting function.  Day-to-day management is accomplished primarily through 
verbal and informal information, with estimates ranging from 50 per cent to 90 per 
cent of executives’ time, increasing with more senior positions.  Interestingly, these 
findings were consistent across regional, headquarters and corporate level executives. 
 
Within their admittedly limited use of programme data or information noted by 
executives interviewed, information sources identified in the interviews were 
considered through the lens of Public Value theory.  (Note that executive awareness 
of information sources would not necessarily translate into their use of such 
information.)  In summarising this analysis, executives identified numerous Service 
level information sources, but (excluding client feedback), have only a limited 
awareness of Outcome information sources, and few Trust information sources.  It is 
argued that these findings support the research findings noted in 7.5.  For comparison, 
it could be argued that these findings are easily mapped onto Figure 16, as follows. 
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Figure 18: Information Sources and Public Value Theory 
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While partially external to the primary research question, this does beg the question of 
the utility of Performance Management systems in increasing executives’ capacity to 
manage, as it can be argued that the heart of Results-based Management is improved 
management, not simply increased accountability (Hatry et al., 2003; Treasury Board 
of Canada, 2003a).  Given that performance management systems have matured, the 
greatest obstacles to the integration of measurement and management are now human 
and cultural, not analytical and technical (Thomas, 2005:16).  
 
Interpreting the research findings, one is struck, not by inherent structure limitations 
and obstacles in acquiring outcome information, although for many programmes this 
would not be a simple task, but rather by a risk-adverse culture, heavily influenced by 
political realities, coupled with a perceived lack of benefits in adopting RBM.  
Nevertheless, without the availability of timely and ‘user-friendly’ performance and 
results information, it is difficult to conceptualize how RBM can be integrated into 
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managerial or accountability functions, even when acknowledging the cultural 
impediments to its use. 
7.7.4 Accountability, Results-based Management and Public Value 
This research has focused on Results-based Management as a management tool or 
philosophy in actively managing for results and the contribution of Public Value in 
understanding implementation limitations.  Briefly considering the link to 
accountability, executives agreed that they could, at least conceptually, be held 
accountable for their contribution towards increased public value in each of the 
Service, Outcome and Trust elements.  At the same time, executives indicated that 
objective measurement would often be difficult, if not impossible.   
 
There was a general consensus that results-based accountability frameworks have 
lagged behind RBM implementation efforts.  Senior Executive interviews noted that a 
mature accountability framework would have the capacity to address the various 
external issues identified by this research in implementing Results-based 
Management: attribution and causality, managerial flexibility, and measurement 
issues.  Political issues were often mentioned too.  There is a dichotomy in public 
service – we would be a lot more willing to increase accountability and transparency 
to the average Canadian, if we could only bypass the political dangers involved 
(respondent: SE-32).  Executives also noted the absence of links between budgets and 
results, both for solid programme results, as well as for weak performers.  This link 
was seen as inherently difficult, requiring political leadership, but would support the 
implementation of Results-based Management significantly.  
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Senior Executive interviewees did indicate that changes in accountability instruments 
were forthcoming to better address these issues, arguably reflecting their enhanced 
access to emerging policies. 
 
In summary, RBM, in addition to its call to actively ‘manage’ for results, could serve 
to document and demonstrate accountability for the Public Value, Services and 
Outcomes achieved.   
 
7.8 Additional Analysis of Interview Data 
In attempting to maximize the overall utility of this research data, additional analysis 
was undertaken.  In conducting this aspect of the research, the seventy-nine interviews 
were repeatedly combined and re-grouped into new categories, specifically: 
headquarters/regional, corporate, gender-based, and by length of service.   
 
Especially relevant in interpreting and understanding the following findings, it should 
be noted that Canadian federal government executives are a fairly homogeneous 
group.  This can be traced to a number of underlying causes including: 
 All executives are hired and promoted by the Public Service Commission, not 
individual departments75, and must demonstrate a series of core competencies 
 Executives are corporately ‘owned,’ and are not employees of a department 
 Relatively few executives are hired from outside the public sector.  Thus, most 
have been exposed to an extensive socialization process while ‘moving up the 
ranks’ 
                                                 
75 Since 2004, the time of these interviews, this policy has changed. 
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 There is fairly extensive executive training, consistent corporate management, 
horizontal activity and communications (management retreats, etc.) which 
increase with executive rank. 
By regrouping interviews into these categories, location (region or headquarters), type 
of work (programme, policy or corporate), and executive level were masked or 
distributed across the new categories.  These were the categories that the research 
design predicted were most relevant to this research, and an underlying driver of case 
study selection.   
 
While, the comparison of regional and headquarters interviews lead to somewhat 
predictable findings, which are reported below in Section 7.8.1, the additional 
research did not lead to any new or additional findings, although, it might be argued 
that the absence of differences is itself an interesting finding.  The underlying method 
considerations for this aspect of the research were discussed in Section 3.7.4. and the 
analysis methods were identical to those used in the case studies. 
7.8.1 Analysis of Regional/Headquarters Differences 
It can be argued that differences between headquarters and regions could be expected 
to occur.  To some extent this is inherent in the differing nature of the work, with 
regions focused on programme delivery and headquarters focused on national 
programme management, accountability and reporting.  This logic is supported in the 
literature (Carroll and Siegel, 1999). 
 
However, it is questionable whether any observed differences noted in this 
supplemental analysis can be attributed to regional/headquarters differences.  As 
noted, one of the key purposes of the Health case study was to study a national 
  Page 299 
program, including regional/headquarters differences.  These findings were presented 
in Chapter 5.  In combining interview data and re-grouping by headquarter/region 
location, what effectively resulted was that Saskatchewan Case study interviews were 
merged with ‘regional’ Health Case study interviews, and Senior Executives 
interviews combined with ‘headquarters’ health interviews.  Obviously, there were 
significant differences in the level of executives ‘added’ to the two datasets.   
 
Within these limitations, the research did find differences.  Regional executives, as 
expected, were much more aware of Service aspects of RBM and had a greater focus 
on meeting clients’ need.  A number of regional executives perceived RBM to be a 
headquarters or Ottawa-based initiative linked to accountability, with limited value to 
programme delivery or Outcomes.  Similarly, a failure to negotiate programme 
Outcomes was noted in a number of interviews.  In terms of RBM support, regional 
executives reported a lower degree of training, less expert ‘RBM’ implementation 
advice, and fewer opportunities to share government-wide experience in 
implementing RBM.   
 
Headquarters executives, especially senior executives, were more aware of Trust 
issues, probably reflecting their greater role in accountability and reporting.  A 
number of comments addressed RBM and national equity issues.  A much stronger 
political sensitivity reflects headquarters’ lead role in political and central agency 
interactions.  The analysis suggests that headquarter executives, in general, had a 
greater awareness of RBM’s potential in demonstrating ‘Value-for-Money’ to 
stakeholders and Parliamentarians. 
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It could be argued that RBM may have somewhat different meanings for these two 
groups, with headquarters perceiving RBM as principally an accountability and 
reporting instrument, and regions seeing it as an administrative requirement of 
limited, and somewhat questionable value in a programme delivery environment.  
Effectively, very few executives perceived its value as a day-to-day management tool 
in actively managing for results, and this view was not dependent on executive 
location (region verses headquarters).   Both groups agreed that RBM implementation 
must be driven from the departmental and Central Agency level, not the regions.  
 
However, it cannot be asserted that these findings reflect true regional/headquarters 
differences.  The argument can equally be made that these finding reflect different 
executive perspectives related to organizational position.  
7.8.2 Analysis of Corporate Executives 
Extracting and examining interview data with executives charged with ‘corporate’ 
functions revealed RBM implementation issues similar to those noted for 
programmes.  This included difficulties of establishing and measuring outcomes for 
corporate functions.  Corporate executives expressed a consistent opinion that the 
results that mattered were programme results, and they noted their supportive role in 
achieving those programme results.  Even within highly process-oriented corporate 
programmes, such as hiring or financial reporting, and where service level standards 
(SLS) had been established and agreed upon, analysis revealed that SLS served more 
of an accountability function, an objective standard to assess internal complaints and 
criticisms by.  Of interest, monitoring against service level standards was not a source 
of current results information for day-to-day management.   
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Similar to their programme colleagues, corporate executives did not monitor client 
satisfaction on a regular or ongoing basis.  Notwithstanding the occasional evaluation 
of corporate programmes, client satisfaction feedback was limited to informal 
comments at management meetings and specific operational complaints. 
 
While, as could be reasonably expected by their geographic location and cross-
programme functions, corporate executives did demonstrate a greater awareness of 
RBM concepts and principles.  Perhaps as a result of their corporate responsibility for 
accountability and reporting, corporate executives were also more cognizant of Trust 
issues.  Nevertheless, this group saw Results-based Management as principally an 
accountability instrument, not as a day-to-day management tool.  Of interest, within 
corporate functions, data is always readily available and could not be considered to be 
an issue.  In summary, based on the corporate executives interviewed, no greater 
progress of RBM implementation was observed or noted. 
7.8.3 Gender-based Analysis 
No differences attributable to gender were found.  Both males and females expressed 
a fairly consistent distribution of opinions and responses to the interview questions.  
This was considered to be normal, given the above noted homogeneous nature of 
executive employment.  Within each group, there appeared to be an equal diversity of 
assessments of the utility of RBM, ranging from enthusiastic to cynical.  No gender-
bias was apparent in the analysis. 
7.8.4 Analysis by Length of Service 
As could be reasonably predicted, executive employment requires a fairly extensive 
career path.  This takes time.  As Appendix A notes, only a handful of executives had 
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less than 10 years of public service76, and they were typically recruited in mid-career 
from outside of the public sector.  As well, again predictably, executive employment 
correlated to age and length of service, with only two of seventy nine interviewees 
under 40 years of age, and the majority over fifty years old.  (For details on 
demographic analysis, see Note on Demographic Data, end of Appendix A). 
 
Within the context of these research interviews, no additional findings could be 
attributed to length of service.   
 
One other demographic variable was initially considered, ‘length of service in their 
current position.’  However, initial analysis revealed that regional executives had 
longer service at their current positions than headquarters, which would bias any 
research findings along a regional/headquarters split.  This was broadly seen by 
regional executives to reflect reduced regional opportunities for promotion or transfer.  
If I was promoted, it would mean moving to Ottawa, and my family and I are not 
willing to relocate at this time in our lives (respondent: SC-23).  As such, it was not 
possible to draw additional conclusions related to length of service that were 
independent of regional/headquarters division.  
 
7.9 The Future of Results-based Management and 
Accountability 
At the conclusion of each interview, executives were asked for their impressions or 
predictions of the future of Results-based Management and accountability.  It can be 
                                                 
76 Interviewees were asked to include public service employment at any level of government (federal, 
provincial, or municipal), but to exclude NGO and private sector employment. 
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argued that these perceptions will reflect the overall priority executives will attach to 
these issues. 
 
Executives reported that they expect Results-based Management to grow in 
importance within the Canadian federal government.  While impediments must be 
overcome (You can’t go out and adopt a new philosophy [of management] and hold 
on the old one at the same time (respondent: HC-15)), executives generally perceived 
the value of RBM, Canadians deserve to know what results we are achieving with 
their tax dollars (respondent: SE-6).  Executives believe the federal government will 
continue to focus on programme outcomes; It so intuitive to Parliamentarians and 
Canadians that you cannot go back (respondent: SE-12). 
 
Executives also expect personal and programme accountability to expand in 
importance.  However, current levels of accountability, while broadly acknowledged 
as critical to public trust and value, were noted as high to excessive with a number of 
comments focused on ‘micro-accountability’ rather than output or outcome 
accountability.  Executives expressed a concerted desire for greater flexibility coupled 
with meaningful accountability for their choices.  
 
A summary of executive comments responses and comments on the future directions 
of Results-based Management and Accountability can be found in Appendix F. 
 
7.10  Summary - Discussion 
Overall, the research analysis and findings have confirmed interviewees’ perspectives 
that Result-based Management has the potential to improve programme results or the 
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management of programmes.  In all case studies, executives confirmed that this 
concept had merit, and contributed, or had the potential to contribute to the creation of 
value for Canadians.   However, limited progress was clearly acknowledged which 
both Public Value theory and Strategic Triangle have assisted in understanding.  As 
well, a stronger integration of the role of executive motivation, accountability and 
information sources could improve the implementation of RBM into the management 
culture. 
 
This chapter has discussed the research findings against the research sub-propositions, 
including several emergent findings.  The following chapter, Conclusions, will 
continue this discussion by responding to the original research proposition. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
8.1 Findings of the Research Proposition 
 
Returning to the primary research proposition:  
How does Public Value Theory help to explain the limited progress in 
implementing Results-based Management within programmes in the 
Canadian federal public sector? 
In order to address the aforementioned research question, the following research    
sub-topics guided the research.  They were: 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Service component to Results-based 
Management 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Outcome component to RBM 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Trust component to RBM  
 Are there other factors that influence the adaptation of RBM? 
 
In assessing or addressing this overall research question and sub-topics, the research 
sought: 
 To explore the progress of RBM through case studies in order to allow 
analysis of and comparisons between one major operational branch of Health 
Canada, the Saskatchewan region, and interviews with senior executives, and 
 To explore, in particular, the view of executives within these different sectors 
of the Canadian public sector. 
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This chapter will first consider the contribution to knowledge that this thesis has made 
in understanding limitations of RBM implementation, as examined through the lens of 
Public Value and Strategic Triangle theories.  This will be followed by the 
presentation of additional findings which emerged during the research analysis.  The 
chapter is organized as follows: 
 
 Contribution to Knowledge – Public Value Theory 
- Executive influence and Control 
 Contribution to Knowledge – Emergent Findings 
- Managerial Flexibility 
- Service Delivery Control and Clarity of Programme Objectives 
- Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes 
- Accountability Aligned to Results 
- Executive Motivation  
 Summary of Emergent Findings – Five Barriers to Implementing RBM 
 Theoretical Implications of Research Findings 
 Practitioner Implications of Research Findings 
 Limitations of the Research 
 Future Research 
 Concluding Remarks 
 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge – Public Value Theory 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the thesis has found that the elements of Public Value 
theory contribute to an increased understanding of the constraints in adopting Results-
based Management.  However, these findings could not be considered sufficient, in 
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and of themselves, to achieving a full understanding of the issues.  The inclusion of 
Moore’s Strategic Triangle, of which Public Value forms one triad, increases the 
explanatory powers and understanding of current limitations of Results-based 
Management within sectors of the Canadian federal public sector.    
 
As noted in Section 7.5, the research concluded that the components of Public Value 
theory: Service, Outcomes and Trust, each have explanatory powers in understanding 
RBM or its implementation.  However, they do not have an equal weight in their 
contribution to increased understanding.  Figure 19, below, replicates the conceptual 
map of RBM constraints, as seen through the lens of Public Value theory.  The 
diagram shows Service as the most important element, Outcomes increasing, and 
Trust with limited relevance.  Collectively, the diagram seeks to identify the location 
of constraints in implementing Results-based Management within the Canadian public 
sector.  
 
Figure 19: A Conceptual Map of RBM Constraints, Using Public Value Theory 
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The research also found that incorporating Strategic Triangle theory contributes to a 
fuller understanding of RBM implementation issues.  Specifically, Legitimacy and 
Political Sustainability incorporates the degree of stakeholder consensus on desired 
results, the political clarity of programme objectives, and the overall programme 
funding levels into RBM.  Similarly, Operational and Administrative Feasibility 
incorporates the level of organizational support, training, knowledge, and experience 
in Results-based Management, which were noted to be weaker in the regions.  
Executives’ control of programme service delivery would also fall under this aspect of 
the theory. 
8.2.1 Executive Influence and Control 
A second contribution of Public Value theory to understanding RBM integration was 
linked to the executives’ degree of control or sphere of influence.  Examined through 
the lens of Public Value theory, it can be argued that as one moves from drivers of 
Service to drivers of Trust, the ability and direct control of executive to ‘create’ public 
value declines rapidly77.   Specifically, analysis suggested that executives have 
relatively greater control of programme service and service delivery elements, and 
less control in influencing Trust.  This is shown in Figure 20.  These findings also 
support the research conclusion that departments with increased control of service 
delivery, reported a greater degree of RBM implementation, discussed in Section 
8.3.2, below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Admittedly, this does exclude the potential for reducing public trust as a result of being caught 
breaching public trust (fraudulent, theft, etc.), for example, the Health Canada scandal currently 
before the courts (in 2005). 
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Figure 20: Public Value and Managerial Impact 
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It is suggested that executives will logically focus their efforts on those aspects of 
programmes and services on which they have the largest potential ability for influence 
or control.   Considered through the lens of Public Value theory, executives 
interviewed clearly perceived that their greatest influence was over programme 
Services, while influence over Outcomes was perceived to have a number of 
significant constraints, and their impact on public or programme Trust was considered 
negligible.  The latter excluded the frequently mentioned possibility of decreasing 
public trust through unethical or illegal actions.   
 
While a tautology, if one were able to understand the specific elements of a 
programme that citizens’ value in term of the services they receive, specific outcomes 
desired and achieved, and the drivers of legitimacy of public sector activities, then 
executives would focus on aspects of these drivers of Public Value, at least the ones 
within their control.  Similarly, performance measures and reporting could build on 
these elements, further supporting increased levels of trust and legitimacy.  These 
findings are also supported by literature, e.g. (Moore, 1995; 2000; Smith, 2004; Grigg 
and Mager, 2005). 
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8.3 Contributions to Knowledge – Emergent Findings 
In addition to research findings linked to the application of Public Value and the 
Strategic Triangle theories, several key findings have emerged from the analysis of 
the research data.  This section discusses five areas: managerial flexibility, service 
control and mandate, difficulty of measuring outcomes, accountability linked to 
results, and executive motivation.  Each of which, it is argued, contributes to a greater 
understanding of the limitations of RBM and its implementation and has been 
presented earlier in the thesis. 
8.3.1 Managerial Flexibility 
Arguably, the most interesting emergent finding from this research was the 
requirement for greater integration between Results-based Management and 
executives’ ability to react to changing circumstances and opportunities, in simple 
terms, the ‘management’ elements of Results-based Management.  As noted in 
Section 4.9, the Logic Model concept emerged from the early research interviews and 
was discussed during the remaining 60 interviews.  This Logic Model is reproduced 
as Figure 21 below.  During the interviews, executives validated the model and 
confirmed that the model described the then current (2004) situation well.   
 
Figure 21: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management 
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Thus, the research was able to conclude that in terms of personal accountability, one 
can logically argue that executives can, and will only, accept accountability for 
achieving or increasing programme results in which they have been provided 
sufficient discretionary power.  Similarly, it can be argued that dysfunction behaviour 
(gaming, etc.) can be reasonably expected if personal accountability is linked to 
results without sufficient managerial discretion to impact programme results. 
The use of the Logic Model enabled the research to conclude that Managing for 
Results must be accompanied by sufficient managerial flexibility at the resource, 
process and output levels.  Conversely, the absence of sufficient flexibility can be 
predicted to result in avoidance tactics by executives.   
 
Thus, this research can conclude that one constraint of RBM implementation rests on 
systematic and inherent limitations of executives’ power to create public value, 
including managerial flexibility. 
 
8.3.2 Service Delivery Control and Clarity of Programme Objectives  
Drawing primarily on the Saskatchewan Case Study confirmed by Senior Executive 
interviews, it can be concluded that two key predictors of greater Results-based 
Management are clarity of programme mandate/desired results and control of 
programme service delivery.  This was discussed in various sections including 4.4 and 
6.5 and 7.2.  Table 32, below, presents the overall conclusions in a 2x2 matrix format 
which suggests that programmes with employee-based service delivery have greater 
managerial flexibility and control of service delivery itself, leading to reduced risk in 
setting and measuring programme objectives.  
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Similarly, clarity of programme mandate and prioritization of desired results permits 
increased managerial focus on the achievement of these goals, while reducing risk, 
including political risk, regarding achievement of other secondary goals.  Especially 
for social programmes, certain executives felt that identification of desired outcomes 
was weak and that there were occasionally unrealistic targets.   
 
Table 32: Programme Mandate and Service Delivery and RBM 
 Clarity of Programme Mandate /  
Objectives (Desired Results) 
 Low High 
Low X ± Control of Service 
Delivery High ± √ 
(‘±’ refers to partial support for RBM) 
 
The research concluded that executives managing programmes where objectives were 
clearer and/or those executives with internal or greater control of programme delivery 
expressed an increased willingness to embrace RBM and to accept accountability for 
results, as compared to executives managing programmes where these conditions 
were weaker or absent.  It can be argued that the former conditions support executives 
in implementing RBM and accepting accountability for public value creation. 
8.3.3 Difficulties in Measuring Outcomes 
As discussed earlier in Sections 4.4.1 and 5.6.1, as well as 7.3.1 of the Discussion 
chapter, executives frequently noted difficulties in establishing and measuring 
programme outcomes, including attribution issues.  As discussed during interviews, 
executives were also clear that these concerns did not preclude using Results-based 
Management, but rather revealed the need for realistic assessment of the feasibility 
and limitations of RBM by headquarters, central agencies and Parliament.  It was also 
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argued that the perception of the difficulties in measuring outcomes is of greater 
importance that the exact nature of these difficulties in understanding the limited 
progress in implementing RBM.   
 
Furthermore, it is argued to be self-evident that assessing and understanding 
programme results implicitly requires direct programme recipient feedback – client 
input.  (Note, client feedback would also assist in monitoring Service aspects.)  
Nevertheless, the research concludes that there is an almost complete absence of 
client sourced information.  The conclusion can only be that Results-based 
Management in the Canadian government has failed to generate dialogue with these 
groups.  This was found to be true across all executive functions: regional, 
headquarters, and corporate.  
 
The research revealed that client satisfaction is clearly an underutilized information 
source.  This finding has not, itself, led to specific conclusions or understanding of 
why this key information remains absent. It remains a potential area of future 
research.  A possible starting hypothesis might include political risk, inability to 
respond to feedback, and cultural impediments.  A secondary effect of the absence of 
client feedback is, it can be argued, to remove or reduce the voice of the direct 
programme recipient from policy deliberations.  In summary, client feedback has the 
potential, as the research has demonstrated, to positively impact several elements of 
Public Value creation. 
8.3.4 Accountability Aligned to Results 
The importance of aligning accountability and results was discussed in section 7.7.4 
of the Discussion chapter, with detailed findings noted in Sections 5.7.1 and 6.6 of the 
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case studies.  This was true of both individual accountability and programme 
accountability for results. 
 
At the programme level, executives perceived a relative absence of links between 
programme outcomes and budgets.  This was true for programmes with strong results 
as well as weaker performers.  At the individual accountability level, executives 
interviewed expressed a general consensus that results-based personal accountability 
frameworks have lagged behind RBM implementation efforts.  This was also 
confirmed in the Senior Executives interviews. 
 
In summary, executives agreed on the difficulty of making this link, which was fully 
acknowledged as inherently difficult and requiring political leadership.  Nevertheless, 
executives interviewed also noted the potential benefits that an increased use of 
results-based information would have.  The threat of programme budget cuts or 
potential for increased budgets, executives agreed, would generate a lot of interest and 
attention in implementing RBM.  
 
Improved reporting of such accountability and results information was also widely 
seen to have potential in demonstrating public value to Parliament, Canadians and 
programme stakeholders.   
8.3.5 Executive Motivation 
One key research conclusion, not incorporated into Public Value or Strategic Triangle 
theories, was executive motivation.  Improved understanding of motivation, as 
applied to RBM has, it could be argued, the potential to improve the ‘take-up’ of 
RBM.   
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The research noted two related findings, first that executives were intrinsically 
motivated to achieve results, as compared with output levels or compliance with 
administrative requirements.  In one sense, executives are predisposed to engaging in 
RBM.  No evidence was found that current RBM policies have considered or 
addressed the existing desire to ‘make a difference’ for Canadians.    
The second finding addresses the role of executive performance pay.  As noted in the 
case studies and discussion chapters, performance pay has met with limited success 
to-date.  The research findings suggest that the intrinsic motivation of public sector 
executives is not complemented by performance pay.  Further research into 
performance pay and its impact on executive motivation is currently underway. 
 
8.4 Summary of Emergent Findings - Five Barriers to 
Implementing RBM 
Having considered certain conditions which executives suggested support RBM in 
Section 7.7, Figure 22 considers the absence of such conditions and advances five key 
barriers identified by executives interviewed, which effectively limit the 
implementation of Results-based Management.  They are: accountability aligned to 
results, control of service delivery, difficulties in measuring results, clarity of 
programme objectives and managerial flexibility, as well as the contribution of the 
overall environment.  Each of these barriers has been discussed in either a Case Study 
or Discussion chapters, and this figure attempts to summarize these discussions.  
While each item is important in itself, the ordering on this graph does attempt to 
reflect the relative attention and weight given these items by interviewees. 
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Figure 22: Five Barriers to Adapting RBM Within a Public Sector Environment 
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In considering possible solutions to these limitations, one is struck by the limited 
potential of executives to intervene.  Of the five, Difficulty in Measuring Results is 
the only area where potential for greater executive effort may pay dividends, and 
where progress has, in fact, been made (Thomas, 2005).  For the remaining four 
limitations, it is argued that solutions would appear to lie principally at the political or 
central agency level. 
 
Executives noted that, for certain programmes, it was not possible to overcome these 
barriers.  For these programmes, standard bureaucratic processes and controls rather 
than outcomes or results, were noted to be the optimum management technique. 
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8.5 Theoretical Implications of the Research Findings 
The thesis’s primary theoretical contribution centres around the differing utility and 
applicability of Public Value Theory’s components, as discussed in Section 8.2 above, 
where empirical evidence from the three case studies suggests that Service and Output 
components have a much stronger impact than Trust.  Figure 19 visually summaries 
this contribution. 
 
In addition, and as supported by the methodological literature on exploratory case 
study research (Flowler, 2002; Yin, 2003b), theoretical implications within 
exploratory research can also serve to identify areas where existing theory is weak or 
absent.   
 
While Results-based Management theories generally support RBM’s use as both a 
management and accountability tool (Meyer and Gupta, 1994; Ingraham and 
Moynihan, 1999; Gow, 2004; Hatry et al., 2003), executive use of RBM remains an 
under-researched topic (Eggleton et al., 2001; Behn, 2002; Radnor and McGuire, 
2004).  This research has identified a number of pragmatic constraints, summarized in 
Figure 22, which could form the basis for development or refinement of theories of 
RBM and its implementation.  One key contribution is the requirement for a stronger 
linkage between executive accountability for results and executive managerial control, 
as noted in Figure 14: A Logic Model of Constraints for Results-based Management.  
As well, RBM as a day-to-day management tool was found to have limited executive 
utility, suggesting that RBM theories are not currently (2004) sufficiently robust to 
explain the empirical reality of these case studies. 
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Secondly, as the literature review noted, in a private sector context, client feedback is 
an integral aspect of the performance feedback loop, both directly through clients 
surveys and indirectly through purchase choices (Conroy, 2001).  Given the quasi-free 
nature of public sector services and products, one could argue that satisfaction surveys 
or other feedback mechanisms would have a greater role and stronger appeal in 
adopting a RBM perspective (Dinsdale and Marson, 1999; Bouckaert and Van de 
Walle, 2003).  Instead, at least within these three case studies, the opposite appears to 
be the case, as discussed in Sections 7.4.2 and 8.3.3.  The absence of theory to address 
or explain this observed phenomenon would appear be a prime area for development 
of an explanatory theory.   
 
Finally, this research has also attempted to make a theoretical contribution to the 
subject of executive performance pay (Vroom, 1964; Kohn, 1993; Jorjani, 2004).  As 
noted earlier (Section 7.7.1), the research findings suggest that performance pay 
would appear to have limited potential within a public sector environment.  While the 
topic has received broad general coverage, it can be argued that refinements to 
theories of performance pay within a public sector environment are required. 
 
In summary, I would argue that this research has made several theoretical 
contributions, and, as exploratory research has identified several theoretical areas 
where empirical evidence has suggested current (2004) theories are weak or absent.  
Several topics suitable for additional research will be discussed in Section 8.8. 
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8.6 Practitioner Implications of Research Findings 
This section will briefly assess these research findings from a practitioner perspective, 
thus considering the contribution of the research at the functional or operational level.  
It seeks to respond to the Academic/Practitioner gap (Swamidass, 1991).  
 
First, at the political and central agency level: 
 Executives will act rationally and will resist or game any measures which are 
not reasonable, or for which the executives have little control  or ability to 
influence 
 In the face of a highly risk adverse culture, with limited rewards for success 
but considerable punishment for failure, public disclosure of poor programme 
results will have limited appeal, which can be predicted to result in selective 
reporting 
 Greater use of Results information, internally or politically, would enhance 
RBM credibility with executives 
 Greater understanding of programme diversity within the Canadian public 
sector, and acknowledgement that RBM cannot be implemented as a ‘one size 
fits all’ model. 
 
At the executive level: 
 Results-based Management is only meaningful to the degree that managerial 
flexibility is present within a programme 
 Executives’ motivation to ‘make a difference’ is not well understood and 
concerns over performance pay reflects this reality 
 The absence of client feedback is a core limitation to RBM 
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 Significant information gaps for outputs and outcome data exist, even where 
corporate systems contain raw data.  In addition, executives report limited use 
of structured information in managing 
 Time requirements to achieve outcomes remain a central issue 
 The current systematic limits and constraints in public reporting, especially 
those linked to telling a public performance story.  It can be argued that the 
reporting system itself must change to support RBM.  However, this change 
must be led by central agencies and politicians.   
 
8.7 Limitations of the Research 
The section summarizes certain limitations of these research findings.  
 
First, this research was an exploratory case study, reflecting the fact that this body of 
knowledge was not well developed.  As with any exploratory study, the research 
proposition generates new questions and hypotheses – which can only be addressed 
through further research (Yin, 2003a).  Acknowledging the explicit focus on linking 
Public Value theory and Results-based Management, and noting the open-ended 
fourth sub-topic which actively sought out other contributing factors, the possibility 
remains that this thesis failed to identify all relevant or critical factors in integrating 
RBM within a public sector environment.   
 
Secondly, this study examines the impacts, limitations and constraints of Results-
based Management from the executives’ perspective.  As noted earlier, other 
stakeholder groups, citizens, managers or politicians, would hold different and 
potentially conflicting viewpoints.   Of particular note, for this research the researcher 
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specifically decided not to incorporate the perspectives of politicians or Ministers.  
This was based on the considerable differences between the respective roles and 
differing experience, and ambitions of politicians and public servants.   
 
There are limitations inherent in the research methods.  While there were no 
discernible grounds for believing any of the following to be true, and although such 
possibilities were actively considered during the course of the research, the possibility 
remains that: 
 Research findings were primarily based on interviews with seventy-nine 
executives, who may not be reflective of the executive cadre as a whole 
 Interviews were conducted during 2004, which in historical hindsight, may be 
a time of great change, and thus atypical 
 A sub-group of executives may have been intentionally blocking or actively 
resisting Results-based Management. There would be strong political and 
professional disincentives to reveal personal blocking strategies and such 
executives might not have been completely honest. 
 
Because the thesis uses a case study approach, the generalization of findings is 
theoretical rather than statistical (Yin, 2003b).  As with any study of one geographical 
area and one national programme, generalizations to the rest of the public sector 
should be made with the greatest of caution. In particular, the diversity and breadth of 
the Canadian public sector can be reasonably predicted to generate a full spectrum of 
take-up of the Results-based Management initiative.  This would also be reflected in 
the role of stakeholders, the degree of politically powerful client groups, and even 
local leadership.  
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8.8 Future Research 
This work, as an exploratory case study, has generated an expanded foundation of 
knowledge and opens up several avenues for future research on Results-based 
Management and Public Value theory.  A few suggestions follow. 
 
Results-based Management 
It would be interesting to conduct a longitudinal study of a department for which the 
research predicts the probability of success in adopting Results-based Management, 
perhaps using an Action Research approach.  Similarly, research contrasting the 
experiences of a SOA such as Canada Post or Farm Credit Corporation, where a 
significantly greater degree of managerial flexibility is present, would compliment 
this research. 
 
The research noted, and the literature confirmed, the critical importance of the 
political level in integrating Results-based Management, as linked in the Strategic 
Triangle to Public Value.   The role of the political level in RBM would also be an 
area worthy of fuller exploration. 
 
Executive Motivation 
Executive motivation to work in the public sector is an under-researched area.  During 
the Literature Review, no material was located addressing this topic within Canada.  
Frankly, this was somewhat surprising given the current executive recruitment and 
retention issue in the Canadian federal government78.   As noted, the research suggests 
                                                 
78 In North America, ‘baby-boomers’ are approaching retirement age, and the next cohort or 
demographic group is  smaller, resulting in concern over finding and attracting the next generation 
of public sector executives.  
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a link between intrinsic motivation - to make a difference - and Results-based 
Management, which is worthy of follow-up research.  At this writing (2006), the 
author is actively engaged in a national survey of federal public sector executives to 
further explore this topic79, including refining current public sector theory on 
performance pay. 
 
Accountability 
A number of executives, including senior executives, indicated that the accountability 
framework is not fully aligned with RBM.  This is also supported by the current 
literature (Ehrenworth, 2005).  This research did not have the opportunity to explore 
this issue fully, although executives, including senior executives, acknowledged this 
as a significant barrier to increased integration of RBM. 
 
Client Feedback 
One final additional area of personal interest would be to undertake further research 
on the almost complete absence of direct programme client feedback.  Such research 
could serve to identify the underlying causes of this curious phenomenon, curious 
given the general consensus that such information is both useful and required for 
effective and meaningful RBM.  The research objective would be to develop an 
explanatory theory(s) suitable for empirical testing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 In June 2006, a national survey on federal public sector executive performance pay was undertaken 
in conjunction with Association of Public Sector Executives (APEX). 
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8.9 Concluding Remarks 
If nothing else, this thesis confirmed that “Government is first and foremost about an 
endless series of contradictions and dichotomies; it is in constant search for 
productive trade-offs and defensible compromises across many competing and 
praiseworthy objectives” (Good, 2004b:xv). 
 
In closing, similar to the executives who spoke eloquently of their career choice in the 
public service, I too feel a personal calling to public service, reflected in thirty-two 
years of public sector employment.  It is my hope that this thesis will be able to ‘make 
a (small) difference’ in our collective understanding of how Results-based 
Management can be further advanced within the Canadian federal government, as 
well as within the broader public sector.    
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10.1  Appendix A – Interview Lists, by Case Study  
 
10.1.1 Key Informant Interview List 
Assigned 
Code 
Level EX Level Gender 
Employer 
KI-1 Director General EX-2 or 3 Male Department 
KI-2 Director EX-1 Male Department 
KI-3 Director  EX-1 Male Department 
KI-4 Director EX-1 Male Department 
KI-5 Director  EX-1 Female Central Agency 
KI-6 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Central Agency 
KI-7 Director EX 1 Female Central Agency 
KI-8 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 Female Central Agency 
KI-9 Director EX-1 Male Central Agency 
KI-10 Consultant – internal EX-1 Female Headquarters 
KI-11 Consultant – internal EX-1 Male Headquarters 
KI-12 Consultant – external NA Female Private Sector 
KI-13 Consultant – external NA Female Private Sector 
KI-14 Consultant – external NA Male Private Sector 
KI-15 Academic NA Male University 
KI-16 Academic NA Female University 
    NA – Not applicable 
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10.1.2  Health Case Study Interview list 
Respon-
dent 
Code 
Level EX Level Gender Location 
(Headquarter 
or Region) 
Years of 
Service 
HC-1 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 Headquarters 30+ 
HC-2 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 Headquarters 25-30 
HC-3 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 
Total:  
males-2 
female-1 
Headquarters 25-30 
HC-4 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Headquarters 20-25 
HC-5 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Headquarters 20-25 
HC-6 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Headquarters 5-10 
HC-7 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Headquarters 30+ 
HC-8 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Headquarters 15-20 
HC-9 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Headquarters 30+ 
HC-10 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Female Region 10-15 
HC-11 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Male Region 30+ 
HC-12 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Male Region 5-10 
HC-13 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Female Region 20-25 
HC-14 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Male Region 0-5 
HC-15 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Male Region 20-25 
HC-16 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Female Region 10-15 
HC-17 Regional Director EX 2 or 3 Female Region 20-25 
HC-18 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters 30+ 
HC-19 Director EX 1 Female Region 10-15 
HC-20 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters 25-30 
HC-21 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters 5-10 
HC-22 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters 25-30 
HC-23 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 0-5 
HC-24 Director EX 1 Female Region 30+ 
HC-25 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 30+ 
HC-26 Director EX 1 Female Region 20-25 
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Respon-
dent 
Code 
Level EX Level Gender Location 
(Headquarter 
or Region) 
Years of 
Service 
HC-27 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 15-20 
HC-28 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters 20-25 
HC-29 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 10-15 
HC-30 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 10-15 
HC-31 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 15-20 
HC-32 Director EX 1 Male Region 15-20 
HC-33 Director EX 1 Male Headquarters  10-15 
HC-34 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 15-20 
HC-35 Director EX 1 Female Region 30+ 
HC-36 Director EX 1 Female Headquarters 5-10 
HC-37 Director EX 1 Male Region 20-25 
Total: 37 
Interview 
EX4 or 5: 3 interviews 
EX2 or 3: 14 interviews 
EX1: 20 interviews 
Male: 21 
Female: 
16 
Region: 14 
Headquarters
: 23 
0-5: 3 
5-10: 3 
10-15: 6 
15-20: 5 
20-25: 8 
25-30: 4 
30+: 8 
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10.1.3  Saskatchewan Case Study Interview List 
Respon-
dent 
Code 
Level EX 
Level 
Gender Location 
(HQ or 
Region) 
Years of 
Service 
SC-1 Director EX-1 Female Region 30+ 
SC-2 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Region 30+ 
SC-3 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Region 30+ 
SC-4 Director EX-1 Male Region 25-30 
SC-5 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Region 15-20 
SC-6 Director EX-1 Male Region 30+ 
SC-7 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 Female Region 30+ 
SC-8 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Region 5-10 
SC-9 Director EX-1 Male Region 30+ 
SC-10 Director EX-1 Male Region 25-30 
SC-11 Director EX-1 Male Region 30+ 
SC-12 Director EX-1 Male Region 15-20 
SC-13 Director EX-1 Male Region 10-15 
SC-14 Director EX-1 Female Region 20-25 
SC-15 Director EX-1 Male Region 30+ 
SC-16 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Region 25-30 
SC-17 Director EX-1 Male Region 5-10 
SC-18 Director EX-1 Male Region 30+ 
SC-19 Director General EX 2 or 3 Female Region 0-5 
SC-20 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Region 25-30 
SC-21 Director EX-1 Female Region 15-20 
SC-22 Director General EX-1 Male Region 25-30 
SC-23 Director EX-1 Male Region 15-20 
SC-24 Assistant Deputy Minister EX 4 or 5 Male Region 15-20 
SC-25 Director EX-1 Female Region 5-10 
SC-26 Director General   EX 2 or 3 Male Region 15-20 
SC-27 Director EX-1 Female Region 10-15 
SC-28 Director EX-1 Male Region 15-20 
SC-29 Director EX-1 Female Region 30+ 
SC-30 Director General EX 2 or 3 Male Region 25-30 
SC-31 Director EX-1 Male Region 25-30 
SC-32 Director EX-1 Male Region 15-20 
Totals EX4 or 5: 2 interviews 
EX2 or 3: 10 interviews 
EX1: 20 interviews 
Male: 21 
Female: 
11 
Region: 
ALL 
Headqua
rters:  0 
0-10: 4 
10-15: 2 
15-20: 7 
20-25: 9 
30: +: 10 
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10.1.4  Senior Executive Interview List 
Respon-
dent 
Code 
Level EX Level Gender 
Location 
(Headquarte
r or Region) 
Years 
of 
Service 
SE-1 Deputy Minister DM Female Headquarters 15-20 
SE-2 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or 5 Male Headquarters 30+ 
SE-3 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Headquarters 25-30 
SE-4 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or 5 Female Headquarters 15-20 
SE-5 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or 5 Male Headquarters 30+ 
SE-6 Deputy Minister DM Male Headquarters 30+ 
SE-7 Special Advisor - ADM equivalent EX-4 or 5 Male Headquarters 25+ 
SE-8 Deputy Minister DM Female Headquarters 30+ 
SE-9 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Headquarters 25+ 
SE-10 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Headquarters 20-25 
SE-11 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Headquarters 30+ 
SE-12 Special Advisor  - ADM equivalent EX-4 or  5 Female Headquarters 25-30 
SE-13 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Headquarters 25-30 
SE-14 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Female Region 15-20 
SE-15 Assistant Deputy Minister EX-4 or  5 Male Region 30+ 
Note: SE-11 to SE-15 are codes for the Assistant Deputy Minister interviews from the 
Health and Saskatchewan case studies which were merged with the ten interviews to 
capture the senior executive perspective. 
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Notes on Demographic Data: 
At the start of each interview a small amount of demographic information was 
collected.  This included sex (visual observation), length of public service, length of 
executive service, and length of time in current position.  This demographic data was 
collected by ranges only (e.g. 15-20 years of service).  As noted in 7.8, while analysis 
was performed based on this information, no additional research findings or 
conclusions were reached.  
 
The ‘length of public service’ data was grouped into 5 year intervals and is included 
in Appendix A and reported above.   
 
The ‘length of executive service’ data was categorized into Limited service 0-5 years, 
Medium service 5 – 10 years, and Long service 10+ years.  The ‘length of executive 
service’ data was not reported in Appendix A as it could potentially lead to the 
identification of individual interviewees (few senior executives have limited 
experience).   
 
The ‘length of time in current position’ data was categorized into Newcomer 0-2 
years, Medium 3 – 5 years, and Experienced 6+ years.  This data was not reported 
above as it could potentially lead to the identification of individual interviewees.  
 
Finally, for completeness, the single reference to executives’ age found in this thesis 
(under 40 years old versus over 50 years old) was a derived value.  As age can be a 
sensitive topic, the data was based partly on visual observation, and partly on years of 
service.  In most cases, the age range was clear.  In the few cases where it was not 
obvious, some tactic was employed to find out (how old were you when you joined 
the public service, age of any children, ask directly, etc.).  However, the age data was 
not used in the research analysis.   
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10.2  Appendix B – Interview Request Documentation 
 
The following letters were sent via email, after an initial telephone contact with the 
Executive or Executive’s Assistant/Secretary.   If required, three to five days later, the 
researcher would follow up with the executive to enquire whether they would agree to 
be interviewed.   
 
The covering email/letter –  
 
This email seeks your participation in an interview to gather perceptions and views on 
public sector managerial accountability, especially the effects of the government's 
focus on Results or Outcome-Based Management on your accountability.  Attached, 
is a one-page description of this research.  
 
The interviews are anonymous in that attribution of your comments is not part of the 
research design. The interviews typically are 35 - 45 minutes, and I am pleased to 
report that executives find the interviews interesting and stimulating, and indicate that 
they enjoy the opportunity to reflect on the direction of the federal government on 
these issues. 
 
Personally, a long service, career public servant, I am on assignment with the 
Saskatchewan Region of Health Canada, First Nations and Inuit Health Branch, 
working out of the Regina office.  
 
I would greatly appreciate your agreeing to be interviewed, and value your input into 
this research. 
 
Thank you in advance for considering this request. 
 
David Try 
306 780 8263 (w) 
306 737 5377 (cel) 
 
david_try@hc-sc.gc.ca 
 
(See attached file: Research Description and Interview Request Letter) 
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The attached Research Proposal –  
 
(Date) 
 
Re: Research on Results-based Management and changing public sector 
accountabilities 
 
Sir/Madam: 
 
I am a career public servant currently employed with Health Canada, Saskatchewan 
Regional Office.  As well, I am a part time Ph.D. student at Warwick Business 
School, Warwick University, UK.   
 
This letter seeks your participation for a one-hour interview to capture your 
experiences relating to the changing nature of managerial accountability within the 
Canadian Public Sector, the research topic of my thesis.  As a long service (30 years) 
public servant myself, this research seeks to capture how executives are reacting to 
these changes, as well as identify information sources and systems which have 
assisted you.   
 
I am seeking to interview each federal executive ‘EX’ in Saskatchewan [or First 
Nations and Inuit Health Branch for the other case study].  I would greatly appreciate 
your agreeing to contribute your knowledge, experience and understanding to my 
research.  Only through gathering a wide diversity of opinions can the research make 
meaningful contributions toward future improvements.   
 
Interest in this research has been expressed by ‘central agencies’, including the 
Treasury Board and Auditor General.  At the conclusion of the project, I will prepare 
an executive summary of the research for government, and would be pleased to 
provide a copy to you.   
 
In closing, your personal contribution is invaluable to improving understanding of 
these changes.  In turn, I believe that this research will contribute knowledge and 
insights into a government-wide management initiative, of interest to you 
professionally, as well corporately.  Should you agree, I would be pleased to meet 
with you at a time and location which would minimise your inconvenience.    
 
Thank you for your consideration of my request. 
 
David Try  
Director Planning and Policy 
Saskatchewan Regional Office 
First Nations and Inuit Health Branch 
Health Canada   
(306) 780-8263 
david_try@hc-sc.gc.ca     
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10.3  Appendix C – Interview Questions and Guide 
 
Within the public sector, and building on an understanding of management activities, 
the thesis will examine the changing accountability requirements of NPM and 
specifically RBM.  Case Study research in the Canadian public sector will lead to the 
development of a conceptual framework assessing the potential contribution of 
Performance Management in addressing these changing accountability requirements. 
 
Reminder to Self - Research Statement 
Does Public Value Theory explain the limited progress in implementing 
Results-based Management within the Canadian federal public sector? 
 
In order to address the aforementioned research question, the following research sub-
topics were identified from the literature review and Key Informant interviews to 
guide the research.  They are: 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Service component to Results-based 
Management 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Outcome component to Results-based 
Management 
 To explore the role of Public Value’s Trust component to Results-based 
Management  
 Are there other factors that influence the adaptation of Results-based 
Management? 
 
SECTION 0 – INTRODUCTION (5 minutes) 
 Permission to record 
 Why I am here 
 Set scope – responses not limited to their current job, include any pervious 
experience 
 Four sections – 
o Introduction (5 min) 
o NPM (5-10 min) 
o RBM (10-15min) 
o Your use of RBM (10-15min) 
 
Ice-Breakers 
Describe the key characteristics of your business, organization, and job 
 
SECTION I – NPM (5 – 10 minutes) 
SECTION GOAL - The initial phase of the research will develop a sound 
understanding of changing context of the Canadian PS management, especially the 
adoption of NPM/RBM. 
 
I would like to talk with you about changes in the management context / 
environment you are currently operating in…… 
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1. Over the last five to 10 years do you believe that MANAGEMENT in the public 
sector has changed?  In what ways? 
1.1. Accountability  
1.2. RBM/Outcomes 
1.3. Citizen focus 
1.4. Values and Ethics 
1.5. Financial Focus  
1.6. Scope of authority 
1.7. Internal Changes - Results for Canadians, TBS Mgmt Acct Framework, 
RMAFs  
1.8. REMEMBER TO PARK - Personal feelings about work/workload 
 
2. How would you define ACCOUNTABILITY as a public sector manager? 
 
3. Do you believe that manager’s accountability has changed over the last five years?   
How? 
3.1. Watch for types of accountability (mgmt, legal, parl, fin./resource) 
 
SECTION II – RMB (10 -15 minutes) 
SECTION GOAL – Focusing on RBM,  the research will explore the value, develop 
hypothesis of the potential application-added in applying RBM, including role of 
performance management tools or systems to support manager’s information use and 
requirements under RBM. 
 
Next, I would like to discuss the role of Results-based Management/Outcome based 
management within your operating environment  
 
Discuss/agree on definition of RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT  
 
4. Do you believe RBM improves government programmes or management? 
4.1. Accountability 
4.2. Management control 
4.3. Control of costs 
4.4. Communications 
4.5. Evaluation 
4.6. Other 
 
5. Is your organization using RBM information?  How and for What? 
5.1. Accountability 
5.2. Management control 
5.3. Control costs 
5.4. Communications 
5.5. Evidence based decisions 
5.6. Supports Evaluations 
5.7. to adjust ongoing operations 
5.8. strategic planning 
5.9. developing policies 
5.10. allocation resources  
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5.11. More effective public sector management 
5.12. More knowledge of what works/what doesn’t 
 
6. What tangible support do you see to build and strengthen the adaptation of RBM 
within Dept/Branch? What support would you like to have? 
6.1. Leadership 
6.2. Crisis/demand for change 
6.3. Forced to 
6.4. Develop strong tools to support 
 
(Accountability) -- On a more personal level, 
7. Exactly what are you accountable for? 
7.1. Inputs 
7.2. Activities 
7.3. Outputs 
7.4. Outcomes 
 
8. Who are you accountable to?  
8.1. Canadians 
8.2. Parliament 
8.3. Central Agencies 
8.4. DM/AMD 
8.5. Current boss 
8.6. Stakeholder 
 
9. Overall, How do you discharge your responsibility for accountability? 
9.1. I don’t 
9.2. Not required 
9.3. Reporting  
9.4. PM system 
 
SECTION III (10 -15 minutes) 
SECTION GOAL - including role of performance management tools or systems to 
support manager’s information use and requirements under RBM. 
 
Next, I would like to discuss how you use or integrate RBM into your management 
style/activities 
 
10. Where do you get your management information from?  
10.1. Executive Information System (EIS) 
10.2. Financial System (SAP) 
10.3. HR (Peoplesoft) 
10.4. Program Output reports 
10.5. Surveys – intermediate outcomes 
10.6. Independent data – Statistic Canada, external surveys 
 
11. Do you use a Performance Management System?  Do you perceive that a PM 
system would improve your management capacity? 
 
12.   Results presumably have something to do with your client’s satisfactions 
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12.1. Who are your clients?  
12.2. Are they happy? 
12.3. What would make them happier? 
12.4. Do you measure client impacts (program outcomes) and client satisfaction? 
How? 
 
13. Within the context of RBM - Overall, in the next couple of years, how do you see 
your role as a manager changing? 
13.1. Accountability 
13.2. Integrating RBM 
 
14. Do you have any concluding comments on Accountability or RBM? 
 
15. Discussion of Performance Pay 
15.1. Economic value 
15.2. ‘Status’ value 
15.3. Fairness of assessments 
15.4. Lack of consequences for poor performance 
 
16. Discussion of personal motivation to work as a public servant 
 
17. Discussion of the ‘Logic Model’ 
- If Inputs (resources) are fixed, processes red taped, outputs occasionally 
constrained by legislation - Can accountability for outcomes be meaningful 
within this current degree of managerial flexibility? 
  
10.4  Appendix D – Nested Analysis Topics and Categories 
 
Results-based 
Management
Topics
Account-
ability
Public 
Value
Executive
Motivation
Perf. Mgmt
Systems1
Managerial 
Flexibility Other
Utility of RBM RecentChanges Service Motivation
Level 
of Use
Level of  
Flexibility
Exec. 
Information
Outcomes Aligned to Results Outcomes Desire for Logic Model
Client 
Feedback
Measurement Public Reporting Trust Issues Budgets
Horizontal
Coordination
Personal
Links to 
Strategic 
Triangle
‘Red-Tape’ PublicPerception3
Intra-Dept.
differences2
Evidence-based
Decision-
making
Future Of
Values & 
Ethics
Future Of
Clear ‘Results’
Mandate
1 – Later moved to a Category within RBM
2 – Saskatchewan Case Study only
3 – Health Case Study only
Recent
Scandals
Programme
Control
Categories
Gaming
Communi-
cationsPublic / 
Stakeholder
Expectation
Actively 
Managing 
for Results
Perform.
Pay
  
10.5  Appendix E – Sample Extract from an Interview Analysis 
 
A sample of the interpretivist method used in analysing the research interviews.  Researcher is identified as ‘DT’ and Interviewee is ‘I’.  
 
Spea
ker 
Line 
No. 
Interview Transcript Topic/Categ
ory 
DT 
 
 
78 
79 
80 
We started by just talking a minute ago about was your organization using results based information how 
and for what.  We were just talking about; you started to say something about this using it to confirm with 
staff, I think was the last thing I heard you saying. 
I 81 Using, yeah, demonstrating to staff that it can be a tool  RBM-uses 
EX information 
DT 82 And getting money from Ottawa to ‘do’ RBM?  
I 83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Yes, getting results of, which for them which would include resources, increased resources from Ottawa, 
and you know demonstrating to them that based on, um, the kinds of evidence and results that we can 
demonstrate, that we really can demonstrate those things and that we will get results.  There is going to be 
greater buy in from the staff and, and greater willingness to, really actively use those kinds of processes  
RBM – Inputs, 
Staff 
HQ assistance 
RBM – Uses 
Communication 
DT 88 
89 
Hw much support do you see Ottawa providing at the branch level or even at the departmental level?  And 
even at the government level, but I’m more interested in support for you/your organization 
 
I 90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Yeah, yeah, not a great deal.  Again it’s, I think it’s, you know the situation here with my own staff is 
probably quite similar to what is happening in Ottawa, in that again there is a lip service paid to it, but I’m 
not always sure that there’s real genuine commitment to it, and or that that commitment translates, you know 
into basing decisions on the evidence or the results that are obtained, um, I don’t see a whole lot of evidence 
of that.  Some, some sectors I do, or some particularly for example, Business Management Director, I think 
there is more of that happening, but across all of the directorates I don’t see a whole lot of evidence use in 
this position 
HQ support for 
RBM 
 
HQ/Region dif. 
 
RBM uses 
DT 97 I will be interviewing the DGs and I’ll ask them!  
I 98 Yeah, yeah, it would be interesting to know what they say.  They probably say the same thing about us. HQ – Region dif 
DT 99 Well, if you, if you, well what direction or guidance or support would you like to see?  
  Page 377 
Spea
ker 
Line 
No. 
Interview Transcript Topic/Categ
ory 
I 100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
 
108 
109 
110 
Well, I guess I mean, the best way for me to say, so you know when I came into this job, I met with my 
senior managers, for I don’t know 45 minutes when I first started, first day on the job or something.  The 
ADM came out um about a month after this for about a half a day, of which we spent about an hour together, 
and basically other than that I haven’t seen anybody.  I mean there’s, and I mean I recognize that at the level 
that I came in you’re expected to be able to hit the ground running, which is true and I did, but it would be 
nice to have support from Ottawa, not only people calling and saying how are you doing out there? And, and 
you know by providing for example, example of it, and, and, giving me you know a framework in which to 
apply those processes at my own level 
 
But saying you know there are some things and some ways that we do business here, and, and evidence 
based decision making is one of them, or results based decision making is one of them, and we want to sit 
down and we want to talk to clients about what that really looks like in terms of how we do business. 
Personal 
performance 
 
Motivation 
Perf. Pay 
RBM – support 
RBM – 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
Evidence-based 
Client Feedback 
 
 
 
  
Appendix E (Con’t) - Sample Category Coding Sheet 
 
Case  – Health Case  
Topic – EX Motivation 
Category – Value and Ethics 
 
Interview reference 1: Line 45, 52 
Interview reference 3: Line 165 
Interview reference 4: Line 76 
Interview reference 7: Line 237, 252 
Interview reference 9: Line 12, 132 
Interview reference 13: Line 87, 93, 159, 166, 178 
Interview reference 16: Line 64 
Interview reference 17: Line 34 
Interview reference 19: Line 112, 130, 137 
Interview reference 20: Line 221 
Interview reference 22: Line 14 
Interview reference 26: Line 55 
Interview reference 27: Line 72, 78, 89 
Interview reference 30: Line 118 
Interview reference 33: Line 32 
Interview reference 36: Line 91, 101 
 
 
Notes: 
- References were initially recorded in respondent-order because that is the way 
they were printed out and analyzed.  I tended to keep this order as it made it 
physically easier to reference material. 
- Line count numbers refer to the first line only; quotes may extend for several 
lines.
  Page 379 
 
10.6  Appendix F – Overview of Public Service Surveys 1999 
and 2002 
 
The 2002 Public Service Employee Survey marks the second time that the Public 
Service of Canada has endeavoured to seek the opinion of all of its employees on a 
wide variety of workplace issues.  It follows up on the first survey, conducted in 1999.  
It is believed that Canada is the only country in the world to systematically survey all 
of its federal public service employees.  Response rates were just over 104,000 (1999) 
and 94,000 (2002) respectively.   
 
The 2002 survey posed 114 questions on issues ranging from an employee's work 
environment to skills and career development and labour-management relations. They 
were developed in consideration of well-regarded organizational principles and 
practices. From the outset, the survey was co-developed by large, medium and small 
departments, agencies, central agencies, public service bargaining agents, Statistics 
Canada and outside experts.  
 
Thirty-nine questions were repeated from the first Public Service Employee Survey in 
1999, showing improvement in thirty-six. New questions were added on topics such 
as service to clients, work-life balance and official languages. Other questions were 
refined from 1999 to obtain a clearer picture of issues requiring greater analysis 
 
Of particular interest to this research, the survey included responses from results 
2,000 plus executives who completed this survey, representing approximately half of 
all executives.  The analysis of this sub-group was used in triangulating certain 
aspects of the thesis research. 
 
Additional information, analysis and results are located at http://www.survey-
sondage.gc.ca/2002/menu-e.html. 
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10.7  Appendix G - Executive Comments on the Future 
Direction for Results-based Management and 
Accountability 
 
Topic Comments/Description 
Results-based 
Management 
 I believe in RBM.  It makes us really think why we’re doing these things.  
I sure hope that this is going to continue 
 Cultural Change: 
 Start collecting and interpreting information for reasons other than just 
 showing how we spent the money 
 Link to longer term strategy, planning, and policy development 
 Identify a few key priorities/results and consistently work towards them, 
we cannot be everything to everybody 
 Big government is over…  We are going to learn how to reallocate funds 
a lot better, and to do that we need to know what we do well, what we do 
OK, and what we do poorly 
 Comments on the requirement for solid leadership from headquarter, 
Senior Executives, Central Agencies, and Parliament 
 Comments related to direct costs to measure results: data collection, data 
analysts, performance management systems In government today, I do 
not think that we have the tools and systems to be Results-based.  And my 
experience with information systems (Finance, IT) is far from positive.  
 Comments on need to resolve difference between results of social 
programmes versus more process Programmes  
 I would love to be accountable for results – of course I need the 
resources to be able to achieve them.  That is certainly one problem 
today, the absence of this link 
 
Accountability  Accountability is a corner-stone of public service… we are always going 
to be accountability to the public 
 Results has at least the potential to help us move from a fixation on 
accountability for budges to incorporate outputs and outcomes… 
 I am very concerned about the current tendency to move back to what I 
would call a rules-based environment 
 Comments - results leads to improved accountability, the results speak 
for themselves 
 The pendulum of accountability is at an extreme again, I hope it swings 
back to the centre a bit 
 It is hard to see how you could be held accountable for outcomes given 
all of the other factors  
 There is a fundamental disconnect between values and ethics and 
excessive control infrastructure, e.g. when the ADM needs approval  for 
the expenditures for coffee and muffins for a (public service) conference 
 Accountability has to become bi-directional 
 The need to move away from micro-accountability and excessive ‘red-
tape’ to a focus on the compliance with administrative rules  
 We do need basic controls…. But, I am accountable to myself – to be able 
to look myself in the mirror… There is no system that can’t be broken… 
So, it’s all about personal values and ethics.  And I think that they’ve 
taken the wrong road here.  It’s frankly insulting sometimes….. 
Source: Compilation of interviews from all Case Studies 
